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Abstract 
The conflict research subdiscipline within international relations commonly 
distinguishes international conflict between nation-states from civil war within nation-
states. By regarding conflict research as a state-centric geopolitical discourse the thesis 
challenges this categorisation because (1) of the many links and therefore blurry practical 
distinction between the two, and (2) stateless nations can be involved in conflict with 
other nations, thus constituting an 'international' conflict. To overcome this problem an 
alternative, nation-centric critical geopolitics of international conflict is proposed. In this 
way the thesis aims to extend both conflict research and critical geopolitics. 
To do this the critique utilises recent literature on the contemporary 
conceptualisation of nation and nationalism to argue against the conventional conflation 
of nation and state and to reconstruct the adjective "international". Recognising that 
nations can exist without also being states enables the conceptualisation of international, 
and when such nations come into conflict, either with other stateless nations or nations 
that are states, this becomes ~international conflict'. This typology allows for 
conventional 'international' conflict, or rather inter-state conflict, by distinguishing 
between ethnic and official nations. 
The theoretical argument is reinforced by consideration of an empirical case 
study, that of the Kurds of the Middle East. The Kurds are presented as a distinct and 
unique stateless nation, the largest in the world, in conflict with the Persian (Iran), Arab 
(Iraq), and Turkish (Turkey) nations that surround them .. The case study is undertaken 
through analysis of the Kurds and their national homeland of Kurdistan at the local, 
Middle Eastern, and global scales, each demonstrating in different ways the divergence 
of nation and state and, in the case of the latter two discussions, an example of an 
international conflict. 
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Preface 
International conflict has, for as long as I can remember, been of special interest 
to me. I cannot pinpoint one reason, nor one event, in my formative years as the defining 
moment for this interest. But I suspect that my curiosity stems from that of my father, 
Al~n. As a teenager during the Second World War of 1939- 1945 he collected a weekly 
news publication called The War Illustrated, which was shipped from Britain to New 
Zealand. 
I well recall many childhood hours spent reading these volumes. Thus I learnt 
about Blitzkrieg, Dunkirk, the Phoney War, the Battle of Britain, Operation Barbarossa, 
Pearl Harbour, the Pacific War, Crete, El Alamein, the Italian Campaign, Operation 
Overlord and D-Day, the Battle of the Bulge, and Victory in Europe and Victory over 
Japan Days; not to mention the grand political figures of history, Sir Winston Churchill, 
Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin; the great commanders, 
Bernard Montgomery, Erwin Rommell, Douglas MacArthur; and finally the fighting 
machines, the Spitfire and Lancaster, the Panzer, Stuka, and Messerschmit, the Sherman, 
Mustang, and B-29: And all at a very young age. 
Before him, my grandfather, Benjamin Bayliss Mayell, was a private in the 15th 
North Auckland Regiment that fought in France in the First World War of 1914- 1918. 
He was wounded at Bapaume, on the Somme, on 24 August 1918 at the age of30. His 
brother, my great uncle, Charles Joseph Mayell, was also in France, a private with the 
New Zealand Rifle Brigade. He was killed in action at Flers, during the bloody Battle of 
the Somme, on 15 September 1916 at the age of24 (the age I will tum shortly after the 
completion of this thesis). His name appears on the list of soldiers with unknown graves 
at the Caterpillar Valley War Cemetery near Longueval, France. 
Later conflicts were also of interest to me. Various media .sources informed me 
about the United Nations' 'police action' in the Korean War of 1950 - 1953, of the 
escalating United States involvement and ultimate humiliation in Vietnam between 1964 
and 1975, of Vietnam's subsequent invasion of Cambodia in 1978, of the Soviet Union's 
invasion of Mghanistan in December 1979 and withdrawal in 1988, of the eight year war 
between Iran and Iraq starting in 1980, ofthe Falklands/Malvinas Islands War of April-
ix 
June 1982, of the US invasions of Grenada in October 1983 and Panama in December 
1989, of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Gulf War of 1990/91, and of 
the Bosnian and Rwandan conflicts .... 
Through the course of my final undergraduate and honours year this longstanding 
personal interest in international conflict has been transformed into a subject of great 
academic interest, which is codified in the present thesis. The inspiration for this 
particular topic came during one of my Political Science honours classes last year, in 
which it was stated that the confrontation between Tito's Partisans and the German army· 
during World War ·Two, in what became Yugoslavia after the war, was not an 
'international conflict' simply because the Partisans did not represent a state .. I thought 
this to be a rather incredulous claim. In this thesis I hope to convince you, the reader, of 
the validity of my reasons for thinking so, and of the legitimacy of my proposed 
alternative conceptualisation of 'international conflict' 
X 
Author's Note 
I would like to take this opportUnity to make some preliminary comments 
regarding this thesis' case study, the Kurds of the Middle East. First, I have been 
extremely fortunate in undertaking this research in 1996, for early in the year David 
McDowall's A modem history of the Kurds was published. This 470-page tour de force 
proved to be an extraordinarily valuable resource in constructing the three case study 
chapters. As one reviewer noted in regard to an earlier work, "'Few people know as 
much about the Kurds as David McDowall" Having read most of his latest offering, I 
have to agree wholeheartedly with this sentiment. On these grounds I defend myself if 
readers feel {McDowall 1996) appears a little too often in this work. It is purely and 
simply because this is far and away the most comprehensive and substantial publication 
on the Kurds. Thank goodness it was published this year and not next! 
Second, at the time of writing (October 1996) events in the Middle East over the 
past two months have given the Kurdish case study a highly topical dimension. In noting 
this development I do not suggest that the Kurds would otherwise have been a mere 
'historical' case study, however, for as long as the Kurdish situation remains unresolved 
the Kurds will always be 'topical'. These latest eventualities have not - as yet - been 
serious enough to warrant a late change in the chapter structure of this thesis, but they 
do provide a pertinent, up-to-the-minute means of concluding the case study material. 
For this reason contemporary events are described and analysed in the final chapter. 
Finally, I feel it necessary to declare my own personal position with regard to the 
Kurds. Although the Kurds are presented as an empirical case study to make my 
theoretical argument, and therefore I should maintain 'objectivity', the research process 
leads - indeed forces, I think - one to develop a considerable level of sympathy for the 
Kurdish plight and their cause. Unless one is especially thick skinned - which I suppose I 
am not - countless tales of forced deportations, the destruction of homes and villages, 
mass deportations, torture, executions, and even attack by chemical weapons that 
characterises Persian, Arab, and Turkish policies towards the Kurds cannot fail to have a 
major impact upon the reader. I therefore declare that, while the Kurdish case study is 
used to prove a point, I do hold a certain amount of compassion for the people that one 
Kurdish leader appropriately described as "the orphans of the international community''. 
"War is the continuation of politics by other means" 
Carl Von Clausewitz 
"What is life? Life is the nation. 
The individual must die anyway; 
But beyond the life of the individual, there is the nation" 
Adolf Hitler 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Proposing a critical geopolitics of 
international conflict 
"As (new) borders create the possibilities of (new) 
conflict and cooperation, so too do borders represent 
both the result and the source of conflict and 
cooperation. In this way, geography and politics are 
intimate, but not curious, bedfellows. These two types 
of situations underscore the longstanding link between 
domestic conflict and international conflict. If one takes 
the state as given, one can categorise most conflict into 
these two categories. If, however, one assumes a 
somewhat fluid state, this distinction becomes less 
apparent .... Kurdistan offers a clue to analysts". 
Michael Ward in The new geopolitics (1992:ix) 
2 
Conflict as contradiction 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 precipitated an immediate crisis in 
international relations. The United Nations Security Council rushed into emergency 
session, instantly condemning the attack and calling for Iraq's unconditional withdrawatl, 
and enforcing strict economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwaie. Almost as 
quickly the United States, led by President George Bush, set about forming an anti-Iraq 
coalition to force, militarily if necessary, Baghdad's armies out of Kuwait. For the next 
five and a half months Iraq's President Saddam Hussein defied the international 
community, leading the Security Council (SC) to authorise military action to evict Iraq3. 
This operation, undertaken by the United States (US) led multinational coalition under 
United Nations (UN) auspices, began on 16 January 199l't. The ensuing Gulf War was a 
short, one-sided affair, Iraq suffering a humiliating military defeat in just six weeks5• 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War the Kurds, a long repressed ethnic group living 
in Iraq's mountainous northern region known as Kurdistan, mounted an impromptu 
rebellion against the Arab6 government. For three weeks in March it appeared as though 
the Kurds might very well succeed in toppling Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Socialist 
regime. Baghdad's elite Republican Guard, however, had escaped the rout in Kuwait and 
unleashed a ferocious vengeance attack on the insolent Kurds. The lightly armed 
guerillas stood little chance against the Guard's modem weaponry, t.he shortlived 
Kurdish rebellion collapsed, and Baghdad inflicted a terrible retribution on the Kurds. 
But this second Iraqi act of aggression did not bring another round of SC Resolutions 
nor a renewed military offensive by the coalition. Rather, there came only muftled 
diplomatic protests from the SC and coalition governments. Unlike the government and 
people of Kuwait, the Kurds were to be left to fend fonhemselves. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (2 August 1990). 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 (6 August 1990), 665 (25 August 1990), and 
670 (25 September 1990). Today, more than six years later, these Resolutions are still in force 
against Iraq. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (29 November 1990). 
Known as Operation Desert Storm, the offensive operation that followed the initial, defensive 
build-up of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia, known as Operation 
Desert Shield. 
United States President Bush ordered a ceasefire on 28 February 1991, which was formalised in 
SC Resolution 687 (3 Aprill991). 
Throughout this thesis I use the term "Arab" to refer only to the Arabs of Iraq, and not to all 
Arabs, unless, of course, the context suggests otherwise. 
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The international community's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was 
therefore in sharp contrast to its reaction to Baghdad's attack on the Kurds. This 
divergence reveals the centricity of the nation-state in international relations: As a 
sovereign nation-state Kuwait is protected from such military action by international law. 
In particular, the UN Charter provides for collective security measures to be taken in 
defence of an aggrieved nation-state. The Kurds, on the other hand, do not live in their 
own nation-state of 'Kurdistan' but merely constitute an ethnic group residing in a 
geographic region within the nation-state of Iraq. As such the Kurds are subject only to 
Iraq's internal laws and are outside the purview of international law. Thus Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait was an illegal act of aggression, a conflict that threatened international peace 
and security; Baghdad's belligerence against the Kurds, in contrast, was entirely within 
the governments' rights as sovereign of Iraq and was thus a 'civil war' under Iraq's 
domestic jurisdiction. 
This seemingly straightforward, dichotomous situation was complicated, 
however, by two factors. First, the Kurd - Arab confrontation was never, in either cause 
or consequence, a . purely domestic event, but closely linked to and influential on 
international relations. For the Kurds were inspired into rebellion by Iraq's political 
instability following its Gulf War defeat and active encouragement from the victorious 
coalition governments. Even more telling were the effects of the Kurdish rebellion and 
Baghdad's suppression of it beyond Iraq's borders. In early April more than two million 
panic stricken Kurds began to flee Kurdistan in Iraq, seeking refuge from the Republican 
Guards' onslaught in neighbouring Iran and Turkey. The refugee crisis instantly involved 
the Tehran and Ankara governments in providing humanitarian assistance to the desolate 
Kurds. Live television coverage of the Kurds' desperate plight, as many thousands died 
of hunger and exposure on the high, snow covered mountain passes to safety, prompted 
public concern in Europe and America. This sympathy turned to outrage when it became 
evident that coalition governments, having encouraged the Kurds into rebellion in the 
first place, now refused to become involved in providing the Kurds with military 
protection and humanitarian relief. Public pressure eventually won the day, forcing the 
'big three' coalition governments - the US, Britain, and France - to launch a joint military 
- humanitarian operation, subsequently known as Operation Provide Comfort. The UN 
Security Council even passed Resolution 688, which not only referred to the Kurds by 
name but framed the refugee crisis as constituting a threat to international peace and 
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securj!Y in th~:rersian Gulf. In these important ways, therefore, this supposed 'civil war' 
came to look more like an 'international conflict'. This proposition, however, contradicts 
the distinction between 'international conflict' - conflict between two or more nation-
states - and 'civil war' - conflict within one nation-state - commonly made by the 
subdiscipline of international relations that studies political violence at this scale, namely 
conflict research. 
A second factor of the Kurd - Arab confrontation further contributes to the 
blurring of the line between 'international conflict' and 'civil war': The fact that the 
Kurds are much more than just an ethnic group. Indeed, on the grounds of contemporary 
research in a wide variety of disciplines the Kurds must be regarded as a distinct, 
separate, and unique nation, with its own ethnicity, language, culture, homeland, and 
way of life. The Arabs of Iraq, who control the state government, must similarly be 
adjudged to be a nation. Thus the Kurd - Arab confrontation of March - April 1991 
constituted a conflict between nations. As the prefix 'inter' means 'between' or 'among', 
then surely the rebellion and its suppression was an 'international' conflict, therefore 
exacerbating the haziness between conflict research's 'international conflict' (really 
interstate conflict) and 'civil war' (really intrastate. conflict). The assertion that the 
Kurds are a nation, however, contradicts international relations', and indeed conflict 
research's, conflation of nation and state into nation-state, the assumptions that only 
nations can be states and only states can be nations, and that all states are nation-states 
and thereby include only one nation within its boundaries. 
Thus the Kurdish rebellion, its Arab suppression, and the refugee crisis presents · 
two· contradictions: By blurring the distinction between 'international conflict' and 'civil 
war' and by undermining the nation-state concept. This thesis is an attempt to reconcile 
these two contradictions. 
As the first step in this endeavour this Introduction establishes the conceptual 
framework within which this thesis is undertaken. It is obvious from the above discussion 
that the nation-state concept lies at the very heart of international relations. For this 
reason the next section examines the nation-state in international relations and, of 
particular concern to this thesis, in the conflict research subdiscipline. The inherent 
spatiality of the nation-state, combined with its centrality in international relations and 
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conflict research, means that these must both be regarded as geopolitical discourses, 
which provides the link to political geography. The third section therefore outlines the 
concepts of geopolitics and discourse, and illustrates how conflict research is a nation-
state centric geopolitical discourse. But as such conflict research is open to critical 
investigation by a recent development within geopolitics, a field known as critical 
geopolitics. This critique centres on a challenge to the validity of the nation-state as the 
unit of analysis in conflict research and presents this thesis' argument of a critical 
geopolitics of international conflict. The main body of this research, outlined in this 
chapter's final section, develops and substantiates this argument by using a literature 
review of nation and nationalism studies to argue against the conflation of nation and 
state, and by utilising an expanded case study of the Kurds. While this thesis' main 
concern is to propose a critical geopolitics of international conflict as a means of 
reconciling the above contradictions, the methodology section also outlines a number of 
secondary objectives. 
The nation-state in international relations 
The term "nation-state" results from the equation and conflation of two distinct 
concepts, those, obviously, of "nation" and "state". First introduced into the English 
language in the thirteenth century CE, the noun "nation" is derived from the Latin verb 
"nasci ", meaning ''to be born", and the consequent noun "nationem ", connoting 
''breed" or "race" (Connor 1978:3 81; Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus 
1993:756; Taylor 1993: 194). Because of its direct association with unasci" and 
"nationem ", "nation" was closely comparable to the adjective "ethnic". This near 
synonymity was an entirely logical etymological extension, because "ethnic" is derived, 
via the French "ethnie ", from the Greek "ethnos", meaning "nation" in the "pristine 
sense of a group characterised by common descent" (Connor 1978:386). The nation, 
therefore, was a community defined by ethnic identity, often strengthened by common 
and unique linguistic and religious identities also. 
Over the next four centuries the noun "nation" was increasingly used to refer to 
the population of a country7, regardless of its "ethnic" composition (Williams 1976: 178). 
I dislike this tenn 'country' because of its blatant ambiguity. Does it mean the countryside of a 
state? Or does it mean the state territory as a whole, including (non-logically) urban areas? It is 
6 
This practice was clearly related to the rise in Europe of the political doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, which asserted the rights of nations to, using the modem term, self-
determination; to the establishment of their own territorial judicial unit known as the 
state. The state's boundaries would thus be determined by the spatial limits of that 
nation, to the inclusion of all members, or nationals, and to the exclusion of all non-
members, or non-nationals. The state government would be controlled by the political 
will of the nation through liberal democracy, hence the notion of 'government by the 
people for the people'. The ethnically defined nation therefore became the source of both 
the state's territoriality and political legitimacy: The nation and the state should be 
spatially congruous and only the nation's government had the right to exercise 
sovereignty over the nation's population and territory. Hence the equation of the nation 
and state concepts and their conflation into nation-state, an ideal form in which a single 
ethnically defined nation has expression as a distinct and unique political community in its 
own state. 
The entrenchment of the nation-state system in Europe from the mid-seventeenth 
century, when the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was signed, and its gradual spread via 
nineteenth century European colonialism around the globe led to the conviction that only 
· nations can be states and only states can be nations (G.B. Smith 1994:404). In turn, this 
assumption led to another, namely that all states are nation-states. As Taylor (1994: 156) 
notes, "In the twentieth century the nation-state has become ubiquitous. All states, 
whatever their cultural make-up, are assumed to be nation-states". With the concepts of 
nation and state thus totally conflated the extended noun "nationalism", by the time it 
entered common usage in the twentieth century, denoted individual (as citizens) and 
collective (as the nation) loyalty to the(ir) state (Connor 1978:386). 
The term 'international relations' refers to both the empirical relations between 
nation-states and inter-governmental organisations such as the European Union and the 
United Nations (the 'real world' of global politics) and the theoretical examination and 
explanation of those relations undertaken by scholars within the academic discipline. 
These two interrelated aspects are respectively categorised here as practical and formal 
international relations. Key texts in the academic discipline include those by Deutsch 
often used as a synonym for state. but it is in my mind wholly inappropriate because of its 
ambiguity. For this reason I refrain from nsing this term throughout this thesis. It is used here 
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(1979), Halle (1962), Keohane and Nye (1989), Morgenthau (1985), Rustow (1967), 
Stoessinger (1990, 1993), and Yost (1968). The equation of nation and state, their 
conflation into nation-state, the assumptions that only nations can be states and vice 
versa, and that all states are nation-states are all common in the international relations 
literature. Consider the following illustrative examples. 
The equating of nation and state is evident in their widespread interutilisation 
and, given that formal international relations (IR.) focuses on the behaviour of and 
relations between states, especially in the use of "nation" when referring to "state" · (or 
rather "nation-state"). The titles of major IR. texts, and the number of editions of some of 
them, highlights this practice. For instance: A world of nations (Rustow 1967); Politics 
among nations (Morgenthau 1985, Sixth Edition); The might of nations (Stoessinger 
1991, Ninth Edition); Nations and men (Duchacek 1971); How nations behave (Henkin 
1979, Second Edition); Why nations go to war (Stoessinger 1993, Sixth Edition); Tides 
among nations (Deutsch 1979); and Games nations play (Spanier 1990, Seventh 
Edition). 
The universal conflation of nation and state into nation-state is also dominant in 
IR. texts: For example, Halle (1962: 10) asserts that "a prime fact about the world is that 
it is composed of nation-states". Similarly, Stoessinger (1991:6) writes that "Our world 
is made up of over one hundred and sixty political units called nation-states". These 
quotes also demonstrate the assumption that all states of the world are nation-states, 
thereby reinforcing the conviction that only nations can be states and vice versa, thus 
further contributing to the equating of nation and state. The nation-state, therefore, 
undoubtedly lies at the_ very heart offormal i~terna#Qnal relations,, which both reflects 
and reinforces its centricity in practical international relations. Indeed, as Nietschmann 
(1993:25) claims, "Almost all academic analysis (formal IR.) and state and international 
policies (practical IR.) are based on (the perception of a) world of states". 
The subdiscipline of formal international relations with which this thesis is 
concerned, namely conflict research, has essentially developed since the end of the 
Second World War. Conflict research (CR) analyses many facets of international 
conflicts; including, inter alia, their context, actors, sources, issues, management, and 
only because it was the term used in the source materiaL 
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outcome. The intellectual father of conflict research is generally considered to be Johann 
Galtung (1975; 1989). Presently John Burton (1969, 1986), Louis Kriesberg (1982, 
1989), Chris Mitchell (1981, 1996), Dean Pruitt. (1985, 1989), Jeffrey Rubin (1981, 
[with Bercovitch] 1992), Saadia Touval (1982, [with Zartman] 1985), and William 
Zartman (1982, 1994) are regarded as leading contemporary scholars. Conflict research 
maintains (and thereby strengthens) the centricity of the nation-state in the broader IR 
discipline by distinguishing international conflict between two or more nation-states from 
civil war within a nation-state. 
Evidence of this distinction literally pours out of conflict research's statistical 
databases, which are used for the scientific evaluation of a vast number of case studies in 
search of general conditions for the successful (and unsuccessful) conflict management 
and resolution techniques ( eg, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, peace -keeping, 
-building, and -making). For these databases focus almost exclusively on conflict between 
nation-states, thus de-emphasising (and in some cases completely omitting) conflict 
within nation-states. Several examples illustrate this point. First and foremost is J. David 
Singer's Correlates of War (COW) database, by far the largest and most comprehensive 
of all, whose 'targets' - that is the actors in international conflict - are "nation-state 
members of the international system" (Cioffi-Revilla 1989:20; see also Singer and Small 
1973 and Singer and Diehl 1990). The International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) dataset, 
developed by Michael Brecher, also uses the nation-state as its unit of analysis (Cioffi-
Revilla 1989:22), as does Jack Levy's database on great power wars (Cioffi-Revilla 
1989:24). Two other databases, those developed by Robert Butterworth (1976) and J. 
David Singer and Melvin Small (1982), deserve mention for these move, at least partly, 
beyond the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Butterworth's dataset includes civil wars 
that have escalated to involve a neighbouring nation-state in the conflict. Singer and 
Small have gone a step further by establishing a separate database for civil wars. Despite 
this movement the nation-state undoubtedly remains the central focus of formal 
international relations and conflict research. 
Conflict research as geopolitical discourse 
Implicit in the above discussion is the idea of international relations, and therefore 
also conflict research, as a geopolitical discourse. This section outlines the concepts of 
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geopolitics and discourse to demonstrate what is meant by 'geopolitical discourse', 
illustrates how IR/CR is indeed a geopolitical discourse, and identifies how its 
'geopolitics' serves to determine its field of study. The explanation of international 
relations and conflict research as a geopolitical discourse provides the link with political 
geography and, more specifically, with a new development within this subdiscipline of 
geography, namely critical geopolitics. 
The field of geopolitics has a long tradition, dating back to the turn of the century 
work by two of political geography's 'founding fathers', Britain's Sir Halford Mackinder 
(1890; 1904) and Germany's Friedrich Ratzel (1969)8• Later, in the 1930's and '40s, 
German Karl Haushofer's geopolitik was a somewhat different but nevertheless 
associated variant. In the post-Second World War period geopolitics suffered 
enormously as a result of geopolitik 's perceived close association with Nazism (Perry 
1995). Although geopolitics recovered somewhat in the 1970s and '80s, it is only now, 
in the last decade of the twentieth century, that geopolitics is making a strong comeback 
from this 'guilt by association' (Ward 1992). As shall be discussed shortly it is 'critical 
geopolitics' that is leading this resurgence. 
Despite this long history 'geopolitics' has been, and indeed remains, 
extraordinarily difficult to define (O'Tuathail 1994b:314). "In conventional academic 
understanding", however, "geopolitics concerns the geography of international politics, 
particularly the relationship between the physical environment (location, resources, 
territory, etc) and the conduct of foreign policy" (O'Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 191). 
Agnew and Corbridge (1995:3) go a step further, and claim that: 
"In its most common usage geopolitics refers to a fixed and 
objective geography constraining and directing the activities of 
states. For example, fixed geographical features of the world, 
such as the disposition of states in relation to the distribution of 
the continents and oceans .... are seen as determining or strongly 
conditioning the strategic possibilities and limits of particular 
states". 
Geography's influence on the foreign policy of nation-states, therefore, is 
constant through time but, because nation-states occupy different and mutually exclusive 
8 Obviously 1969 is not the tum of the century, but this reprint ofRatzel's The laws of the spatial 
growth of states does not cite the original publication date. I am unsure of its first exact date, 
but I am sure it was around the late 1890s/1900s. 
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space, it varies spatially. Geopolitics, however, holds that this spatial variation has the 
same effect on a nation-state's foreign policy: Thus the influence of the sea, for example, 
on a coastal nation-state is the same the world over, as is the influence of being a 
landlocked nation-state. Indeed, for Mackinder (1890) and Ratzel (1969) geopolitics' 
central argument was that a nation-state's geographical location was the most important 
factor in determining not only that nation-state's foreign policy but its very destiny. 
Similarly, Haushofer asserted that geopolitik demonstrated ''the dependence of all 
political events on the enduring conditions of the physical environment" {Bassin 
1987:120). 
So even though geopolitics is specific to each nation-state, because of its own 
unique location, resources, territory, etc, it is held to be an objective form of analysis. As 
O'Tuathail and Agnew explain: 
"By its own understandings and terms geopolitics is taken to be a domain 
of hard truths, material realities, and irrepressible natural facts. 
Geopoliticians have traded on the supposed objective materialism of 
geopolitical analysis .... (which is held to be) impartial as between one or 
another political system or philosophy. (Geopolitics) addresses the base of 
international politics, the permanent geopolitical realities around which 
the play of events in international politics unfolds. These geopolitical 
realities are held to be durable, physical determinants of foreign policy. 
Geography, in such a scheme, is held to be a non - discursive 
phenomenon: it is separate from the social, political, and ideological 
dimensions of international politics". 
The concept of geography influencing the foreign policy of nation-states means 
that political elites and their foreign policy professionals are able to define their own 
nation-state's geopolitical 'place' - and perceive those of other nation-states- within the 
world system. Thus geopolitics is also the mapping of global political space, the 
spatialisation of international relations. This cartography is produced and disseminated by 
political elites and their diplomatic fraternity and are reinforced, inter alia, by the mass 
media, educational institutions, and academic think-tanks. O'Tuathail (1994a:535, 542) 
refers to these as "sites" of production and dissemination of geopolitical knowledge. The 
construction and perpetuation of a nation-state's geopolitics establishes a geopolitical 
discourse. 
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The term 'discourse', like geopolitics, is difficult to define, so there are myriad 
variations (Gregory 1994:136 - 37). In their argument about discourses in political 
geography, however, O'Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 192- 93) assert that: 
"discourses are best conceptualised as sets of capabilities .... used by 
people in the construction of meaning about their world and their 
activities. (Discourses are) NOT simply speech or written statements but 
the social rules by which verbal speech and written statements are made 
meaningful. Discourses enable one to write, speak, listen, and act 
meaningfully. They are a set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which 
(social agents) are able to take what they hear and read and construct it 
into an organised meaningful whole". 
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, a geopolitical discourse is a set of 
socially constructed, embedded rules by which practitioners and scholars map global 
political space and spatialise international relations in order to practice, analyse, describe, 
and explain international political events, and how such phenomena relate to global 
geopolitics in general but more specifically to the geopolitics of their own nation-state. A 
geopolitical discourse is thus employed by professionals and academics as a tool for 
understanding and representing practical and formal international relations. 
The centricity of the nation-state in international. relations and conflict research 
means that both must be recognised as geopolitical discourses. For as an inherently 
spatial concept the nation-state provides the boundaries with which international 
relations, and indeed political geography, maps global political space (Map 1: 1 ). This 
nation-state centric geopolitics is crucial in formal international relations, for as Agnew 
and Corbridge (1995:78; emphasis added) explain: 
"It has been the geographical division of the world into mutually 
exclusive territorial states that has served to define the field of 
study. Indeed, the term 'international relations' implies an 
emphasis on the relations between territorial states in 
contradistinction to processes going on within state territorial 
boundaries". 
Thus formal international relations distinguishes its area of concern in accordance 
with its geopolitical map of the world. So too does the subdiscipline of conflict research, 
for as we saw above CR defines its specific topic of international conflict as conflict 
between nation-states. Hence conflict research's nation-state centric map of political 
space exerts a profound influence on which conflicts are included on conflict research 
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databases and which conflicts are excluded. The entire conflict research epistemology 
and results, therefore, rests heavily on its nation-state centric geopolitical discourse. 
Ma 1:1 
§ 
"' 
Source: BYU 1991. 
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A critical geopolitics of international conflict 
The conceptualisation of international relations as a geopolitical discourse has 
provided the impetus for the emergence over recent years of a new 'critical geopolitics' 
field within political geography (eg, Dalby 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993; Dodds and Sidaway 
1994; Luke 1994; O'Tmi.thail 1992, 1994a, 1994b; O'Tuathail 1992; O'Tuathail and 
Dalby 1994; Sidaway 1994). In contradiction to its geopolitics predecessor, which 
viewed geography as an objective, fixed, and apolitical influence on geopolitical 
discourses, critical geopolitics argues that geography is a highly subjective, continually 
changing, and overtly political modifier of geopolitics. O'Tuathail and Agnew 
(1992: 192), for example, argue that: 
"The great irony of geopolitical writing, however, is that it was always a 
highly ideological and deeply politicised form of analysis. Geopolitical 
theory .... was never an objective and disinterested activity". 
Critical geopolitics, therefore, contends that: 
"Geography is a social and historical discourse which is always intimately 
bound up with questions of politics and ideology. Geography is never a 
natural, non - discursive phenomenon which is separate from ideology and 
outside politics. Rather, geography as a ·discourse is a form of 
power/knowledge itself'. 
The conceptualisation of geography as a social and historical discourse challenges 
conventional geopolitics because it enables critical geopolitics to recognise and explore 
spatial arid temporal variations in the geopolitics of nation-states, thus undermining the 
supposed objectivity and universality of geopolitical analysis. Thus geopolitics is now 
seen by the critical geopolitics literature as time and place specific; geopolitics is a 
socially constructed discourse and therefore unique to each nation-state. There may be 
some, even many, common geopolitical perceptions among diffe~ent nation-states9, but in 
its entirety a nation-state's geopolitics is all its own. Hence there exists an 'American 
geopolitics', a 'Sovietology', and yes, even a ''Kiwi geopolitics" (Dalby 1993). 
Recognising geopolitical discourses as time and place specific enables critical 
geopolitics to subject them to "rigorous problematisation and investigation" (O'Tuathail 
1994a:526, 527), to expose and explore the ways in which geopolitical discourses are 
constructed and perpetuated by geopolitical sites of production and dissemination. One 
9 For example, as between the US and its West European allies during the Cold War. 
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of the most important means by which critical geopolitics undertakes the critique of 
geopolitical discourses is to use post-structural linguistics. This movement, which 
originated in France during the 1960s following critiques of linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure'sstructuralism, argues that there is an inherent and considerable tension in the 
sign between the signifier (a written or spoken word) and that which is signified (the 
action, concept, or object, etc that a signifier refers to). Thus the relationship between 
signified and signifier is not necessarily permanent nor stable, that the friction between 
them will inevitably have temporal and spatial variations (Eagleton 1983; O'Tuathail 
1994a). Critical geopolitics applies these lessons to spatial concepts and references 
common in geopolitical discourses in order to pushlpu111stretch them ''beyond the limits 
of their declared meaning" (O'Tuathai11994a:536). This technique seeks to expose how 
conservative foreign policy elites, as the most important sites of geopolitical production 
and dissemination, spatialise international relations (Dodds and Sidaway 1994:518). In 
this way, therefore, critical geopolitics is ''a question not an answer, an approach not a 
theory" (O'Tuathail 1994a:526). And it is this approach that is used in this chapter to 
propose a critical geopolitics of conflict research's conceptualisation of 'international 
conflict'. 
This critique centres on a challenge to conflict research', and therefore also 
international relations', use of the nation-state as its unit of analysis. This approach is not 
in itself a new one. Giddens (1985:31), for example, condemns IR's division between 
what goes on within nation-states and what goes on between them as ·''unfortunate and 
indefensible", and argues that 
''Theorists of international relations, relatively unconcerned with 
what goes on inside states, tend to underestimate the significance 
of internal struggles that influence external policies. Everyone 
acknowledges that to treat a state as an actor is a simplifying 
notion, designed to help make sense of the complexities of the 
relations between states. But what is only a theoretical model is 
all too often given a real significance" (Giddens 1985:288). 
O'Tuathail (1994a:537) argues against the use of the nation-state on the grounds of its 
non-universality: That the nation-state is "a norm (of international relations) built around 
an idealised reading of the histories of certain European states", and therefore not 
automatically applicable to other parts ofthe world. 
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In this discussion, and indeed in this thesis, I aim to further this critique of the 
nation-state as the unit of analysis in international relations by arguing for the complete 
separation of nation and state on the grounds that they are, in fact, two distinct concepts. 
Moreover, I will also extend this challenge by applying it to one specific branch of IR, 
obviously conflict research. The remainder of this section, therefore, outlines my 
reasoning for challenging the nation-state concept and then applies this argument to 
conflict research. 
We have seen above that international relations commonly equates nation and 
state, con:flates the two concepts into nation-state, thus interutilises the three. terms, 
assumes that only nations can be states and vice versa, and that all states are nation-
states. It is my argument that all of these practices and convictions are erroneous: That 
nation and state are not one and the same, that their interutilisation is incorrect, that 
nations can exist without being states and vice versa, and that only a few states are in 
fact nation-states. These assertions are based on the following line of argument. 
As previously discussed the term "nation" refers, first and foremost, to an ethnic 
community related. by common descent. This relationship means that there are 5 000 
nations in the world today, for this is the number of distinct ethnic groups (Carment 
1993: 137; Nietschmann 1993:25). This number emphatically rejects that equating of 
nation and state, for there are only around 200 states in the contemporary .world: A ratio 
of 25 to one. As not all ethnic groups can be regarded as p.ations10, however, the 
divergence between nation and state is not as drastic as this statistic suggests. 
Nevertheless, two surveys of the world's states still reveal the erroneous equation of 
nation and state. The first of these surveys (Connor 1972:320; emphasis original) found 
that: 
10 
''Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 percent) can 
be described as essentially homogenous from an ethnic point of 
view. An additional 25 states (18.9 percent) contain an ethnic 
group accounting for more than 90 percent of the state's total 
population, and in still another 25 states the largest element 
accounts for between 75 and 89 percent of the population. But in 
31 states (23. 5 percent), the largest ethnic element represents 
only 50 to 74 percent of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5 
· percent) the largest group fails to account for even half of the 
state's population. Moreover, this portrait of ethnic diversity 
The difference between an ethnic group and a nation is discussed in Chapter Two. 
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becomes more vivid when the number of distinct ethnic groups 
within states is considered. In some instances, the number of 
groups within a state runs into the hundreds, and in 53 states 
(40.2 percent), the population is divided into more than five 
significant groups". · 
Similarly Nielsson (1985:33; emphasis original) surveyed 164 states, his findings 
revealing that "the conventional concept of the nation-state fits only one-fourth (45) of 
the members of the global state system"11• This overwhelming divergence between the 
number of nations and states categorically demonstrates the demand for the separation of 
the nation and state concepts, and consequently rejects their conflation into nation-state 
and the assumptions that only nations can be states and vice versa, and that all states are 
nation-states. 
The recent establishment of civil war databases, a recognition that civil wars can 
and do have international dimensions which can and do threaten international peace and 
security. For example, such conflicts are capable of spreading across international 
boundaries; a second state may provide covert military, financial, and logistical support 
to one or another party to the conflict; or indeed may openly intervene with its own 
· forces (Small and Singer 1982). While this concession· is significant, I believe that it does 
not go far enough, for two reasons. First the fact that 'civil wars' are included on 
separate, and not incorporated into existing 'international conflict' databases, 
demonstrates that this categorisation will be maintained. It may even be intensified, for in 
this typology 'civil wars' are considered to become of real salience if and only if they 
transgress international boundaries and/or involve the government of a second nation-
state. Second, and as a consequence of the first, IR' s/CR' s nation-state centric map of 
global politics is/will be even further entrenched, thus continuing to deny local political 
geographies. 
11 Nielsson defined a nation-state as a state where 95 percent or more of the population were from 
the same ethnic group, thus allowing for a minority group of up to 5 percent of the total 
population. Had he employed a more strict interpretation of 'nation-state', as Connor has done, 
Nielsson would undoubtedly have come up with a somewhat smaller figure. 
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Thesis methodology and objectives 
From the above outline of my argument for a reconceptualised 'international' 
conflict it is obvious that the meaning of nation and nationalism is crucial. If the nation is 
not simply the population of a state, and nationalism is not the loyalty of that population 
to the state, then what, exactly, is the nation and nationalism? This fundamental question 
is answered in Chapter Two, which uses an extensive literature review of nation(alism) 
studies to present an understanding of the contemporary conceptualisation of nation and 
nationalism. This chapter's general argument is that the nation is a distinct political 
community with a common sense ·of identity that, via the political doctrine of 
nationalism; seeks fulfilment through political expression in the nation-state. In this 
regard the nation and the state are undeniably linked, but they are certainly not one and 
the same. Moreover, this discussion will distinguish between two main types of nation 
and nationalism; those nations that are states and those nations that are not states. From 
this literature review I will re-sign the meaning attached to the central concepts of nation 
and nationalism to emphasise their distinctiveness from IR' s and CR' s traditional usage, 
which also enables the deconstruction of the adjective 'international' into 'international'. 
From here it is possible, in theoretical terms, to conceive of 'international' conflict 
regardless of whether the nations involved are states or not. Chapter Two concludes by 
linking the structure of its preceding discussion to the empirical Kurdish case study 
which follows in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. 
These three . chapters are organised according to an increasing gradation of 
geographic scale. Thus Chapter Three starts at the local scale by introducing. the Kurds 
and Kurdistan in a regional geography that explains the main facets of Kurdish national 
identity. While these dimensions bring Kurds together, one doffiinant aspect of the 
regional geography of Kurdistan keeps them apart: The division of the Kurds and 
Kurdistan into no less than six states, the great majority of their population and the vast 
proportion of the territory partitioned between Iran, Iraq, and 'turkey. For this reason 
Chapter Three provides three mini regional geographies of the Kurds Kurdistan in these 
three states, and identifies the ethnic, religious, and linguistic similarities and differences 
betwe.en the Kurds and the Persians, Arabs, and Turks. This final section therefore 
necessitates an increase in geographic scale to allow the analysis of the Kurds in Iran, 
Iraq, and Turkey. 
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Chapter Four analyses the actual international conflict in Kurdistan that has 
continued virtually unabated since the late nineteenth centuty. This discussion also traces 
the development of the Kurds from an ethnic group into a nation through three stages. 
Of tribal, party, and finally popular nationalism. The purpose of this dialogue is to 
provide a strong example of an international conflict which conflict research would 
inappropriately ·categorise as a, or rather three, civil wars; but as Chapter Four will 
illustrate the ·conflict in Kurdistan is much more than just a 'civil war'. 
Chapter Five increases the scale once more to the global, and analyses the Kurds' 
role in global geopolitics throughout the twentieth centuty. This discussion demonstrates 
that the state is not a container and that the three 'civil wars' are not only related to each 
other but also to global scale geopolitical events. Moreover, Chapter Five will also 
· illustrate . that the Kurds liave consistently been exploited by foreign powers for the 
latter's own much broader geopolitical purposes. In doing this, however, foreign 
governments have offered a consistent, if implicit, recognition of the differences between 
nation and state. 
Apart from developing the above argument for a reconceptualised intt:(rnational 
conflict, far and away this study's most important objective, this thesis has a number of 
secondary goals. First and foremost amongst these is to extend, albeit in a small way, the 
growing critical geopolitics literature. I seek to do this. by exploring and contesting a 
specific area of formal international relations which, as far as I am aware, has not yet 
been subjected to critical geopolitical analysis. I hope, therefore, to make my ow,n small 
contribution to the revival of geopolitics, and hence also to political geography as a 
whole. 
Because of the interdisciplinary nature of critical geopolitics, this thesis has a 
.. number of objectives that relate to aspects of disciplines perhaps hitherto untouched by 
political geographers but recently of increasing interest. For example, I hope. to extend 
post-structural linguistics by arguing that the adjective 'international' does not have to 
signif)r 'inter - nation-state' of even 'inter-state', but that it can be read as 'international'. 
Although other authors (eg, Connor 1978; Taylor 1995) have recognised that 
'international' conventionally denotes 'inter - nation-state' or 'inter-state', I believe my 
signing is original and, in the context of this thesis, wholly appropriate. This thesis also 
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aims to extend post-colonial studies by going outside the traditional, over-worked 
(boring!) European and North American case studies of nation and nationalism (eg, 
Canavan 1996; Keating 1995; Penrose 1991) and using the Kurds of the Middle East as 
the empirical weight behind my theoretical argument. Again, the examination of the 
Kurdish nation and of Kurdish nationalism is not in itself unprecedented ( eg, Entessar 
1992; Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992; Chaliand 1993; McDowalll996), but this particular 
case study does use previous material in an original manner for my own unique purposes. 
And in this sense this thesis makes an infinitesimal contn'bution, given the enormity of 
this literature, to what I have here called nation( alism) studies. 
Finally, this thesis also has the secondary objective of bringing a political 
geography perspective to the conceptualisation of international conflict in what I hope is 
a credible critique of conflict research. I wish to reiterate that this is a constructive . 
critique; this thesis does not deny that 'international conflict' does indeed occur between 
states, but extends this conceptualisation to include conflict between all nations, 
regardless of whether they are states or not. In this respect I hope to offer something to 
conflict research, and perhaps even to international relations in general. I thus intend this 
thesis to provide a bridge linking what in my experience, given their undoubted and 
considerable interrelationships, are two unnecessarily disparate disciplines. 

Chapter Two 
Nation, nationalism, and 
international conflict 
"The geopolitical location of communities (and relations 
with) their neighbours often help to activate a sense of 
ethnicity among members. Relations of alliance and 
conflict help to sharpen a feeling of self-differentiation 
between communities involved in these political 
relations over a long period ... .It is not society or 
ethnicity that determines war, but conflict itself which 
determines the sense and shape of ethnicity. War may 
not create the original cultural differences, but it 
sharpens and politicises them, turning what previously . 
were 'ethnic categories' into genuine integrated 
(nations), aware of their identities and destinies". 
Anthony D. Smith in The ethnic origins of nations (1986:39). 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the nation and nationalism literature as a 
means of reconceptualising international conflict. This objective will be achieved by 
exploring the contemporary conceptualisations of nation(alism) in the recent research 
literature outlined in Chapter One. I shall begin with a general discussion of the 
difficulties in evaluating this subject, of which the subjectivity ofnation(alism) is the most 
problematic. After this, three common themes found in this research (territory and 
resources, ethnicity and culture, and historical geography) ·are highlighted in order to 
develop an initial three dimensional typology of the modem nation. 
These three themes, however, do not categorically distinguish the nation from an 
ethnic community, a vital distinction to make. To overcome this problem a fourth theme 
is added to the above typology, that of political community. This fourth dimension not 
only separates. a nation from an ethnic community, but also provides the link with the 
political doctrine of nationalism. This dogma demands the fulfilment of the principle of 
self~determination, which nationalism claims is a nation's 'natural right'. In a world in 
which all territory (except perhaps Antarctica) is claimed by one state or another - and 
sometimes by more than one - contemporary nationalism clearly amounts to calls for 
secession from existing states, and as such are strongly resisted by state governments. · 
This schema alludes to the distinction between two types of nation(alism)s, namely those 
that have states, or official nation(alism)s, and those without states, or ethnic 
nation(alism)s. 
Reconceptualising international conflict as conflict between nations, regardless of 
whether they have their own state or not, enables a nation centric, as opposed to conflict 
research's state centric, conceptualisation of international conflict. This alternative thesis 
perceives the nation in accordance with its contemporary conceptualisation outlined in 
.· the nation(alism) studies literature review, and not just as the population of a state. It 
perceives nationalism as a political doctrine which demonstrates loyalty to the nation, 
and not allegiance to the state; and it perceives 'international' as an adjective signifying 
relations between nations, interactions not dependent on statehood. Thus by relaxing, 
even removing, the state centric assumptions of international relations/conflict research I 
propose a reconceptualised international conflict in order to develop a critical geopolitics 
of international conflict. 
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This chapter also provides the analytical framework for evaluating the Kurdish 
case study which follows. The three dimensional typology of the modem nation, for 
example, corresponds to the regional geography of Kurdistan presented in Chapter 
Three. The fourth dimension of political community and the political doctrine of 
nationalism match the discussion of the international conflict between the Persian, Arab, 
and Turkish official nations and the Kurdish ethnic nation undertaken in Chapter Four. 
Finally, the idea of a nation centric geopolitical discourse is tied to Chapter Five's 
dialogue on the role of the Kurdish nation in the global geopolitical discourses of 
colonialism, Cold War, and, presently, in what I tentatively call the 'rogue state' 
doctrine. 
A review of nation(alism) studies 
Before commencing this literature review in earnest, I think it is useful to offer a 
brief summary of nation(alism) studies' conceptualisation of nation and nationalism, in 
order to provide the reader a road-map with which to negotiate the terrain ahead. The 
following discussion is structured around six main themes that run through the literature. 
The first three of these refer to the internal dimensions of the nation, which are: 
(1) the psychological, emotive attachment of a people to a 
specific territory through prolonged occupation, resource use, 
and the projection of history onto this territory, which becomes a 
'national homeland'; · 
(2) the adherence of a vast majority of a unique and ethnically 
distinct people to its own language, religion, customs, arts and 
music, etc., collectively known as culture, which commands the. 
everyday life of the individual and the group; and 
(3) the universal awareness of the major historical events which 
have shaped all of the above facets of the nation. 
While these themes go a long way to enabling a good conceptualisation of the 
nation, they do not specifically distinguish the nation from other human collectives, ·for 
example ethnic groups, which may also share the above traits. _What makes a nation 
distinct is encapsulated in the fourth theme of the nation(alism) literature: 
( 4) the establishment of a people as a distinct and unique political 
community, through the rise of an integrated economy with a 
single division of labour, a common oral and written lingua 
franca, a unified, organised religion, a mass, public culture, and 
the emergence of broad based political parties. 
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The fifth theme explains the phenomenon of nationalism as the political doctrine 
which drives the transformation from ethnic to political community, to nationhood status. 
This theme claims that nationalism: 
(5) emphasises a people's common ethnicity to unite, politicise, 
and mobilise the nation to achieve the ultimate objective of self-
determination in the nation's own state. 
My interpretation of this literature leads me to conclude that nationalism creates 
the nation, and therefore that it is the political doctrine of nationalism which distinguishes 
the nation. For this reason I reiterate my argument of conceptualising nation and 
nationalism as nation(alism). 
I noted in the Introduction to this chapter that in today' s world in which all 
·territory is claimed by at least (and sometimes more) state. It is therefore necessary to 
distinguish between nations and nationalisms which are states and those which are not. 
This distinction is evident in one final theme in the nation(alism) literature: 
( 6) the nationalism of a nation which has achieved statehood is 
described as official nationalism (and thus the nation is an official 
nation), while the nationalism of a nation which has not achieved 
statehood is described as ethnic nationalism (and thus the nation 
is an ethnic nation). 
These six themes correspond to the structure of the following discussion: The 
first three themes are expanded on in 'A three dimensional typology of the nation'; the 
fourth is examined in 'Adding a fourth dimension: Distinguishing nation from ethnie'; the 
fifth in 'The political doctrine of nationalism'; and the sixth in 'Official and/versus ethnic . 
nations'. But first, some introductory comments on the subject and subjectivity of 
nation(alism). 
The subject(ivity) of nation( a/ism) 
An array of difficulties present themselves when attempting to discuss briefly yet 
comprehensively the body of literature that I have collectively labelled 'nation(alism) 
studies'. The first and perhaps most serious problem is the sheer volume of this research, 
which makes it very difficult to cover exhaustively. Moreover, these writings include · 
leading contributions from a vast range of academic disciplines including, inter alia, 
anthropology (eg, Eriksen 1993), geography (eg, Jackson and Penrose 1993), history 
(eg, Hobsbawm 1990), philosophy (eg, Gellner 1983), politics (eg, Kellas 1991), 
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sociology (eg, AD. Smith 1986) and an array of sub- and inter- disciplinary works. Such 
diversity complicates research enormously, for the material is organised horizontally 
across these disciplines, not vertically under its own heading. 
The great diversity of researchers interested in nation( alism) reflects the 
multifaceted character of the two concepts. For both "nation" and "nationalism" are 
simultaneously cultural, social, and political references (Connor 1990a:98; lgnatieff 
1993:5; Jackson and Penrose 1993:1). As a consequence nation(alism) can be an 
extraordinarily subjective and situated phenomenon, giving it considerable spatial and 
temporal variation: Nation(alism)'s meaning is not the same in all places at one time nor 
th(l same at one place through time. The subjectivity and geographical variability of 
nation(alism) means that there is no universally accepted definition of either, just a 
plethora of possibilities for both. 
These difficulties, however considerable they may appear, can be overcome. The 
mountainous research material problem is mitigated by focussing on several key themes -
outlined above and examined fully below - that emerge in the literature, for example in 
works by B. Anderson (1983), Bhabha (1990), Breuilty (1994), Connor (1972, 1978, 
1990a, 1990b), Diamond and Plattner (1994), Eriksen (1993), Gellner (1983, 1994), 
Hobsbawm (1990), Ignatieff (1993), Johnston, Knight, and Kofman (1988), Keating 
(1996) Kedourie (1990), Kellas (1991), Me~dwell (1989), R. Pearson (1993), Penrose 
' (1990, 1994), Penrose and May (1991), Renan (1990), Rogowski (1985), Ryan (1990, 
1995), A.D. Smith (1971, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), Stokes (1993), 
Tiryakian and Nevitte (1985) and Williams and Kofman {1989). This list also negates the 
interdisciplinary problem, for these authors provide a reasonably comprehensive 
coverage of the numerous academic disciplines involved in nation(alism) studies. 
The wide variety of perspectives included in the literature reviewed also enables 
the problem of nation(alism)'s multi-dimensional character ·to be _simplified. With these 
works focussing on different but interrelated aspects of the nation( alism) phenomenon, 
one gets a substantive overall impression of its contemporary conceptualisation. From 
this picture it is possible to develop a general but sufficient understanding of 
nation(alism) that is employed not only in this chapter but for the remainder of this thesis. 
In tum, this schema alleviates the problem of 'defining' nation and nationalism. With no 
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such delusion of grandeur I do not attempt to propose universal definitions of this 
subjective and therefore highly variable phenomena. Rather, I present a typology of 
nation(alism) as a useful representation of the common themes that run through the 
literature. 
One such theme is highly pertinent at this point, for it enables the 'objective', 
common traits of collective nation(alism)s to be reconciled with the subjective, unique 
characteristics of individual nation( alism)s. This theme is best represented by AD. 
Smith's (1982: 149 - 51) "core doctrine" of nation(alism) and "secondary theories" of 
nation(alism). A close parallel can also be drawn with Penrose's (1994: 195) "general 
category" ofnation(alism)s and "specific" nation(alism)s. 
Whatever the nomenclature, it is essential to note that these are not distinct, 
mutually exclusive polities incorporating different aspects of the nation( alism) 
phenomenon. Far from it, in fact, because nation(alism) utilises a subjective interpretation 
of "core doctrine" dimensions to construct and perpetuate itself. The most famous 
treatise on the subjectivity of nation(alism) is undoubtedly Benedict Anderson's (1983) 
"imagined community" thesis. Anderson argues that the nation is an imagined 
community, and therefore, again, highly subjective, for four reasons: 
(1) individual's imagine themselves and their lives to be part of a 
much larger community; 
(2) that community is imagined as spatially bounded by finite but 
elastic boundaries, within which is their nation and beyond which 
is other nations; 
(3) within its own territory the nation is imagined as the only 
legitimate sovereign, and thus a nation's ultimate objective is its 
own nation-state; and 
(4) it is an imagined community, based on an historical territory, 
a common culture, and a shared sense of origin and destiny, 
which commands the complete loyalty of its members, 
transcending other social identities. 
Anderson's imagined community proposition clearly includes the core doctrine-
secondary theories ofnation(alism). The idea of the nation as a 'community' hints at the 
former dimension, while the qualifier that this human grouping is 'imagined' is indicative 
of the latter dimension. 
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Although I have argued for the conceptualisation of a singular nation(alism) 
phenomenon, it is necessary for pedagogic reasons to separate, at least temporarily, this 
unitary concept into nation and nationalism. I therefore move from the subject(ivity) of 
nation(alism) into a discussion of three themes which provide a general, three 
dimensional typology of the nation. 
A three dimensional typology of the nation 
The nation( alism) literature commonly identifies numerous aspects of the nation, 
which I have grouped here under the three headings of territory and resources, ethnicity 
and culture, and historical geography. These categories, or dimensions of the nation, 
closely reflect those proposed by Penrose and May (1991:169- 71), namely "physical 
environment", "national character'', and "historical development". I employ these 
separate but interrelated and mutually reinforcing categories so as to reduce the 
multifaceted nation to a more manageable subject for analysis. Each discussion will begin 
with the objective/core/general aspects of the particular dimension, then proceed to 
illustrate their subjective/secondary/specific aspects, with empirical examples of the latter 
provided for illustrative purposes. 
Territory and resources 
Perhaps the most obvious dimension of the nation, for political geographers 
anyway, is its spatiality, its existence in space (eg, Giddens 1985; Taylor 1993). But 
' . 
actually defining a nation's space is a very difficult task, a consequence of the non-
congruence between nations and existing state boundaries, as demonstrated in Chapter 
One, and the subjectivity of the nation, which defies the use of purely objective map 
drawing criteria. Mapping the nation is therefore an extremely contentious exercise in 
subjective and inherently political cartography. 
For individual nations, however, territory is much more than just 'a place to live'. 
Through prolonged occupation of a particular space a nation is able to project its history 
and culture on to the(ir) landscape, providing permanent reminders of historical events to 
present and future generations (Kedourie 1985; Hobsbawm 1990; Penrose and May 
1991}. Thus through time a nation develops an extraordinarily powerful psychological 
attachment to its territory: An imagined community indeed. 
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The power of this devotion was emphatically demonstrated by Adolf Hitler 
during his twelve year reign as Fuhrer, when he was able to "make his appeals to the 
German people in the name of state (Deutsches Reich); nation (Volksdeutsch), or 
homeland (Deutschland), because all triggered the same . emotional associations" 
(Connor 1978:382 - 3). The immense appeal of National Socialism was evident in its 
persistence, enabling "Germans to carry on a war long after it became evident that the 
cause was hopeless and that perseverance could only· entail more deprivation, 
destruction, and death" (Connor 1978:385). 
The role of territory in the national conscience can be equally powerful when a 
. nation is, for whatever reason, dislocated from its 'national homeland'. One pertinent, 
extreme example comes immediately to mind: The Jews and their Promised Land of 
Palestine. The Jewish Diaspora separated the nation from its crucial historical - religious 
sites throughout Palestine, especially the Holy City of Jerusalem. This dislocation was an 
all pervasive motivation behind the Zionist movement, established in the late nineteenth 
century with the specific objective of a Jewish return to the Promised Land and the 
establishment there of a Jewish nation-state. The horrific death of six million Jews in the 
Holocaust of World War Two empowered an emotional Jewish nation(alism) that 
created the state oflsra~l in May 1948. The Zionist triumph, however, necessitated the 
displacement of the Palestinians, for whom Palestine was an. equally important national 
homeland. Indeed, the resulting Israeli - Palestinian conflict, now half a century old, has 
its sources in the fact that the territory of Palestine has been imbued with both Jewish 
and Muslim history and culture. 
A second link between place and people is the specific natural resources that a 
territory provides to the nation. For these resources will undoubtedly exert some 
i,nfluence on the nation's economy and social structure. In turn, sociocultural rules will 
act as a feedback loop, determining the type, rate, and means of resource use. Thus the 
nation "identifies itself with the land .... so that the land and the people becom~ a united 
entity" (Penrose and May 1991:170). Threats to 'national resources' will thus often be 
perceived as threats to the nation itself, and will be defended by assertions of the nation's 
'natural right' to continue using traditional resources. In a world of decreasing resource 
availability and accessibility, competing claims by nations, whether states or not, are 
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likely to increasingly be a source of conflict (Penrose and May 1991~ Nietschmann 
1993). 
In summary, then, territory and resources help to define a nation's place in space 
and the interrelationship between a people and their homeland. Thus the name of the 
nation becomes immediately identifiable in the name of the national homeland: In our 
case study, for example, 'Kurdistan' literally means 'the land of the Kurds'. 
Ethnicity and culture 
The spatiality of the nation does not, however, provide us with the basis of the 
nation, nor how nations differ from other nations. It is widely recognised that nation's 
are set apart from each other by this second dimension, namely the interrelated concepts 
ofethnicity and culture (eg, Eriksen 1993; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Kellas 1991; 
and A.D. Smith 1971, 1986, and 1991). Indeed, following A.D. Smith's (1986) 
influential work, it is the idea of the ethnicity which provides the actual origins of the 
nation. 
Ethnicity is crucial in defining the. nation because of its ascriptive character: An 
individual's ethnic identity, their nationality, is determined by birth and cannot, therefore, 
be changed. Thus ethnicity has the enormous power of inclusion and exclusion, the 
nation constituting only those who are of common descent and omitting those of foreign 
blood, so creating an 'us'- 'them', 'we' - 'they' dichotomy (Ignatieff 1993). Moreover, 
ethnic identity is a powerful, even the most powerful, force which unifies people who 
share common physical traits - the visible, outward signs of a distinct commUnity - and 
psychological attributes - the intangible, inner subjectivity of the imagined nation. 
Ethnicity therefore provides the basic but overriding identity for all members, subsuming 
all social cleavages (Connor 1972; Gellner1983). 
But despite appearances ethnicity is not an objective, anthropological criteria, for 
it too is stretched by subjective reasoning. The thread of ethnic identity most frequently 
pulled in this manner concerns the (supposedly) common, pure blood lineage from a 
unique, figurative 'Adam and Eve'. A nation is likely to claim such a "myth of descent" 
(AD. Smith 1982: 152), even though 'objective' anthropological and historical evidence 
may reject such propositions. The strength of the myth, however, overrides and renders 
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meaningless these 'scientific' observations. Connor (1978:380 - 81; emphasis added) 
provides an excellent illustrative example, suggesting that a nation's 
"broadly held conviction concerning the group's singular origin 
need not and seldom will accord with factual data. Thus, the 
anthropologist may prove to (their) own satisfaction that there 
are several genetic strains within the Pushtun people who 
populate the Afghani - Pakistani border region and conclude 
therefrom that the group represents the variegated offspring of 
several peoples who have moved through the region. The 
important fact, however, is that the Pushtuns themselves are 
convinced that all Pushtuns are evolved from a single source and 
have remained essentially unadulterated. This is a matter which is 
known intuitively and unquestionably, a matter of attitude and 
not of fact". 
The importance of ethnicity, then, is that it provides an individual's all transcending 
id~ntity, a large extended family related by 'pure' blood ties which provides not only the 
highest identity, but security, protection, and a 'sense of belonging' (Ignatie:ff 1993). 
Ignatie:ff (1993:8), however, notes that "common ethnicity, by itself, does not 
create social cohesion and community". Ethnicity, in other words, is not a sufficient 
condition for defining the nation. Thus other indicators of national identity are required. 
The nation(alism) literature identifies several such aspects, together constituting an 
adjunct of ethnicity that we can collectively refer to as 'culture' (Kedourie 1985; 
Hobsbawm 1990; A.D. Smith 1986}. Two stand-out facets ofthis general term are 
language and religion, but also includes customs, folklore, arts and music, etc. 
The ties between ethnicity and language seem intuitively obvious, for like · 
territory a nation's language usually shares the name of its ethnicity. One of the first 
people to attempt to marry the concepts of ethnicity and nation, German philosopher 
Johann Gottfried vonHerder (1744- 1803}, recognised and exemplified the importance 
of language when he claimed that "without its own language, a Volk (the German noun 
for nation) is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms" (Quoted in Penrose. and May 
1991:170). Thus language is seen as the major cultural expression of ethnicity, for 
"language unites the group, but also distinguishes it from other groups; it is the means of 
establishing a group's identity as a homogeneous unit" (Penrose and May 1991: 170; 
Emphasis added). The French Revolution of 1788, as an illustration, established the 
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boundaries of the Republic of France on the spatial limits of the French language 
(Connor 1978). 
Religion performs much the same function, assisting to create a sense of national 
solidarity and, again, to differentiate itself from other nations. As with ethnicity and 
language, the links between ethnicity and religion are often close. There is much 
correlation, for example, in the relationship between Arab ethnicity and the Islamic 
religion, but by no means is it a perfect match, for not all Muslims are Arabs. A pertinent 
case in point would be the virulent religious nation(alism) of the Persian Shi'a Muslims in 
Iran which, under the revolutionary leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, established the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 (Cottam 1979). Religion, therefore, is another salient 
dimension in determining and distinguishing national identities. 
The ethno-religious character of a nation is likely to be a major source of a great 
variety of customs, folklore, arts and music, . etc. These additional national attributes 
influence the daily life of individuals, whose collective and consistent adherence to this 
national culture demonstrates their unified will to live as a nation. In the late nineteenth 
century Ernest Renan refers to the nation in this context as a "daily plebiscite" {Quoted 
in Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985:58). A mass, public culture thus provides yet another 
dimension for establishing and separating national identities {B. Anderson 1983). 
Despite the apparent objectivity of these criteria, once again nationalism employs 
a subjective perspective on the make up of the nation. It is one of the greatest ironies, 
even contradictions, of nation(alism) that, while it claims to be a single, homogeneous 
entity on one or more of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture, the nation more often 
than not includes people and small groups of different blood, tongue, faith, or lifestyle 
(A.D. Smith 1991). In general, though, ethnicity and culture serve as a powerful 
dimension in defining a nation, the vast majority of whose members will share the same 
ethnic origins, language, religion, and cultural identity. These dimensions, by themselves 
or in any combination, are also what distinguishes one nation from other nations: They 
are modes of inclusion as well as exclusion. 
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Historical geography 
The nation( alism) literature commonly identifies a third dimension of the nation, 
that of "historical development" (Penrose and May 1991: 170), which provides the 
previous two essentially static dimensions with a temporal axis for analysis. The 
reasoning behind this third dimension is that nations continually evolve: They do not 
simple appear and remain constant once they have done so. To suggest that nations are 
temporally but not spatially variable is, of course, antithetical to a geographer's 
perspective. If nations evolve, the probable spatial variations in the necessary conditions 
for such development will mean that nations are not omnipresent, and if they continue· to 
evolve temporarily they may also be able to do so spatially. For these reasons I have 
classified this dimension as 'historical geography', giving it both temporal and spatial 
axes. Despite the recognition of the need to allow for the spatial evolution of nations, it 
is the temporal aspect which undoubtedly dominates this dimension. In other words, the 
history of nations is all important, but particular historical experiences may also have 
spatial causes .and consequences. 
Conceptualising the historical geography of nations is peFhaps best achieved by 
considering the two dimensions already discussed. The Jewish dislocation from their 
'Promised Land' of Palestine and their post-Holocaust relocation to the state of Israel 
were clearly two interrelated watersheds in the historical geography of the territorial 
aspects of the Jewish nation, and are therefore now crucial parts of Jewish history. This 
example is illustrative of a broader point that migrations, forced or otherwise, play a 
'significant role in the historical geography of nations. 
Similarly, historical geography plays a central role in a nation's changing system 
of resource use. As technology increases through time, a nation's economy follows the 
general transition from an agrarian, to an industrial, to a post-industrial organisation. 
This development will clearly transform a nation's social structure, and. much else 
(Gellner 1983). Thus the development of resources is a critical factor in the historical 
geography of nations. 
Connor's (1978) brief discussion on the ethnic diversity of the Pushtuns 
demonstrates the historical geography of ethnicity. Clearly, the world is no longer (if it 
ever was) made up of mutually exclusive peoples who did not and do not engage in 
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intermarriage. As was noted above, however, such miscegenation and 'mixed blood' 
lines of descent do not force the abandonment of the perception that a nation is 
characterised by pure descent. Indeed, because nations often include their own 'minority' 
or 'impure' elements, one could argue that in order to be a nation such 'imperfections' 
must be present. 
Given the strong links between ethnicity and language and religion, it is perhaps 
inevitable that a nation's tongue and faith are also· affected by historical geography, in 
two ways. First, a nation may be able to develop its language from a mixture of local 
dialects into a lingua franca, to establish a single common vocabulary and syntax (B. 
Anderson 1983; Entessar 1989). Again, the French language is a pertinent example here 
(Connor 1978). Second, by coming into contact with other languages a nation can 
expand its vocabulary through linguistic borrowing. To illustrate this phenomenon I need 
go no further than my/our own English tongue: Just how many words in this vocabulary 
are not derived from Latin, Greek, Old French, etc? Religion, too, is an aspect of the 
nation which can be modified by historical geography, and in much the same way as 
language. That is, a nation's religion can change, or rather evolve, as a result ofinternal 
dynamics. Or, and more catastrophically, a nation can have a new religion thrust upon it 
by a conquering nation. As we shall see in the next chapter, for example, the Kurds were 
"forcibly converted" to the "new religion of Islam" by the victorious Arab invaders in the 
seventh century CE (O'Ballance 1996:1). · 
With a nation's language and religion subject to historical geography it is logical 
that this metamorphosis can be extended to its overall culture. Through changes in 
religion, in particular, customs and folklore are most likely to be. adapted. Arts and music 
are also modified by contact with the outside world. Yet these can take on a significance 
of such magnitude that the new cultural aspects. appear to be of a nation's own making. 
Taylor (1993:201) cites an extraordinary example: 
"The national costume of Scotland is perhaps the m<;>st widely 
known of all European nations. All readers will associate tartan 
kilts with Scottish clans. The general assumption is that they 
represent the ancient clothing of Scottish kinship groups. It will 
come as a surprise to many readers, therefore, to find out that the 
tartan originates from Holland, kilts from England, and there 
were no 'clan tartans' before 1844". 
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What this brief discussion of the historical geography dimension of a nation 
demonstrates, of course, is the concept of national history. A nation's perception of its 
history is incredibly subjective, consistent with the subjectivity of the preceding two 
dimensions. 'Objective' analyses of a nation's history is rendered meaningless by the 
nation's capacity to construct an 'imagined geography' (Said 1978; Gregory 1995) of all 
dimensions of itself 
This three dimensional typology of the nation, in which its multifaceted character 
has been simplified into the three faces of territory and resources, ethnicity and culture, 
and historical geography, has demonstrated that statehood is not a prerequisite to 
nationhood, for nowhere in this framework does the concept of state appear. Rather, 
nation, as presented here, can be conceptualised as an historic community of people who 
. /believe themselves to be united by a unique combination of ethnic, language, religious, 
and cultural ties, sharing a common territory and resources, and who have experienced 
the same historical processes and events. 
Adding a fourth dimension: Distinguishing "nation" from "ethnie" 
This conceptualisation of nation still does not, however, distinguish the nation 
from other human collectives. An ethnic group, for example, could also share all of the 
above attributes, or at least a sufficient combination of them to also warrant description 
as a nation. Take, as an illustrative case in point, the Maori of New Zealand. As a unity 
they clearly have a deep association with Aotearoa, their 'land of the long white cloud', 
while as separate tribal entities their historical attachment to local environments is 
expressed in the concept of 'tangata whenua ', the 'people of the land'. Similarly, 'iwi ', 
or tribe, are tied to territory through sociocultural rules of resource use codified in the 
concepts of 'taonga', or 'treasures', 'mahinga kai', or 'food gathering areas', and 
'kaitiakitanga ', or 'guardianship of resources'. The Maori also share, most obviously, a 
common ethnicity and language which distinguish them from other groups. Religion is 
closely tied to the Maori myth of creation, whereby Rangi, the sky father, and Papa, the 
earth mother, produced six children represented in the Maori perception of an integrated 
physical and human environment: Tane (forests), Tu (people), Rongo (cultivated foods), 
Haumia (wild foods), Tangaroa (sea and seafood), and Tawhiri (wind and storms). All 
these aspects of Maori culture exerts a strong influence on the their customs, folklore, 
arts and music, etc. Finally, in terms of historical geography, two major events can be 
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cited as watersheds in Maori history: Their mythical migration from Hawaii in the seven 
canoes, or waka, and their subsequent occupation of Aotearoa, and the arrival of the 
European and the dislocation and disruption of Maori society as a consequence of 
colonisation (Barlow 1991; Grey 1994). 
Does this mean that all ethnic groups are nations? The three dimensional 
typology presented above would seem to hint at such a correlation. Moreover, in his 
treatise on The ethnic origins of nations (1986) A.D. Smith persuasively argues for an 
extraordinarily close relationship between ethnic groups, or to use his French 
terminology, 'ethnie ', and nations. AD. Smith's conceptualisation of ethnie as the 
origins of nations ~nab1es all ethnie to be described as "potential" or "would be" nations 
(1986: 154; Connor 1978), while some have achieved this status and can be duly entitled 
'real' or 'actual' nations. Thus AD. Smith, and the nation(alism) literature in general, 
recognise that no, not all ethnie are nations. 
So what, then, distinguishes a nation from an ethnie? It is vital to make this 
distinction blatantly obvious because there are in fact significant, essential differences 
between the two communities. In order to continue my typological interpretation and 
representation, these divergences are collectively presented through the addition of an all 
important fourth dimension, that of political community, to distinguish natip~s from 
ethnie. This distinction is crucial not only because of the fundamental differences 
between nation and ethnie but, having criticised the conflation and interutilisation of 
nation and state, despite their inherent dissimilarities, we must exercise extraordinary 
caution and not fall into the same linguistic trap and simply equate nation with ethnie. 
Political community 
The common conceptualisation that as "potential nations" ethnie provide the 
origins of 'actual' nations implies some type of transition from. one to the other. This 
fourth dimension represents the evolution of an ethnie into a single, unified, distinct 
political community called the nation (Canavan 1996). The general features of this ethnie 
- nation development and distinction are the focus of this discussion. 
The processes of ethnie metamorphosis are closely linked with the forces of 
modernism (Gellner 1983; A.D. Smith 1986, 1991; Bhabha 1990). As such the 
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establishment of a nation is more than ju·st an ethnie 's political evolutio{\ for it involves 
economic, social, and cultural change as well, even prior to any political development. 
For example, economic change will involve the general shift from an agrarian, to an 
industrial, to a post-industrial organisation (Gellner 1983). Closely associated with this 
transition will be land reform, whereby traditional ownership patterns are dismantled and 
replaced with private, market oriented tenure. Economic and land ownership 
transformation will create an urbanised, educated intelligentsia, giving rise to a single 
division oflabour (AD. Smith 1991) 
This economic integration of the many diverse, small scale entities making up an 
ethnie is matched by the forces of social assimilation, especially in relation to language 
and religion (Connor 1972). The diverse dialects likely to characterise an ethnie 's overall 
language will be subsumed into a single lingua franca through education, literature, and 
the mass media, a process particularly emphasised by B. Anderson (1983). The French 
language is again a pertinent example here. Similarly, an ethnie 's religion is likely to be a 
patchwork quilt, with local peculiarities within a broader, single faith. Again, these 
idiosyncrasies will be transformed into a unitary religious dogma, reflecting a middle path 
or general consensus, via policies enforcing an 'official' religion and, where the dominant 
strand of an ethnie 's religion demands, on the grounds of religious unity. Once more, the 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran is a good case in point, for it vehemently asserted 
Ithna'asheri as the 'one true path' within Shi'a Islam, forsaking all other strands thereof 
· (Cottam 1979). With linguistic and religious anomalies merged into single entities it is 
perhaps inevitable that an ethnie come nation will move increasingly towards cultural 
homogeneity. Thus a single national dress, national flag, national anthem, and national · 
holiday(s) will be adopted (A.D. Smith 1991; Breuilly 1904s). 
Interwoven with all these threads of the ethnie - nation evolution is, of course, 
that of political development. This aspect, perhaps individually the most important, will 
be characterised by the simultaneous emergence . of popular participatio{\ broad based 
political ... parties, and governmental institutions and bureaucracies. The growing 
involvement of the masses in 'national' politics helps create a sense of common purpose, 
if not a feeling of solidarity. This growing sentiment will be reflected in and perpetuated 
by the rise of a large variety of mass political organisations, usually founded by the urban 
intelligentsia but gradually expanding to envelope the general populace, that will seek to 
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dominate the national agenda. In turn, the governmental administration will establish and 
enforce a system of common legal rights and duties on its members (A.D. Smith 1991). 
The conceptualisation of nations evolving out of ethnie leads to the inevitable 
question of when does an ethnie become a nation? This important problem receives very 
little attention in the literature (Connor 1990a), the prime focus being the question 'what 
is a nation?' (Renan 1990). But the dilemma of when an ethnie warrants description as a 
nation has received particular attention by Walker Connor (1990a). The problem, 
essentially, is this: Does an ethnie become a nation at the instant a prominent leader 
espouses nationalist rhetoric, for example by calling for self-determination? Or is an 
ethnie not a nation until 100 percent of the nation's population declare their nationality 
and .commit themselves to the nationalist struggle for autonomy or statehood? Connor 
(1990a:95, 97) rules out a positive answer to the first possibility by suggesting that 
"nationalism is a mass not an elite phenomenon", and therefore that 
"a history of national consciousness should not, like a history of 
philosophy, simply describe the thought of a limited number of 
eminent (people) without regard to the extent of their following. 
As in the histories of religion, we need to know what response · 
the masses have given to different doctrines". 
But this persuasive argument does not force the acceptance of the second 
alternative. To adopt a 100 percent threshold would certainly be a very stringent and 
rather impractical criteria, for an ethnie could well be described as a nation before this 
point. I therefore argue that the answer to the question 'when is a nation' is to emphasise 
the temporal transition from ethnie to nation. Thus I see the nation as beginning with 
the first documented call for self-determination, and evolving from then into a mass 
movement predicated on achieving that objective. This typology allows for a 'weak' 
nation(alism) at the start of this process, building into a 'strong' nation(alism) sometime 
along the way. 
All these transitions contribute to the creation, from ethnie beginnings, of a 
nation as a single, unified, distinct political community. The driving force behind this 
transformation is the political doctrine of nationalism, the specific topic of the next 
subsection. 
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The political doctrine of nationalism 
The study of nationalism in nation( alism) studies is almost as variegated as the 
phenomenon itself However, as Latawski (1995:5) notes, "if a common thread of 
agreement can be found among nationalism's interpreters it can be found in the 
understanding of nationalism as a political doctrine". For this reason, and also because 
conceptualising nationalism as a political doctrine provides the best path for advancing 
this chapter, I adopt such a position. 
This discussion begins by establishing a two dimensional "core doctrine" of 
nationalism, which is then used to structure the following explanation. The first of these, 
which I term the 'internal' dimension, illustrates how nationalism creates the nation by 
emphasising ethnicity as the basis for 'national identity'. This strategy employs a 
subjective, ethnocentric reading of the historical geography of the nation, linking also to 
the territory and resources and cultural dimensions of the nation. The second aspect, 
which I call the 'external' dimension, demonstrates how nationalism invokes the principle 
of selfMdetermination to provide the link between the nation and the state. For 
nationalism asserts that the nation, as a distinct and unique political community, has a 
'natural right' to its complete fulfilment through the establishment of its own true nation-
state. While these two dimensions of nationalism have different foci, it is important to 
note that these are not separate processes but are concomitant, simultaneous aspects of 
the political doctrine of nationalism. 
According to A.D. Smith's (1982: 150) "core doctrine", nationalism holds that 
every individual belongs to a nation, and that this "national identity" (A.D. Smith 1991) 
is the single most important, and overwhelmingly so. Of all the various identities that an 
individual can hold, it is that of ethnicity which persists, because it is ascribed by birth 
and thus cannot be changed. An individual may be able to convert to another religion, 
learn other languages, adopt other cultures, live in other places, improve their 
socioeconomic status, even change their gender, but their ethnicity cannot be exchanged. 
Moreover, and as a consequence of its omnipresence, ethnicity provides an all powerful, 
common identity for people of different classes, occupations, ages, genders, and 
sexualities. 
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It is this common denominator of ethnicity which nationalism emphasises and 
disseminates in its internal unification policies aimed at transforming the ethnie into the 
nation. As a unifying force ethnicity not only acts to unifY current generations, but also 
provides continuity between past, present, and future generations (Kedourie 1985; 
Canovan 1996). Nationalism's key strategy in this regard is to glorify the nation's alleged 
"myth of descent", which essentially traces (entirely subjectively and in a manner that 
does not exclude future re-interpretations) the historical geography of the nation, from 
time immemorial to the present, and including a vision of the future (A.D. Smith 
1982:152- 53). 
This "narration of the nation" (Bhabha 1990) pinpoints the nation's ethnic origins 
in time and space, and commonly installs a single, spiritual, god-like ancestor as the 
forbearer of the whole nation. The Ethiopians, for example, claim descent from the Lion 
of Judah, the Jews from Abram of Ur (A.D. Smith 1982: 153). Following this ancient 
beginning comes a time when the first national hero( es) courageous, self-sacrificing 
deeds liberated the people from foreign control and exploitation.· Hence the importance 
of Joan of Arc in French nationalism, and William Wallace in Scottish nationalism1• This 
age of heroism established a great, glorious, and free historical nation with a majestic and 
unique language, religion, and culture. 
The next stanza in nationalism's myth of descent reads like the story of Lucifer, 
of the proverbial Paradise Lost. For with the demise of the national hero(es) the nation as 
a whole descends into servitude and slavery, its language, religion, and culture decline in 
prestige, and the nation may even be exiled from its homeland. Nationalism portrays the 
new masters as either completely alien, the local puppets of foreign powers, or at least as 
unrepresentative of the nation (Kellas 1991). In this "myth of decline" (A.D. Smith 
1982: 153) the nation lies dormant in a deep sleep (Buckley 1994). 
And modem nationalism is the alarm clock awakening the ~leeping giant, seeking 
to reverse this fall from Heaven, and to return the nation to its former glory. Through 
this "myth of rebirth" (AD. Smith 1982:153) a new generation of national hero(es) lead 
a modem nationalism that attempts to reclaim the language, religion, culture, and where 
After viewing the film Brave heart during the year I just had to mention William Wallace, for it 
is ftom the Wallace clan my minuscule proportion of Scottish blood is derived! 
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the people have been displaced, the national homeland of the nation. Hence; for example, 
in 1789 the French peasants-come-revolutionists stormed the Bastille and overthrew a 
hated monarchy, installing a popular government and establishing the Republic of France, 
and the numerous cases of decolonisation in Africa and Asia in the 1950s and '60s, 
which threw off the repressive yolk of direct foreign control. Thus modem nationalism is 
more like Lazarus, its myth of common descent legitimating its call for national 
mobilisation in order to write the epilogue to this narrative of the nation: The restoration 
of the nation to its rightful place as a unified, distinct, and free social, cultural, and 
political entity, and its everlasting existence as such. 
This aspiration brings us to the external aspect of nationalism, for its fulfilment 
depends, in the ultimate, upon outside recognition of the legitimacy of such objectives. In 
this regard the "core doctrine" ofnationalism holds that the world is naturally divided 
into unique nations, and that world peace and stability is dependent upon the freedom 'of 
all nations. The strategy most commonly employed to voice the validity of this twofold 
contention is to invoke the political principle of self-determination. For nationalism 
claims that the nation has a natural right, as a nation, to determine its own affairs, free of 
foreign interference, and in accordance with its own sociocultural, religious, and/or 
political discourses. Moreover, nationalism asserts that it is only through the universal 
implementation of self-detennination that all nations can become free· and thus live in a 
harmonious global society (AD. Smith 1982: 150). 
It is through this principle of self-determination that nationalism provides the link 
between nation and state. Gellner {1983: 1) simply yet powerfully summarises nationalism 
as a "political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent". Furthermore, nationalism usually holds that the nation itself is not complete 
without its own state (G.B. Smith 1994a:404). Thus the establishment of a true nation-
state, where all and only members of a nation reside within the(ir) state, has "a central 
place in terms ofthe objectives of nationalism" (Latawski 1995:7). While a nation-state 
may certainly be every nationalism's ideal goal, the nation(alism) literature recognises 
that in certain circumstances this essentially separatist ideology may not be practicable. 
For reasons of Realpolitik, therefore, ''the (nationalism) doctrine leaves open the form 
(and content) of self-determination" (A.D. Smith 1971:23 - 4). Cultural autonomy or 
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political federation within· existing state boundaries are obvious, less severe alternatives 
to secession. 
Nationalist demands for self-determination will therefore involve, somewhat axio-
and auto-matically, the state government(s) playing (usually the reluctant) host to the 
'dissident' nation. But the latter will often seek a wider audience for their claims than the 
former, with nationalism often appealing to global powers and even that loftiest of all 
political communities, the international community. Such pleas seek external and 
influential recognition and support of the nation's struggle for self-determination. 
Endorsement of a nation's quest for freedom is likely to depend greatly on the specific 
geopolitical interests of the outside powers. 
In summary, then, nationalism's simultaneous invocation of an internal myth of 
common descent and external demands for self-determination combine to form an 
extraordinarily powerful force that drives at least the political dimension of an ethnie 's 
transformation into a nation. For nationalism's appeal to a nation's common ethnicity, 
historical origins, glorious past, present day repression, and future triumphant destiny all 
inspire a collective, emotional, and positive response from the masses: Political parties 
will rise, nationalist propaganda will be increasingly disseminated, and thousands will 
take up the struggle in defence of the nation. Similarly, nationalism's demands for 
autonomy, federation, or independence will provide a tangible target for national 
mobilisation, a sense of common purpose in achieving the nation's ultimate fate. Thus as 
a political doctrine nationalism looks both backwards and forwards- in Nairn's (1977) 
metaphor, nationalis~ is the modem Janus- as well as both inside and outside in order to 
transform an ethnie into a political community called the nation. It is possible to 
conclude, therefore, with the provocative suggestion that nationalism not only creates 
the nation, hence nation(alism), but - especially in its demand for national self-
determination- is also the distinguishing characteristic between a· nation and an ethnie. 
Official nations andlversus ethnic nations 
It is critical to discuss at this point one final theme in the nation(alism) literature, 
which recognises that different nationalisms not only share "core doctrines" but may also 
have similar "secondary theories". There exists subsets of nationalism: In A.D. Smith's 
(1971:193) words, nationalism is "a single category containing subvarieties, genus, and 
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species, a diversity within a unity". Or in Ignatieffs (1993: 14) terms, nationalism "is not 
one thing in many disguises but many things in many disguises". A.D. Smith (1971:216-
18) himself distinguishes between three such subsets, existing along a continuum from 
'ethnic' -nationalism centred on the ethnie -to 'territorial' - nationalism built around a 
pre-existing state skeleton -with a third 'mixed' variety in between. Kellas (1991:51 -
52) offers a respective typology of an 'ethnic' nationalism, an 'official' nationalism, and 
with a 'social' nationalism in the middle. For the purposes of this discussion (chapter and 
thesis) it is sufficient to conceptualise two subsets of nationalism which, following Kellas 
(1991), I have named 'official' and 'ethnic' nationalism. The following discussion 
examines the general features of official and ethnic nationalism, and - crucially for this 
thesis - why the two are likely, indeed almost certain, to come into conflict. 
Official nationalism is conceptualised as those nationalisms which represent a 
state, or, more specifically, a nation that has achieved statehood. An official nation, 
therefore, controls all facets of the state apparatus; the legislature, the courts, the 
bureaucracy, and the military. _ 
As demonstrated in Chapter One, an official nation's state territory is unlikely to 
be ethnically homogenous, its boundaries will incorporate any number of ethnie, as 
potential nations, and/or even actual nations. Such ethnically plural, even multinational, 
states are particularly common in Africa and Asia, where colonial cartography drew state 
boundaries with little if any regard for pre-existing ethnic maps. Different indigenous 
ethnie and nations were consequently united and divided. In the wave of decolonisation 
during the 1950s and '60s the departing colonial power frequently handed the reins of 
government to one favoured indigenous group, who had often beaten off other local 
contenders. Thus upon gaining independence scores of official nations faced the 
-immediate challenge posed by the divisive ethnic/national plurality of their state's 
territory and population. 
In an·attempt to overcome these fractures official nations employed- and still do 
employ - a variety of modernising, centralising policies aimed at the social, cultural, 
economic, linguistic, religious, and political integration of the state's population. 
Collectively known as eit~er 'nation-building' or 'nation-formation' (eg, Connor 1972; 
Canovan 1996; Keating 1996; Penrose 1990), these strategies effectively seek to develop 
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a nation based on an overriding affiliation to the state. In other words, official 
nation(alism) uses nation-building to create a true nation-state, with a single national 
identity from which no deviation is tolerated. 
Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is conceptualised as those nationalisms 
that represent those nations which are not states. An ethnic nation, therefore, controls no 
aspect of any state apparatus and are the very targets of official nationalism's nation-
formation strategies. 
But what ethnic nationalism does have on its side is the immense unifying power 
of ethnic identity, to politicise and mobilise the population (Connor 1972, 1978). 
Contrary to the expectations of official nationalism and modernist predictions, ethnic 
nationalism has not only persisted but strengthened in the face of twentieth century 
progress. Indeed, many ethnic nationalisms, particularly in the 'Third World' but by no 
means exclusively there2, can be said to have risen in response to, and against, the 
combined forces ofmodernism, centralism, and nation-formation. As we shall see in the 
Kurdish case study, this is certainly a powerful explanation of the emergence of Kurdish 
ethnic nationalism from the late nineteenth century. 
Given ethnic nationalism's opposition to official nationalism, it is not surprising -
perhaps it is even inevitable·- that the evolution of ethnic nations has frequently escalated 
into overt and violent conflict with official nations. This conflict can be conceptualised in 
terms of competing political ideologies. An official nation, empowered with territorial 
sovereignty over a space often far greater than its own national homeland, seeks to assert 
and maintain its control over this additional area. In contrast, an ethnic nation located in 
those extra regions will assert its natural right to self-determination, to claim its national 
homeland to the exclusion of all others. Thus official nationalism maintains its right of 
2 The literature freely talks about the rise of ethnic nationalism in the developed states of Western 
Europe and North America, previously thought of as quintessential nation-states, for example: 
Scottish (Keating 1996) and Northern Irish (Ignatieff 1993) nationalism in Great Britain; 
Catalan nationalism in France (Keating 1996); Frisian nationalism in Holland (Penrose 1990); 
and Quebecois nationalism in Canada (Keating 1996). Similarly, despite grand theories of 
nation-formation, Marxism - Leninism has also failed to purge ethnic nationalism in the 
'Second World' states of the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. Here, ethnic nationalism 
has undergone a great resurgence since the collapse of communism in 1989, which is also 
reflected in the literature. For example, in the Ukraine (Ignatieff 1993); across almost all of 
east-central Europe (Griffiths 1993; Latawski 1995); and especially in the former Yugoslavia 
(eg, Griffiths 1993; Ignatieff 1993). 
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territorial sovereignty over the whole state and the population, while ethnic nationalism 
maintains its right to self-determination in its national homeland: Two diametrically 
opposed political doctrines headed for a seemingly unavoidable clash. 
And when such violent clashes do occur they contribute significantly to the 
construction of the ethnic nation. For ethnic nationalism is able to marry the official 
nation's military strategies of nation-formation to nationalism's general idea of an 
oppressed nation struggling to free itself from foreign domination. Ethnic nationalism can 
then portray the onslaught as unjust, tyrannical, and a serious threat to the very existence 
of the nation. And, as the core doctrine of nationalism also enables, the only way to 'save 
the nation' is to fulfil its destiny as an independent state. The specific battles and the 
overall conflict will thus be of great importance in the historical geography of the nation, 
in the transition from ethnie to overt political community. Indeed, to recall A.D. Smith's 
(1986:39) words: 
"It is not society or ethnicity that determines war, but conflict 
itself which determines the sense and shape of ethnicity. War may 
not create the original cultural differences, but it sharpens and 
politicises them, turning what previously were ( ethnie) into 
genuine integrated (nations), aware of their identities and 
destinies". 
Despite the likelihood and importance of conflict between official and ethnic 
nations, such confrontations are, as demonstrated in Chapter One, excluded from conflict 
research's classification of international conflict on the grounds that one of the 
participants is not a state. I seek to remedy this rather arbitrary categorisation in the next 
section by developing a reconceptualised international conflict. 
'A nation-centric glossary of terms. 
This discussion demands and empowers a post-structural analysis of three of the 
most fundamental terms in international relations: Nation, nationalism, and international. 
For no longer is it possible to automatically equate and conflate nation with state; no 
longer can nationalism be seen as loyalty to the state; and no longer can international 
denote simply inter-state relations. What is developed here, therefore, is a nation centric 
glossary of terms that is employed in this thesis. 
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Re-signifying "nation" and "nationalism" 
The above discussion has made it abundantly clear that the contemporary 
conceptualisation of the nation in nation(alism) studies is far more than simply the 
population of a state. It is therefore necessary to use "nation" advisedly and certainly not 
as a simple synonym for "state" or "nation-state". This distinction does not suggest that 
"nation" and "state" are mutually exclusive, hence the idea of 'official nations'. But it 
recognises that while official nations dominate the state, they are not necessarily the only 
nation within that state's boundaries. The noun "nation" is therefore used in accordance 
with the typology presented above; that is, as a distinct and unique political community 
seeking national fulfilment, as an ethnic nation, through self-determination or, ·as an 
official nation, through territorial sovereignty. To reiterate, it is not used to refer merely 
to the ·whole population of a state, nor will it be used interchangeably with "state" or 
"nation-state". 
The noun. "nationalism" is similarly re-signified, for the preceding section also 
made it crystal clear that the contemporary conceptualisation of nationalism is somewhat 
different from the notion of loyalty to the state. Indeed, if "nationalism" signifies 
individual and collective loyalty to some greater community, then it is the nation, and not 
the state, which is the focus of such allegiance. Moreover, nationalism as a political 
doctrine demonstrates the need to reconceptualise its meaning as an intense identification 
with the nation. But again this distinction ,does not suggest that nationalism cannot 
denote an equally powerful loyalty to the state, thus the concept of 'official nationalism'. 
The noun "nationalism" is therefore used to refer to individual and collective loyalty to 
the nation and to the political doctrine which pursues national self-determination (or 
territorial sovereignty), and not to signify the supposed allegiance of a state's entire 
population to that state. 
The separate terms of nation and nationalism, with their re-signified meanings, 
· will however be seldom used individually. The reason for this is that, as I introduced in 
Chapter One and explored further in this chapter, I place particular emphasis on the idea 
that it is the nationalist movement which politicises an ethnie and transforms it into a 
nation. Nationalism creates the nation, which perpetuates and strengthens its own 
nationalism, furthering the construction of the nation. Thus to write nation and 
nationalism, to present them separately, fails to represent the intimate interrelationship 
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between the two. Hence I write nation( a/ism), which should be read as both nation and 
nationalism. While on occasion this may sound strange, even grammatically incorrect, I 
maintain its use to better portray the confluence of the terms. Only when circumstances 
demand will specific reference be made to nation and nationalism. 
Reconstructing "international" 
The above conceptualisation of the nation not only runs counter to the 
conventional meaning of the term but also against that of the adjective "international". 
Separating the concepts of nation and state ~ables "international's" constructed 
meaning of"inter- nation-state'' (or, given our rejection of the term ''nation-state", more 
· simply "inter-state") to be re-constructed to represent what it describes - relations 
between nations. Once again, this re-construction does not exclude reference to relations 
. between states, for this is possible by conceiving of such interactions as between two (or 
more) official nations. What it does do is expand the meaning of ''international" by 
including relations between all nations, regardless of whether they are states or not. Thus 
the state centric objective i~ written as 'international', the inverted commas signifying 
that "inter-state" is what is really meant, while the nation centric adjective is written 
international, the italics signifying the absence of the. hitherto assumed presence of the 
state conjoint. 
As international signifies relations between at least two official nations, one 
official and one ethnic nation, or two ethnic nations, then "international conflict" 
represents conflict in any one of these dyads. Thus international conflict does not omit 
conflict between states, but conceptualises such events as conflict between two (or more) 
official nations. The inclusion of conflict between official and ethnic nations and conflict 
between ethnic nations therefore extends conflict research's state-centric 
conceptualisation of 'international' conflict, proposing instead a nation-centric, 
reconceptualised international conflict. This idea of international conflict, of course, 
brings us to the Kurdish case study example to be presented in the following three 
chapters. 
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Conclusion: Towards the Kurdish case study 
The Kurdish case study provides a highly pertinent, illustrative example of an 
ethnic (Kurdish) versus official (Persian, Arab, and Turkish) international conflict. This 
conclusion makes several important points in order to establish some linkages between 
the predominantly theoretical discussion in this chapter to the predominantly empirical 
discussions of the next three. First, the three dimensional typology of th~ nation outlined 
above corresponds to the three sections of the regional geography of Kurdistan 
presented in Chapter Three. Second, the Kurds' transition through three distinct but 
related stages from an ethnie into a nation is examined in Chapter Four through the lens 
of the actual international conflict between the Kurds and the various Persian, Arab, and 
Turkish governments. Chapter Four identifies three distinct but related sta~es in the· 
evolution of Kurdish nation(alism). ThircL Chapter Five analyses the role of Kurdish 
nation(alism) in the three global scale geopolitical discourses that have overlayed this 
international conflict, namely colonialism, Cold War, and the rogue state doctrine. 
I would also like to make some preliminary comments concerning the material 
included (and excluded) in the following case study chapters. What can be and is 
· presented within the time and space constraints of this thesis is only a small slice of 
Kurdish history. I have selected the pieces used here in terms of their importance in 
regard to the argument(s) of this thesis. This practice may lead to the criticism that this is 
but a 'selective history' of Kurdish politics with only those aspects that fit my argument 
included in the discussion. It is not my intent, however, to present a biased 'edited 
highlights package' of Kurdish politics in order to strengthen my case. Such an approach 
would quite obviously contradict the principles and purpose of academic research. I 
therefore pronounce that any omissions of what the initiated reader may believe to be 
salient aspects of Kurdish politics have been made because of this thesis' time and space 
constraints and my theoretical argument. For it must be remembered that this is not a 
comprehensive history of the Kurds, but an example of an international conflict that 
challenges conflict research's conventional understanding of this phenomenon. 
Finally, because this thesis uses nations and not states· as its unit of analysis, I 
draw attention here to some crucial terminological practices employed throughout the 
case study. First, I will take care to refer to the ''Persian", "Arab", and ''Turkish" 
nations, rather than to ''Iran", ''Iraq", and ''Turkey", which are obviously states. In 
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particular, it is necessary to avoid reference to the "government of Iran/Iraq/Turkey", for 
such terms imply that each government has full control over all of their state's territory, 
and that they are the legitimate representative of all people resident within their territorial 
boundaries. Use of such terms would, therefore, contradict the nation centric map of 
political space that I am proposing, fail to take account of the Kurds' consistent and 
vehement denial of state sovereignty in Kurdistan, and give the untenable and completely 
erroneous impression that the Kurds hold equal political and cultural rights and are 
legitimately represented by these three state governments. I therefore avoid such terms 
and instead use phrases like ''the government in Tehran/Baghdad/ Ankara", or ''the 
Persian/ Arab/Turkish government", which overcome the above problems because they 
refer only to the specific location of the government, who that government represents, 
and who controls that government. I cannot, of course, escape completely the state-
centric discourse of international relations, however, and for this reason it is necessary, 
on occasion, to use the state names of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In such circumstances 
these titles will be used only to refer to the territorial unit of the state, and not the state 
.government. Nevertheless, I shall endeavour to keep these instances to an absolute 
minimum. 
Chapter Three 
The stateless nation: 
A regional geography of Kurdistan 
"(The Kurds are) just as proud, independent, and 
thievish as their ancestors. They are as devotedly 
attached to their mountains as the Scots or Swiss, and 
like the former, they are divided into clans or septs, 
acknowledging the supremacy of their chiefs, who are 
regarded with the same devotion, and followed with the 
same blind zeal which used to distinguish the 
Highlanders in former days. · They are proud, haughty, 
and overbearing exactly in proportion to their ignorance, 
and like our own clans of old, despise more or less all . 
arts but those of war and plunder, and all professions 
but that of arms". 
James Baillie Fraser in Mesopotamia and Assyria (1842)1 
Quoted in McDowall1989:9 
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Introduction 
This first case study chapter introduces the Kurds and Kurdistan at the local 
scale. I will do this via a regional geography that flesh out the three dimensional typology 
of the nation presented in Chapter Two. This discussion is therefore divided into three 
sections ~ Place, People, and Partition - which respectively examine the territory and 
resources, ethnicity and culture, and historical geography of the Kurdish nation. 
After locating Kurdistan in the global and Middle Eastern spatial contexts the 
Place section discusses at some length the problems and politics of precisely delineating 
Kurdistan. These difficulties illustrate the spatial fluidity of the nation in contradiction to 
the spatial rigidity of the state. Nevertheless I will offer my own map of Kurdistan in 
recognition that I have to draw its boundary somehow/where. This boundary will 
emphatically demonstrate the spatial incongruence between nation and state, thus 
pointing to an alternative map of political space. Having mapped Kurdistan its physical 
geography and major cities and towns are outlined. 
The People section then introduces the ethnic origins, language, and religion of 
the Kurds. Just as the Place section notes the difficulty :in accurately bounding Kurdistan, 
the People section discusses the problems and politics of determining the contemporary 
Kurdish population. And just as Kurdistan had to be demarcated an estimation of . 
Kurdish numbers must also be, and therefore is, given. 
Finally, I draw specific attention to what is undoubtedly the most important facet 
of the Kurdish nation s historical geography: The Partition of the Kurds and Kurdistan 
into no· less than six states. For it is the division of the Kurds by 'international' 
. '-~--~· ·-~ ~ 
boundaries and the consequent denial of an independent state of Kurdistan that has both 
boosted Kurdish nation(alism) and created international conflict with the surrounding 
state governments. This nation(alism) and conflict is especially evident in the ·three states 
of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, a direct consequence of the fact that Kurdish territory and 
population constitute not only significant proportipns of the state s totals but also the 
overwhelming majority of Kurdistan and Kurds. This Partition section therefore presents 
three 'mini' regional geographies of the Kurdish nation in the states of Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey, including the ethnic, religious, and linguistic sources of the international conflict 
between the Kurdish ethnic and Persian,.Arab, and Turkish official nations. 
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Place 
Location 
At both the global and Middle Eastern scales Kurdistan's location might be 
described as peripheral. Globally Kurdistan lies at the distant margins of southeastern 
Europe, the southern borderlands of the Caucasus, and the northern extremities of the 
Middle East (see inset, Map 3:1). In the Middle Eastern context Kurdistan's location is 
also largely peripheral, occupying the southeastern comer of Turkey, southern parts of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, a northwestern sliver of Iran, the northern quarter of Iraq, and 
northeastern margins of Syria (Map 3: 1). 
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Mapping Kurtlistan -Problems and politics 
To precisely delineate Kurdistan on a larger scale map, however, is not as simple 
a task as it may sound from this general description. The critical but simple reason for 
this difficulty is that Kurdistan has never been and certainly is not today a state, thus it is 
not a pre-existing territorial unit of the conventional world political map. Instead, what is 
being attempted here is a mapping of political space in accordance with the Kurdish 
national homeland, which straddles contiguous territory in six states and is thus in 
.~ 
discordance with these entities1 Moreover, within each of these six states the Kurds do 
not live strictly within any internal administrative boundaries2• As a result of both these 
factors there is no codified spatial delineation ofKurdistan. 
The absence of a clear and consistently used demarcation of Kurdistan gives rise 
to two distinct problems for attempting to establish such a map. First~ the spatial expanse 
of Kurdistan, and therefore the position of its boundary, will vary according to the · 
'definition' of Kurdi.stan used. Secondly, the temporal variable means that boundaries 
drawn using the same definition at different times will not necessarily result in the same 
demarcation ofKurdistan. 
The first step, then, in delineating Kurdistan is to decide upon a suitable definition 
for bounding Kurdistan. One such method, and the most obvious and appropriate one at 
that, springs immediately to niind: A demographic map, whereby Kurdistan includes 
those areas in which the Kurds constitute some proportion of the total population. 
Clearly, a number of alternative paths exist within this population method. The most 
extreme would be to include in Kurdistan only those areas where Kurds constitute 100 
percent of the population. Such a spatial definition would be extremely limiting and result 
in a highly fragmented Kurdistan, given that areas dominated by Kurds include small but 
/far from negligible populations of, for example, Arabs, Jews, and Turkomen. It would 
also be a rather harsh standard to employ, for as we have seen in Chapter One only very 
rarely, if ever, do even states incorporate only one ethnie or nation. 
2 The only Kurdish province With official sanction is the 'Kordestan' administrative region in 
Iran, based around the city of Sanandaj. 
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At the other extreme one could go so far as to spatialise Kurdistan as all those 
areas where any Kurds live. This is a reasonable argument and could be appropriately 
achieved in contiguous Kurdistan . But this definition could also be interpreted so as to 
include the Kurdish dominated shantytowns around such obviously non-Kurdish cities as 
Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, Istanbue, and Tehran, .hundreds of kilometres away from 
contiguous Kurdistan. Moreover, it could be further stretched to include Kurdish areas in 
the Lebanon and, absurdly, in such far-flung European cities as Bonn, Hamburg, and 
London4. 
An appropriate compromise would therefore seem to be the 50 percent threshold. 
This lower limit would undoubtedly be a much fairer definition than the 100 percent 
criteria, but at the same time limiting the spatial expanse of Kurdistan to areas where the 
Kurds constitute a majority of the population. McDowall (1991: Between pages 25- 26; 
1996:xiv) offers two extremely useful choropleth maps (Maps 3:2 and 3:3) which can be 
used as guides in defining Kurdistan by this method. While this configuration is 
invaluable in representing the spatial, proportional distribution of Kurds, these maps are 
somewhat restricted by the rather broad categories. Moreover, the 50 percent threshold 
is not represented by a boundary line between these categories. 
3 
4 
Kendal (1993b:39) estimates that in 1970, already a generation ago, there were half a million 
Kurds living and working in Istanbul, and another 1.5 million to 2 million in Turkey's other 
main industrial centres. These enclaves of Kurds, created by government policies of 
assimilation and the attraction ·Of employment, :further problem~tise mapping the Kurdish 
nation. 
While this may seem like a rather incredulous suggestion, B. Anderson's (1983) idea of the 
nation as an imagined community gives it some credibility, for Kutds living and working in 
these cities not only send home remittances to support their families, but have organised 
themselves into political groups which pressure host governments and generally serve to 
increase the profile of the Kurds plight. As an example, in Hamburg earlier this year Kurdish 
groups sympathetic to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) staged a number of demonstrations 
against the German government for supplying military equipment to Turkey, subsequently used 
by Ankara in its fight against the PKK (Usher 1996:25). The idea of Kurdish nationalism is 
not, therefore, confined to the place of Kurdistan, and a fluid interpretation of the spatiality of 
the nation opens up the possibility of including such places as part of the Kurdish nation. 
54 
T 
MAP2 
DISTRIBUTION 
OF KURDS 
across Turkey, 
Iran and Iraq 
~ 75-1QO•t. 
~30-75% 
liiiillD Under Jo•t. 
Milts 
0 •• 100 l I I I I • .. 100 ISO zoo 
Kllometru 
llO 
Map 3:2 Kurdish population distribution (1991) 
As oftotal 
R A 
Source: McDowa111991: Between pages 25-26. 
Map 3:3 Kurdish population distribution (1996) 
As of total -~-.. I nf., 
N 
160Km 
100 miles 
R A N 
S Y R 
Source: McDowall1996:xiv. 
55 
It is opportune at this point to discuss another major problem when deciding 
where Kurdistan is and where it is not. This problem flows from variations in the h:~rge 
volume of reference material which I have taken into consideration. Sources refer to 
specific places as being distinctly Kurdish which fall outside my 50 percent threshold 
interpretation of McDowall's population distribution maps (eg, Sivas and Marash in 
central Turkey). The cause of this problem is quite clearly the temporal variation hi the 
literature (eg, from O'Ballance 1973 to McDowall1996), which brings us to the second 
major obstacle in demarcating Kurdistan, the temporal variable. Research undertaken at 
different times, even using the same spatial basis of Kurdistan, will come up with 
. disparate delineations ofKurdistan5. 
After deciding on the 50 percent threshold as my definition of the spatial expanse 
of Kurdistan and much comparative reading, I have come up with Map 3:4 as my 
synthesised, demographic map of Kurdistan. This map is largely based on McDowall's 
work, but in places I have made modifications to account for divergences evident in the 
reference material. I must note that this Kurdistan is, in general, considerably smaller 
than maps of Kurdistan found in the reference material, a direct result of the 50 percent 
threshold rather than a lower standard6. While I believe this delineation of Kurdistan is 
reasonably accurate, I once again emphasise the difficulty in mapping the spatially 
problematic place that is Kurdistan. 
Any demographic map of Kurdistan, although based on objective criteria, is an 
inherently political statement, for the implication is that within Kurdistan's boundary -
wherever this is drawn - the state governments have no control over the population and 
the entire territory is under Kurdish control. But the transition from government to 
Kurdish control does not occur in accordance with simple demographics. In the instance 
of Map 3:4, for example, the government may control areas with more than a 50 percent 
5 
6 
For examples of just how spatially different maps of Kurdistan can be, see maps in Ahmad 
1994; Anderson 1993; Bengio 1995; Bradshaw 1991; Buckley 1994; Bulloch and Morris 1992; 
Chaliand 1993; Entessar 1984; Evans 1991; Hassanpour 1992; Hellier 1989; Ignatieff 1993; 
JRO 1991; McDowall 1989, 1991, 1996; O'Ballance 1973, 1996; Pelletiere 1984; Short and 
· McDermott 1981; Tear Fund 1996; The Economist 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994. 
As an illustration some references, for example Bulloch and Morris (1992:4) and Tear Fund 
(1996:2), refer to Kurdistan as being approximately the same size as France, some 551 000 
square kilometres. As will be seen later in this chapter, this figure is two~thirds bigger than my 
Kurdistan, a clear indication of the consequences of using the 50 percent population threshold. 
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proportion of Kurds, and the Kurds may control areas with less than a 50 percent 
proportion of Kurds; nevertheless the 50 percent threshold provides a balanced 
interpretation. This problem has a high temporal variation because of the ongoing 
political - military turmoil between the state governments of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey and 
the Kurdish nationalist organisations in each state. 
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In practical political terms, therefore, the spatial expanse of Kurdistim is a direct 
reflection of the military balance of power. When the Kurds are in a position of relative 
strength, Kurdistan expands. When one or more of the governments are in ascendance, 
Kurdistan shrinks. Thus the 'political' borders of Kurdistan essentially coincide with the 
military front line at any point in time, and this is reflected in temporally disparate texts 
referring to specific places as Kurdish controlled at one time and government controlled 
at another. Thus Kurdistan's borders, however defined, are positively liquid. I wish, 
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therefore, to make the same succinct disclaimer as McDowall (1991:8) does, namely 
because "no map of Kurdistan can be drawn without contention . the demographic map 
included (Map 3:4) is not a political statement (but is intended only as a) statement of 
where (the majority of the population are Kurds),. 
If maps of Kurdistan can be interpreted in political terms, then they can also be 
constructed as political propaganda. Thus there is a considerable divergence between the 
spatialisation of Kurdistan by the involved parties. Kurdish nationalist organisations and 
sympathisers are predisposed to expand Kurdistan. Conversely, the governments in 
Tehran, Baghdad, and Ankara portray Kurdistan as substantially smaller ip. size 
(McDowall 1989:5). An illustrative example of this spatial irony occurred during 
negotiations for a Kurdish Autonomy Region in Iraq in 1970 (Map 3:5). 
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In a similar vein JR07 (1991: Between pages 2 - 3) presents a map which 
dramatically demonstrates the Kurdish itlclination to exaggerate 'Kurdistan' (Map 3:6). 
For several reasons this is a rather ambitious map. It is wildly optimistic to suggest that 
'Kurdistan' reaches the northeastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea8, as it is to claim 
territory to within 60km of the Persian Gulf It is doubtful whether, at any stage and to 
any significant temporal duration and level of political control, 'Kurdistan' has 
penetrated to within 200km of Tehran and/or 80km of Baghdad. Furthermore, as a result 
of the rich oilfields around Kirkute, this locality is one of the most strongly contested 
places between Kurds and the Arab government. 
8 
9 
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I would say what this acronym stands for, but JRO documents do not themselves indicate what 
it refers to, although it does appear to be some type of educational organisation. 
McDowall (1991:8) notes that this claim is probably made so as to give a possible Kurdish state 
a convenient sea outlet . 
In Chapter Six I shall demonstrate that Kirkuk has only once been in Kurdish hands, and then 
or just on a week, in March 1991. 
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Physical geography 
Using Map 3:4's delineation, Kurdistan is approximately 330 000 square 
kilometres (km2) in area, a region slightly bigger than New Zealand10. Kurdistan's 
dominant topographic feature is the north end of the Zagros mountains, providing a very 
rough, alpine terrain. Most of the area exceeds 3 000 metres (m) in elevation. In the 
extreme east of Turkey, near the borders with Armenia and Iran, is Kurdistan's highest 
point, Mount Ararat, at 5 165m. 
These mountains are of the utmost importance for the Kurds, for· whom a long 
history of occupation has resulted in the formation of a strong psychological attachment. 
This bond is evident in the common Kurdish saying that "the Kurds have no friends but 
the mountains" (Bulloch and Morris 1992:2; Buckley 1994: 1). Indeed, the Kurds and the 
mountains are essentially synonymous, a definite and distinctive Kurdish national 
homeland. The Zagros mountains and other smaller ranges, therefore, play a crucial part 
in the Kurds' 'geographical imagination'. 
Because Kurdistan is landlocked its climate is mainly continental in character, so 
it is subject to a large variation between winter and summer temperatures. Cold winters 
are exacerbated because of Kurdistan's high altitude, and temperatures of around 
-10°C are not uncommon11• In summer the hottest parts ofKurdistan reach the mid 40s. 
Kurdistan has two rainy seasons, one in March at the beginning of spring and the other in 
November at the end of autumn. The summer drought of June- August is longer and 
more extreme than the winter drought of January -February. The winter shortage of 
water is due to precipitation falling as snow and remaining frozen until the March thaw. 
Precipitation levels are extremely variable. In southern Kurdistan, where the 
Mesopotamian Plain joins the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, rainfall is commonly 
between just 100 and 200 millimetres (mm) per year. Travelling north into the heart of 
Kurdistan, precipitation levels rise in relation to altitude. The biggest proportion of 
Kurdistan, between Lakes Van and Urmia, receives between 600- 1 OOOmm annually. 
10 
11 
The area of New Zealand is 268 812 square kilometres. 
This figure is a generalisation for Kurdish settlements. In higher altitudes but less inhabited 
areas this figure will be much lower. 
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The highest mountain peaks receive 1 000 - I 500mm. The average annual rainfall for all 
ofKurdistan is around 600mm12, only slightly drier than Christchurch at 660mm. 
The high precipitation levels in the mountains of Kurdistan give rise to a large 
number of important rivers and lakes which, in a part of the world where water is' a 
scarce resource (and increasingly so), gives Kurdist~ considerable strategic importance, . 
For example, the two most famous Middle Eastern rivers after the Nile, the Tigris and 
the Euphrates, both have their headwaters in Kurdistan in Turkey and flow into Iraq, the 
latter after first passing through Syria. Two other major rivers, the Great Zab and the 
Little Zab, are important tributaries of the Tigris River. 
Kurdistan's extensive river system is estimated to have a hydroelectric power 
generating capacity of an astonishing 90 000 million kilowatts (Kendal l993b:38). In 
recent years the Iraqi and Turkish governments have been especially active in exploiting 
this potential, and a number of dams have been built. This contemporary development is 
an indication of the growing importance of water in the Middle East; for as we shall see 
in a moment Kurdistan s resources are significantly underdeveloped because of the · 
prevailing political and military situation. Kurdistan's supplies of this scarcest Middle 
Eastern resource are supplemented by the vast natural lakes of Lake Van and Lake 
Urmia. These are further added to by the increasing number of artificial lakes created by 
the new hydroelectric dams. 
While Kurdistan' s water resources are peculiar to this part of the world, 
Kurdistan is also endowed with substantial deposits of the resource that makes the · 
. Middle East in general such a vital area: Oil. Kurdistan's oilfields, concentrated around 
the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk13, constitute up to half of Iraq's oil reserves. But 
exclusive control of this most precious Middle Eastern resource has so far eluded the 
Kurds, although demands are frequently made for a considerable percentage-of Iraq s oil 
revenues to be spent in Kurdistan14• Approximately half the length of two major oil 
12 
13 
14 
I have estimated this figure from hydrological maps of the region. 
Within the Kirkuk oil:fields lie two sites of particular interest. First, at a place called Baba 
Gurgur lies the biblical fiery furnace into which Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego were 
thrown (Daniel3:20- 24). Second, at Nuzi a small clay tablet was discovered which, dated at 2 
500 BCE, contains the oldest known map: A significant site for geographers indeed. 
In the negotiations for a Kurdish Autonomy Region in Iraq in 1970, for example, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party made this a fundamental demand. 
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pipelines, the 1 000 kilometre Baghdad to Dortyol (Turkey) and the 500 kilometre 
Batman (Turkey) to Dortyol, travel through Kurdistan. 
The unstable political and military conditions that have plagued Kurdistan in 
modem times have prevented large scale exploration, let alone exploitation, of 
Kurdistan's other mineral resources. Although speculative, what research has been done 
suggests that there are substantial chrome, coa~ copper, gold, iron, lignite, silver, and 
even uranium deposits in Kurdist~ (Short and McDermott 1981:5; Vanly 1993:140). 
Because of the continued volatility of the area these seem unlikely to be exploited in the 
near future. 
Within the many mountain valleys, and on the smaller and less frequent plains, 
fertile agricultural land Q.as been put to good use, although substantial· amounts of such 
land remains underutilised. At the northern edge of the Fertile Crescent, Kurdistan's 
main agricultural crops include barley, cotton, lentils, peas, rice, tobacco, and wheat. 
Various fruits are also grown. Sheep and goats are raised for meat and milk, while cattle 
are employed as work animals .. Wild animals include bears, foxes, wolves, boars, and 
hyenas. 
One resource which has been exploited, although too much so, is Kurdistan's 
hitherto vast cedar and oak forests. With the development of modem energy sources 
being a relatively recent phenomenon (not to mention government controlled) the Kurds 
have had to rely almost exclusively on these forests for fuel and building materials. As a 
consequence of this reliance this resource has been seriously depleted (Kendal 1993b:38; 
Buckley 1994:1). 
Cities and towns 
The de facto capital ofKurdistan is the city of Arbil (see· Map 3:4), located in the 
centre of a rectangle formed by the Great Zab, Little Zab, and Tigris Rivers. A city that 
has existed since c.2200 BCE, Arbil is also said to be the ancient stronghold of the man 
commonly referred to as the greatest Kurd that ever lived, and certainly a crucial icon in 
Kurdish history: Saladin. This powerful Muslim leader defeated Richard the Lionheart in 
the Crusades of the twelfth century CE. Although he fought first and foremost as a · 
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Muslim and was not a Kurdish nationalist, modem Kurdish nationalism regards him as 
such. Saladin was born in a village called Tikrit on the western bank of the Tigris River 
north of Baghdad. So too was Iraqi President Saddam Hussein: An interesting 
contradiction of place in Kurdistan in Iraq. 
Other major cities in Kurdistan include Mahabad, Sanandaj, and Kermanshah in . 
Iran; Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya in Iraq; and Diyarbakir, Bitlis, and Van in Turkey. 
Kermanshah and Sulaymaniya are the largest cities in Kurdistan, with populations around 
the one million mark (Buckley 1994: 1). In describing the major cities and towns of 
Kurdistan we again see the contradiction that this place is. In what Kurds (and others) 
call Kurdistan, these sites still belong to other spaces, namely the state territories of Iran, 
Iraq, and Turkey. 
In southeastern Kurdistan lies the now infamous town of Halabja, which on 16 
March 1988 was the scene of only the second but largest chemical weapons attack since 
World War One15. Since then Halabja has been commonly referred to as the Kurdish 
Auschwitz, "not because the scale of the massacre was comparable with that of the Nazi 
death camp, but because the victims were chosen merely because they were Kurds" 
(Bulloch and Morris 1992: 142). The chemical attack on Halabja tragically represents a 
contradiction of 'international' conflict: Far from being an attack on the territory of 
another state, this assault was carried out by Iraqi forces on an enemy located on Iraqi 
territory. Thus state security is not exclusively threatened from another space (that is, 
state), it can be, and is being, undermined from within. 
People 
Ethnic origins 
The precise ethnic origins of the Kurds remain uncertain. But the most frequently 
offered explanations (eg, Anderson 1993; Chaliand 1993; .Entessar 1984, 1989, 1992; 
MacDonald 1993; McDowall 1989, 1991, 1992, 1996; Pelletiere 1984) of their 
anthropological history traces Kurdish ancestry to a number of Indo-European tribes 
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who migrated into the region of modem day Kurdistan approximately four thousand 
years ago. Kurds themselves believe they are descendent from a specific Indo-European 
tribe known as the Medes, who ruled this area for 1 500 years. Anthropological and 
historical evidence, however, does not support this perception of a pure Kurdish lineage. 
But it is important to recognise, as done in Chapter Two, that for nation(alism) pure 
ethnic origins are a matter of the heart and not of fact. In Connor's (1978:380; emphasis 
original) words, "what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is''. 
In 550 BCE, the Persians defeated the Medes in war and became the rulers of a 
greater Persia, and the Medes remained subordinate inhabitants of the mountainous 
regions of Persia s. northwest. Over the next millennium the Medes intermingled with 
other tribes, although they maintained their ethnic distinctiveness vis-a-vis the 
Armenians, Azeris, Turks, and Persians. A major factor in resisting assimilation was their 
inhabitancy of the mountainous regions of Kurdistan. By the time the Arabs conquered 11 
the Persians in the seventh century CE, however, this miscegenation had become so i 
i 
extensive that the Arab word "Kardu ", meaning 'nomad', was applied to all the people ' 
living in this mountainous region. It is from this Indo-European tribal melange that the 
modem day Kurds are descendent. Similarly, the noun 'Kurd' is derived from the Arab 
noun "Kardu " , a rather ironic origin, and a point to be remembered in the following 
two chapters. 
Language 
Like their ethnicity the Kurdish language is of Indo-European heritage. The 
Kurdish language is divided into three main dialects, known as Kurmanji, Sorani, and 
Zaza. The first two are the major dialects in terms of the number ofKurds that use them. 
Kurmanji is spoken by the large majority of Kurds, almost exclusively those living in 
Turkey, but including contiguous populations in northern Iraq and northwestern ~an. 
Sorani is the dominant dialect of the Kurds of southeastern Kurdistan. Zaza is spoken by 
only a small minority of Kurds, located in the northwest of Kurdistan. A minor dialect, 
Kirmashani, is used in the extreme southeast of Kurdistan, mostly in Iran but also over 
the border in Iraq. Map 3:7 shows the distribution of these Kurdish dialects. 
15 The other instance in which chemical weapons were used since World War One was when Italy 
invaded Abyssinia in 1935. 
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The three main dialects of Kurmanji, Sorani, and Zaza are mutually unintelligible, 
and this has consistently proved to be a major obstacle to the development of a unified · 
Kurdish nationalist movem.ent. The Kurds have been. unable to develop a single, universal 
lingua franca to overcome this linguistic diversity. Entessar (1989: 86) notes three major 
reasons for this persistent division: The rugged mountain terrain has impeded the 
communication between Kurdish tribes and clans; the absence of a stt:~:mg central 
administration has allowed diverse languages to persist; and the emergence of the state 
system further fragmented the Kurds and resisted open communication between Kurds · 
under the jurisdiction of different states. Only recently have efforts to remedy this 
divisive facet of Kurdish nation(alism) met with any measure of success. For example, 
the main dialect of Kurmanji dominates Kurdish literature and as such is the most 
revered Kurdish vernacular. 
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Religion 
Prior to their conversion to Sunni Islam by the conquering Arabs in the seventh· 
century CE, the Kurds practiced various forms of a wide variety of religions, including 
Ahl-I Haqq, Alevi, Nestorian and Assyrian Christianity, Judaism, Yazidism, and 
Zoroastrianism. Today, over 75 percent of Kurds are Sunni Muslims (McDowall { 
1996: 10), adherents of either the Qadiriya or Naqshbandiya brotherhood within this 
branch of Islam. The remaining Kurds are either Alevis, an unorthodox form of Shi'a 
Islam practiced in the northwestern extremes of Kurdistan, or Ithna' asheri Muslims, a 
more conventional form of Shi' a Islam found among the Kurdish tribes in and around the 
southern Kurdistan cities ofKermanshah and Khanaqin. ·Small communities of Christians, 
Jews, Ahl-I Haqq, and Yazidis persist to the present day. Religious differences, 
especially between Sunni and Shi' a Kurds, have also proved inhibitive to a unified 
Kurdish nationalist movement, although like language these are less pronounced today 
than in the past. 
Population -Problems and politics 
It is worth spending some time discussing the contemporary population of the 
Kurds, because for a number of interrelated reasons this is a topic of enormous debate 
and controversy (Chaliand 1993a; Entessar 1992; Gunter 1988; Kreyenbroek and Sperl 
1992; McDowall1996; O'Ballance 1996; Pelletiere 1984). First, because the Kurds are 
fighting for autonomy and self-determination from Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, these three 
states have "a strong vested interest in downplaying their precise numbers" (Pelletiere 
1984:15). Contrastingly, but for the very same reason, Kurdish nationalist organisations 
have a "strong vested interest" in inflating their numbers. Indeed, a 1986 Kurdish claim 
put their number at 26 million, a figure that Gunter (1988:390) describes as 
"overzealous". The irony here is obvious. 
Second, because Kurdistan is. not a state a ~national' census has not yet been 
carried out. Instead, the Kurds are 'included' in the censuses of the states in which they 
live. So state governments, already motivated to minimise Kurdish numbers, are in 
control of census statistics. Moreover, Kurds who participate in such censuses are often 
intimidated by the overt and very real threat of political oppression and social 
discrimination. Consequently they do not identify themselves as Kurds. This non-
disclosure has been particularly common in Turkey, where there has historically been no 
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offichi.l recognition of the existence of a Kurdish minority16 (Gunter 1988:391; Buckley 
1994:6). Kendal (1993b:39), who participated in Turkey's 1965 census, highlights this 
problem: 
"A significant number of Kurds are still deeply marked by the 
brutalities of the past half-century of anti-Kurd repression and 
are very wary of declaring themselves as Kurds . When asked 
'What is your mother tongue?' destitute slum-dwellers who 
knew not a word of Turkish would answer heavily: 'Better put 
Turkish, we don t want any trouble"'. 
A contradiction thus arises, whereby the Kurds claim they belong to the Kurdish nation, 
but governments claim they belong to the state in which they live. 
Recent research has established ~.commonly agreed upon but still approximate 
Kurdish population figure of around 20 million (Evans 1991:37; McDowall 1992:32). 
The latest information available estimates the current Kurdish population to be 24 - 27 
million (McDowall 1996:3), which makes them the fourth largest ethnic group in the 
. Middle East, behind Arabs, Persians, and Turks (Short and McDermott 1981:4), and the 
largest stateless nation in the world (Anderson 1993:109; MacDonald 1993:124). 
Offering a specific estimation of the contemporary Kurdish population is as difficult as 
delineating Kurdistan s boundaries. However, after much comparative reading I propose 
the contemporary Kurdish population to be 25 million, but this figure is certainly not 
beyond contention. 
Partition 
The Kurdish nation in six states: An overview 
From Maps 3:2, 3:3, 3:4, 3:6, and 3:7 it can be seen that Kurdistan's 330 000km2 
is divided among six states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. 
So too are the vast majority of the 25 million Kurds, although not all of them iive within 
16 This contrasts with Iran and Iraq, where there is some degree of legal recognition of the Kurds, 
although this is invariably ignored by these two state governments. 
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the 'Kurdistan' of each state17• Tables 3:1 and 3:2 provide data on the division of 
Kurdistan and the Kurds into these six states. 
Table 3:1 The division of Kurdistan 
State Total State Kurdistan Percentage Percentage 
Area (km2) Area(km2) State Area Kurdistan Area 
Armenia 29 800 2 500 8.39 0.76 
Azerbaijan 86 600 2500 2.89 0.76 
Iran 1 648 000 72000 4.37 17.58 
Iraq 434 925 58 000 13.34 21.82 
Syria 185180 5000 2.70 1.52 
Turkey 779452 190 000 24.38 57.56 
Total 3163 957 330 000 10.43 100 
Source: Author. 
Table 3:2 The division of the Kurds 
State Total State Kurdistan Percentage Percentage 
Population (m) Population (m} State Popn Kurdish Popn 
Armenia 3.4 0.2 5.9 0.8 
Azerbaijan 7.3 0.2 2.7 0.8 
Iran 58.9 5.6 9.5 22.4 
Iraq 18.4 4.2 22.8 16.8 
Syria 13.8 1.0 7.3 4 
Turkey 59.2 13.0 22 52 
Lebanon 2.7 0.06 2.2 0.2 
Europe n/a 0.74 n/a 3 
i 
\ 
" ~/ 
Total 161* 25 15.53* 100 
n!a indicates figures not available. 
*These totals are calculated excluding the data for Lebanon and Europe. 
Source: Author. 
Tables 3:1 and 3:2 demonstrate the territorial and population dominance of 
Kurdistan and the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and especially Turkey, with these three states 
collectively incorporating nearly 97 percent of Kurdistan and accounting for over 90 
percent of all Kurds. These statistics help to explain why Kurdish nation( alism) is so 
17 As noted above, there are considerable Kurdish populations in western Turkey, as well as in 
central Iraq and ~tern Iran. Given the difficulties in estimating the Kurdish population as a 
whole, it is impossible to tell solely from the resource material at my disposal what proportion 
of Kurds live within Kurdistan as opposed to those living in other parts of these six states, and 
in particular of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. 
68 
strong in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey and, conversely, so weak in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Syria. As a consequence, the Kurds in the former trio of states are the exclusive focus of 
this case study in general and more specifically in the following three subsections. 
These three 'mini' regional geographies will commence by introducing the 
location and size of each state's Kurdistan, and also their Kurdish population. I will then 
outline the deep ethnic, linguistic, and religious chasms between the Kurds and the 
Persians in Iran, the Kurds and the Arabs in Iraq, and the Kurds and the Turks in Turkey. 
These cleavages are the very source of the bitter and protracted conflict that has existed 
for centuries but which found new expression with the establishment of these three 
states. In other words, it is these divisions that have led to the Kurdish ethnic versus 
Persian, Arab, and Turkish official international conflict. 
The Kurdish natioll in the state of Iran 
Kurdistan in Iran18 occupies a north - south slither of territory in the state's 
extreme northwestern corner (Map 3:8). Approximately 72 000km2 (Table 3: 1), it is 
bounded to the north by the Iranian borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and its 
western boundary is delineated by the Iran - Turkey and Iran - Iraq borders. Kurdistan in 
Iran extends as far eastwards as to include Lake Urmia and stretches as far south as the 
city ofKermanshah. Iran is home to some 5.6 million Kurds (Table 3:2). 
The Indo-European ancestry of the Kurds means that they are actually ethnically 
related to their Persian neighbours in Iran for both groups are, intriguingly, of Aryan 
descent19 (Pelletiere 1984: 19; Entessar 1989:86). Ethnicity thus appears to be grounds 
IB / 
19 
· .. Throughout this chapter/thesis I will use the term 'Kurdistan in Iran!Iraqtrurkey' to refer to 
Kurdish territory in thes~ three states, although in places this may 'sound' unusual, even 
grammatically incorrect. But I do so because it provides a Kurdish-centric description of these 
three 'state Kurdistans', and not a statewcentric description like alternative terms such as 
'Iranian!Iraqifl'urldsh Kurdistan' would, because these imply that the area of Kurdistan within 
state boundaries belongs to that state, a geography that is most obviously refuted by Kurds. 
Because I am concerned with constructing an alternative map of global political space, to use 
terms such as these latter ones would clearly be a contradiction, even hypocritical. I therefore 
avoid such language. 
I say intriguingly because of the infamy associated with the term Aryan following Nazi 
Germany's racial policies of 1933 - 1945, which served as the ethnic basis of The Final 
Solution of the Holocaust. 
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for mutual understanding and cooperation. But this possibility is far outweighed by 
religious and linguistic sources of conflict, the former being the most important. 
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The Kurds and the Persians belong to two very different branches of Islam, the 
Sunni and Shi'a respectively. Ghassemlou (1993:96) has claimed that 98 percent of 
Kurds in Iran are Sunni Muslims. Although some Kurds in the south of Kurdistan in Iran 
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are ShFa Muslims, these are certainly a minority and are relatively inactive politically. In 
contrast Crystal (1994:574) asserts that 93 percent of Persians are Shi a Muslims, the 
official state religion of the Islamic Republic. Like their ethnicity the Kurdish language is 
of Indo-European origin (Tucker 1989:xv; Entessar 1992:4;Kreyenbroek 1992:70), and 
although also part of the Iranian family of languages, Kurdish and Farsi (the official 
language of Iran) are not mutually intelligible. The linguistic disparity between Kurdish 
and Farsi is therefore the second major contributor to the animosity between the two 
groups. 
The Kurdish nation in the state of Iraq 
Kurdistan in Iraq occupies a band of southeast - northwest territory running 
across the 'top end' of Iraq and parallel to the spine of the Zagros mountains (Map 3:9). 
· Approximately 58 000 km2 (Table 3: 1), it is bounded in the west by Iraq's border with 
Syria, to the north by the border with Turkey; and to the east by the border with Iran. To 
the south Kurdistan in Iraq reaches the city of Khanaqin near the Iranian border. The 
Kurdish population in Iraq is 4.2 million (Table 3:2). 
The ethnic and religious relationship between the Kurds and Iraq's Arabs is the 
exact mirror image of the situation in Iran. For the vast majority of Kurds and Iraqi 
Arabs are coreligionists of Sunni Islam, but they are of two very different ethnicities, 
Ku_rd and Arabic. The irony here is clear, as Pelletiere (1984:19; emphasis added) 
explains: 
"In Iran .... Kurds who might ordinarily live as equals with their 
racial brothers are alienated on the grounds of religion. And, 
ironically, in Iraq the situation is precisely the reverse. There the 
Kurds are coreligionists of the dominant Sunni Arabs, but as 
Kurds (that is, non-Arabs) they are considered aliens" . 
. In addition to this ethnic hatred - a common Arab saying is that "Allah sent three 
plagues: The rat, the locust, and the Kurd'' (O'Ballance 1996:vili) - Kurds and Arabs 
speak mutually unintelligible languages. This ethnic and linguistic disparity are the root 
sources of their common enmity. 
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Kurdistan in Turkey is by far the largest of all three 'state Kurdistans', occupying 
the state's southeastern corner (Map 3: 10). Approximately 190 000 km2 (Table 3: 1), it is 
bounded to the east and south by Turkey's borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. 
To the west and north Turkish Kurdistan ends where the Kurds n() longer constitute the 
ethnic majority. Kurdistan in Turkey includes Kurdistan's second major lake, Lake Van, 
and the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Turkey has the largest Kurdish 
population of these three states, with 13 million Kurdish inhabitants (Table 3:2). 
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In both Iran (ethnicity) and Iraq (religion) the Kurds have one of the three 
defining ethnic and cultural traits in common with the Persians and Arabs. In Turkey 
there is no such corresponding identity: The Kurds and the Turks are ethnically, 
linguistically~ and religiously distinct from each other. Thus in the state with the largest 
Kurdistan territory and the largest Kurdish population, there is the greatest number of 
conflict axes between t~e Kurdish ethnic and state official nations. Despite the ethnic 
distinction official Turkish policy maintains that Kurds and Turks are of the same 
ethnicity. The Kurdish and Turkish languages are also of great diversity, but this is also 
overlooked by Turkish government policy, which attempts to enforce the Turkish 
language. The supposed ethnic homogeneity between Kurds and Turks has resulted in 
the social, political, and legal practice of referring to Kurds as simply "Mountain Turks 
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who have forgotten their language" (Atarodi 1991:283; Bulloch and Morris 1992:168). 
Finally, Turkey's secular Islam is very· different from the Sunni Islam predominantly 
practiced by the state's Kurds. 
These brief regional geographies have illustrated the Kurds' geographic and 
political position in relation to the dominant ethnic groups of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. By 
summarising the ethnic, linguistic, and religious similarities and differences between the 
Kurds and the Persians, Arabs, and Turks I have also highlighted the sources of this 
Kurdish ethnic versus state official international conflict. Table 3:3 gives a 
diagrammatical representation of these sources of conflict. 
Iran 
Iraq 
Turkey 
Key: 
Conclusion 
Sources of international conflict in 
I sources of possible ethnic harmony ~.__ __ ...J 
Source: Author 
By providing a thorough regional geography of Kurdistan this chapter has 
introduced at the local scale the Kurdish case study. This method has also proved 
successful in substantiating the thiee dimensional typology of the nation presented in 
Chapter Two by exploring the territory and resources of Kurdi~tan, the ethnicity and 
culture of the Kurds, and the overriding aspect of the Kurds historical geography. And 
it is that partition of the Kurds, as a nation, and Kurdistan, as their national homeland, 
into no less than six states that emphatically demonstrates the spatial divergence between 
nation and state. The bounding together by 'international' boundaries of ethnic, religious, 
and/or linguistic groups as distinct as the Kurds on the one hand and the Persians, Arabs, 
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and Turks on the other into the states of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey provides the sources of 
the international conflict in Kurdistan. Because this conflict, which is the specific focus 
of the next two chapters, directly involves the governments in Tehran, Baghdad, and 
Ankara the geopolitical scale of analysis is expanded from the local to the Middle 
East em. 
Chapter Four 
Nation(alism) and international conflict 
in Kurdistan, 1880 - 1996 
"The Kurds are the fourth most numerous people in the Middle 
East. They constitute one of the largest nations in the world 
today to have been denied an independent state. Whatever the 
yardstick for national identity the Kurds measure up to it. 
Kurdish nationalist thinking can be summed up as follows: 'The 
Kurds constitute a single nation which has occupied its present 
habitat for at least three thousand years. They have outlived the 
rise and fall of many imperial races: Assyrians, Persians, 
Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols, and Turks. They have their 
own history, language, and culture. Their country has been 
unjustly partitioned. But they are the original owners, not 
strangers to be tolerated as minorities with limited concessions 
granted at the whim of usurpers'". 
Martin Short and Anthony McDermott in The Kurds (1981: 4) 
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Introduction 
In order to fulfil its two fundamental purposes this chapter increases the 
geopolitical scale of analysis from the local to the Middle Eastetnr The first objective of 
this discussion is to trace the Kurds' transition from an ethnie into a nation, thus fulfilling 
the critical fourth dimension of the nation as proposed in Chapter Two~ that of political 
community .. There are undoubtedly numerous ways to chart this development, but the 
chosen method accords to the second objective of this chapter: To demonstrate the 
international conflict in Kurdistan from the late nineteenth century to the present. Thus 
the emergence of Kurdish nation(alism) is analysed through the lens of the international 
conflict. In moving towards and achieving these twin objectives tqis chapter illustrates 
that the concepts of nation and state are far from synonymous, and therefore that their 
. conventional conflation in international relations is inappropriate, and also that the 
assumption that every state is a nation-state is indeed erroneous. Moreover, this 
discussion will also provide an emphatic example of an international conflict, thus 
highlighting an area of neglect in conflict research for this, as we shall see, is far more 
than just a 'civil war'. On the other hand, this chapter also gives a strong indication of 
the necessity for separating nation and state, of conceiving of ethnic and official nations, 
and indeed of international conflict argued for in Chapter Two. 
The discussion is divided into three sections. The first concentrates on an initial 
period of Tribal nation( alism} from the late nineteenth century to the outbreak of World 
War Two in 1939. This phase was characterised by growing nationalist rebellion against 
increasing penetrations by central government, but also by inter-tribal rivalry that. 
prevented a strong, unified Kurdish nationalist movement from evolving and pushing 
claims for national self-determination. This divisiveness cost the Kurds dearly, as they 
~ere unable to establish their own independent nation-state ofKurdistan. 
The second phase, immediately after the Second World War, saw the 
establishnient of modem Kurdish political parties. Party nation(alism) was able to 
transcend tribal allegiances to an unprecedented level, thus mobilising an increasing 
number of Kurds against the state governments in Tehran, Baghdad, and Ankara. 
Kurdish political parties were, however, beset with residual inter-tribal animosities that 
continued to circumvent a single, combined nationalist movement. 
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Despite this the third phase saw the emergence of a truly Popular nation(alism) 
that since the 1960s has sustained a virtually continuous state of all out war in Kurdistart 
in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Although there have been periods of quiet, these have been 
intermittent and certainly ovezwhelmed by the episodes of violence. This stage of 
Kurdish nation(alism) bring us to the present day. 
Tribal nation(alism) 
Traditional Kurdish society was centred upon a strong attachment to the tribe, 
typically an extended family group with a number of smaller sub-units occupying a· single 
mountain valley (M:cDowall 1991). The tribe was headed by two types of leader, the 
agha and the shaykh. The agha was responsible for the economic organisation of the 
tribe, while the Sunni Muslim shaykh provided religious and political leadership. The two 
were not mutually exclusive: An agha could also be a shaykh and vice versa. It was the 
shaykh which was most revered, commanding the loyalty of their tribe, and importantly 
of the tribal warriors, or peshmerga, literally 'those who face death'. For centuries the 
Kurdish tribes were effectively isolated from one another, but contacts grew throughout 
the nineteenth century. So too did inter-tribal rivalries, however, animosities that often 
descended into open fighting and banditry as the tribes attempted to exert their influence 
over their neighbours. By the 1870s the shaykhs were proving to be willing and able 
mediators of inter-tribal conflict. The main reason behind their success was their 
expansive knowledge and strict application of Islamic law, which created the impression 
of impartiality. This perceived absence of bias had the important effect of enabling the 
more capable and powerful shaykhs to transcend tribal politics, thus raising the prospect 
of pan-tribal unity. So for the first time in Kurdish history the shaykhs attempted to bring 
the hitherto disparate tribes together. It is in the late nineteenth century, therefore, that 
the Kurds began the transition from ethnie to nation. 
Shaykh Ubayd Allah: The first nationalist 
Undoubtedly the most important shaykh was Shaykh Ubayd Allah1 of the town of 
Nehri, near Hakkari. By the late 1870s he was held in the utmost esteem by shaykhs and 
citizens alike. Olson (1989:3) notes that "some of the greatest tribal chieftains of the time 
Also spelt 'Obeydollah' or 'Ubaydallah'. 
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addressed Shaykh Ubayd Allah as 'Your Highness"'. This popularity was in itself not 
unique: What made Shaykh Ubayd Allah different was his unprecedented assertion of the 
existence of a Kurdish nation and his consequent attempts to unite all the Kurdish tribes 
and establish an independent state of Kurdistan. Ubayd Allah explained his claim of 
Kurdish nationhood and their rig4t to self-determination in an often quoted ( eg, Olson 
1989:2; Entessar 1992:82; McDowall 1989:10, 1991:14, 1996:53) letter of 1878 to 
British political officers2 in the region: 
"The Kurdish nation ... .is a people apart. Their religion is different (from 
that of others), and their laws and customs are distinct .... The Chiefs and 
Rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, and the 
inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters 
cannot be carried on in this way with the (Ottoman and Qajar) 
Governments, and· that necessarily something must be · done, so that 
European Governments having understood the matter, shall inquire into 
our state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our 
·own hands. Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the m~tter into 
their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continued evil 
deeds, and the oppression which they suffer at the hands of the two 
governments of impure intentions". 
In 1880 Shaykh Ubayd Allah carried out his threat, he and his followers mounting 
a rebellion that established an autonomous principality amidst the Ottoman Empire. 
Shaykh Ubayd Allah declared that his rebellion was undertaken in the name of the 
Kurdish nation, and not by individual tribes. 
The Shaykh Ubayd Allah rebellion was, however, q:uickly quashed by the 
combined forces of the Ottoman and Persian Empires. Captured and incarcerated in 
Constantinople, Shaykh Ubayd Allah escaped, returned to Nehri, was recaptured, exiled· 
to Mecca, where he died in 1883. The rebellion, however, lives on in Kurdish national 
conscience. Shaykh Ubayd Allah is regarded as the first leader to try to unify the 
disjointed Kurdish tribes, to gain complete political independence from Middle Eastern 
powers, and to establish a sovereign Kurdish national homeland. For all these reasons he 
remains for many Kurd's "the first great Kurdish nationalist" (McDowall 1996:53). 
2 There is some confusion in the literature as to who exactly Shaykh Ubayd Allah wrote this 
letter. For example, McDowall (19%:53) claims that it was sent to William Abbott, the British 
Consul- General in Tabriz (Iran), while Olson (1989:2) suggests that it was delivered to British 
Vice- Consul Clayton in Baskale (Turkey). It seems plausible that, given the importance of this 
proclamation, both, if not more, British diplomats received this communique. 
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After Shaykh Ubayd Allah's failed rebellion similar but less significant uprisings 
suffered the same fate. It was not until the outbreak of World War One in 1914 that the· 
geopolitical situation in the Middle East began to be transformed into a more favourable 
environment for the Kurds. Indeed, the complete disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
by wars' end in 1918 gave rise to the possibility of an independent Kurdish state. The 
post-war period, therefore, was a critical time for the Kurds, who made new assertions 
·ofnation(alism). 
Simko and Said 
At the end of World War One the Ottoman Empire was no more and the Persian Empire 
was at a very low financial and organisational ebb. This power vacuum once again 
enabled the Kurds to establish tribally based autonomous enclaves. As in the pre-war 
period, the shaykh was most commonly the head of the tribe and, where confederations 
of tribes were established in the aftermath of the war, of these larger entities as well. 
One such instance was the Shikak tribe of western Persia, around the southern 
and western edges of Lake Urmia. The Shikak are an important example, for in the 
summer of 1918 - actually before the end of the war, it should be noted - its leader, an 
agha by the name oflsma'il Simko, led a rebellion against Tehran. 
As Simko's army inflicted a series of defeats on failing Qajar forces the rebellion 
gained considerable momentum, and at its peak numbered between eight and ten 
thousand (Entessar 1992: 12). By the time the Armistice was signed in October 1918 
Simko had established "an autonomous Kurdish government in the area west and south 
of Lake Urmia" (Koohi-Kamali 1992: 175). Within this area Simko appointed Kurdish 
governors and published a journal called Independent Kurdistan. And on this note, 
crucially for our purposes, Simko called for the independence of Kurdistan under his 
own leadership (of course). 
But Kurdish nation(alism) was still very much in an embryonic phase, and as a 
rural tribal leader Simko himself "had disdain for urban, settled, non-tribal 
folk .... (suggesting) that his nationalism was defined more by socioeconomic status than 
by ethnicity" (McDowall 1996:221). And although Simko did head a large tribal 
confederation, the Shikak, and united a number of other tribes with him, Simko failed to 
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completely overcome pre-existing rivalries with neighbouring tribes. Remembering tribal 
animosities from yesteryear some of Simko's neighbours contested his claim to the 
Kurdish leadership and dissented from his chosen course for achieving and securing self-
determination. Had Simko been able to gain the allegiance of surrounding tribes he 
would have expanded the territory under his control, increased the size of his army, and 
would thus have stood a better chance of achieving his nominally nationalist objectives. 
As it was, however, Simko's rebellion was defeated by Qajar government troops in 
February 1920, and Simko fled to the high mountains. 
Despite this rout Simko almost immediately began to reorganise his forces and to 
acquire the support of his former colleagues. Rearmed by the Turks in Van, and fighting 
under a Turkish flag (how ironic!), Simko's forces, numbering about 2 000, began to 
reassert their control in the areas west and south of Lake Urmia. By the end of 1921 
Simko's army was 5 000 strong. Tribes actively opposed to Simko and internal 
disagreements amongst tribal groupings who stood beside Simko, however, proved fatal 
to his second rebellion. In February 1921 the Qajar government in Tehran was 
overthrown by General Mohammed Reza Khan, who immediately began reorganising 
and modernising the Persian army. Eighteen months later Reza Khan defeated Simko's 
unsupported army, and on 16 August 1922 Simko fled to Turkey. When Simko next 
returned to Persia, in 1929, lured by Reza Khan - by then the first Shah of the Pahlavi 
Dynasty -he was killed in an ambush by government forces. Simko's demise was a 
serious blow to Kurdish hopes for their own state. 
At the time of Simko's second defeat another important post-war Middle Eastern 
figure was staging his ascent to political stardom, a former Ottoman Army General 
named Mustafa Kemal. In the wake of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration, Mustafa 
Kemal set about establishing a Turkish national homeland. His incredible organisational 
and leadership skills saw a reconstituted Turkish army assert its control over some of the 
former Ottoman territories, including areas occupied by the Kurds. Moreover,. in pursuit 
of a Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal set about the abolition of the Caliph as well as the 
sharia courts of Islamic law. 
Turkish sovereignty, and secular sovereignty at that, was anathema to the Kurds 
of what was to become, in 1923, the modem day Republic of Turkey . .This prospect was 
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especially abhorrent to one Shaykh Said, leader of the Azadi tribe, whose stronghold was 
approximately 150 kilometres west of Lake Van. The religious aspect was particularly 
important. When Mustafa Kemal finally abolished the Caliph on 3 March 1924 and the 
sharia courts on 8 April, Azadi preparations for rebellion intensified. During the summer 
Shaykh Said toured the Zaza speaking areas where he was most popular, gaining support 
among tribes neighbouring the Azadi. 
In February 1925 the rebellion began_ in the town ofPiran. It was triggered not by 
Shaykh Said but by an unplanned clash between his forces and a posse of Turkish 
gendarmes in pursuit of a small band of Kurdish outlaws who had sought sanctuary with 
Shaykh Said. But Shaykh Said's hand had been forced, and the rebellion was underway. 
Over the next month Azadi peshmergas and their cohorts, some 15 000 of them 
(Entessar 1992:83), seized a number of towns spread over some 65 OOO.km2 (Map 4:1). 
Trouble, however, was brewing. In late February Mustafa Kemal's new 
Republican government dispatched a contingent of some 35· 000 troops. Within a few 
short weeks the rebels had been halted, forced into retreat, and then surrounded. By mid 
April 30 leaders of the rebellion had been executed. Shaykh Said and his entourage 
temporarily evaded capture until late April, when they were handed over to the Turks by 
a chief of a neighbouring Kurdish tribe which had opposed the rebellion. Shaykh Said 
was subsequently hanged, along with 46 others, in Diyarbakir on 4 September 1925 
(McDowall 1996:196). 
The betrayal of Shaykh Said symbolised the failure he shared with Isma'il Simko 
in Persia: Both were unable to convince surrounding tribes to support their rebellion. In 
Shaykh· Said's case the non-participation of two tribal groupings, the Alevi and the 
Sernak, proved critical. The Alevi did not join Shaykh Said for his was an overtly Sunni 
Islamic rebellion whereas, as noted in Chapter Three, the Alevi religion is a form of Shi'a 
Islam. The Sernak tribes remained neutral for two reasons, firstly because their chiefs had 
accepted gratuity and offers of government posts from the Turks, and secondly because 
they lived in a prosperous part of the region and simply preferred "the security of peace 
to the ravages ofwar" (Olson 1989:96). 
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Source: Olson 1989:97. 
Core of rebellion 
~ Extent of rebellion 
The Kemal government exacted an horrific revenge on the Kurds for the Shaykh 
Said rebellion. Scores of his supporters were hanged. Hundreds of villages and towns 
were ransacked before being burnt to the ground. The hundreds of thousands. rendered 
homeless by such actions were deported en masse to other parts of Turkey to facilitate 
the/Turkicisation' of Kurdistan in Turkey. Kurdish propaganda and Turkish cover-up 
make any estimation of casualties difficult and ·tentative, but McDowall (1996:200) 
suggests that between 1925 and 1928 15 000 Kurds were massacred, over half a million 
.• 
evicted, of which a further 200 000 subsequently perished. The aghas and shaykhs were 
particular targets for deportation or murder, and their lands and possessions were 
confiscated. Similar Kurdish uprisings throughout the 1920s and '30s in Kurdistan in 
Turkey brought only similar retribution. Turkey's then Minister of Justice epitomised the 
government's attitude when he asserted that "the Turk must be the only lord (and 
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master) of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right 
in this country, the right tOb~ servants and ~laves" (McDowall~1989: 12). 
Barzanji and Barzani 
Similar rebellions with the same result were staged in southern Kurdistan. The 
first of these was undertaken by Shaykh Mahmoud Barzanji, an extremely powerful man 
because he was also an agha. Barzanji had served under the Ottomans as the Kurdish 
governor in Sulaymaniya, northeast of Baghdad. As mandate power after the war Britain 
not only retained but increased the area of Barzanji's jurisdiction, the use of indigenous 
authorities "an old British colonial habit. ... found to have advantages" (O'Ballance 
1996:19). Expanding the size ofBarzanji's domain, however, brought him into conflict 
with neighbouring tribal leaders, particularly those in Amadiya, Arbil, Barzan, Kirkuk, 
and Zakho, who rejected his authority. Barzanji was also perceived as a British puppet. 
The British realised their mistake and, when Barzanji questioned British authority in 
1919, removed him into exile in India. 
Barzanji's absence, however, was to be shortlived. For in 1922, when Mustafa 
Kemal's reinvigorated Turkish army crept ever closer to the Mosul vilayet (province), 
the British hurried Barzanji back to lead the Kurdish defence, with the proviso that he 
adhere strictly to British instruction. But Barzanji had other ideas, and upon his return he 
promptly entered into negotiations with the Turks, who· easily illspired him into rebellion 
against the British and their Arab proxies in Baghdad. Although this uprising was small 
and rather impromptu, it was only suppressed after the Royal Air Force (RAF) bombed 
Barzanji's stronghold in Sulaymaniya. 
Despite this attack Barzanji lived to fight another day, a day which came in 1931. 
The catalyst for this second Barzanji rebellion was the Anglo - Iraqi Treaty of 1930. 
Dismayed by the absence of provisions for Kurdish autonomy in·this agreement and the 
. inclusion of the Mosul vilayet into Iraq, Barzanji once again revolted and demanded a 
united and independent Kurdistan. His actions, however, also failed to gain the support 
of other tribes. When the RAF once again bombed his headquarters in Sulaymaniya in the 
spring of 1931, Barzanji's rollercoaster political career finally came to an end, with 
Barzanji accepting house arrest in southern Iraq. 
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The corning of complete Iraqi independence in 1932 under the rule of the 
Hashemite Arabs led by King Faisal inspired yet another Kurdish rebellion. After 
Baghdad attempted to collect taxes and establish a police presence in Kurdistan the 
Barzan tribe from the upper reaches of the Great Zab River, "an area of traditional 
lawlessness seldom touched by external authority" (O'Ballance 1996:20), rebelled under 
the leadership of Shaykh Aluned Barzani. Like Barzanji before him, however, his 
uprising was quashed by Iraqi troops operating with RAF support, and he surrendered to 
Turkish forces in June 1932. 
But his brother, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who was both an agha and a shaykh, 
continued the fight for another twelve months. With only a small force of peshmerga 
remaining Mulla Mustafa surrendered in June 1933 when the RAF once again appeared; 
· although this time they dropped amnesty leaflets, not bombs. Even though it was, from 
the outset, a uni-tribal uprising with little chance of success that stuttered to its inevitably 
anti-climactic end, the Barzani rebellion of 1932 - 33 did signal the start of the 
prestigious political career of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who became "almost synonymous 
with Kurdish revolt.-... He was to prove, even forty years o~ (that) no other Kurd could 
so rally rank and file Kurds as could he, to the chagrin of those Kurds who wished to do 
away with the old tribal order" (McDowall1991:26). 
The rebellions of Simko and Said, Barzanji and Barzani, demonstrate that, 
despite the enormous advances made, in particular but not only, by Shaykh Ubayd Allah 
in the bite nineteenth century in establishing a pan-tribal nation(alism), Kurdish politics 
were still dominated by inter-tribal rivalries, distrust, and conflict. All four leaders, one 
an agha, one a shaykh, the other two both an agha and a shaykh, failed to completely 
transcend these divisions with surrounding tribes whose allegiance, when the moment of 
truth came, they most required. This lack ofunity was undoubtedly the root cause of the 
eventual failure of these six and many other rebellions. 
Party nation(alism) 
The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, Iran 1946 
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As was the case during the 1914- 18 war, World War Two enabled many aghas 
and shaykhs to re-establish local autonomy. The potential for such action was greatest in 
what was a weak Ir~n. Reza Shah's government was perceived by the Allies as having 
pro-German tendencies, so in August 1941 the British and Soviet Armies 'invaded' Iran, 
forcing Reza Shah to abdicate. The Soviets occupied the north of the state while a 
British zone was established in the south. In between, the new government in Tehran, led 
by Reza Shah's son Mohammed Reza Shah, exercised a very limited sovereignty. It was, 
once again, in this power vacuum that the Kurds began to form their first broad based 
political parties. 
One of the first of these new organisations was the Committee for the 
Resurrection of Kurdistan, or Kom_ala (committee) for short. This party rose m 
opposition to the Soviet installation of many Kurds3, lacking in the necessary popular 
respect, as local authorities in place of departing representatives of the Tehran 
government. The Komala was formed in the city of Mahabad by some urban, middle 
class Kurds who were "familiar with the intellectual ferments· of the time", many of them 
having been educated overseas, and whose specific objectives were to ''further the cause 
of Kurdish self-determination" (Entessar 1992:16 - 17). Membership was contingent on 
Kurdish parentage, thus excluding, for example, Azeris and Kurds of mixed blood, even 
though communities of both groups lived and worked in Kurdish areas and spoke the 
Kurdish language. The Komala was, therefore, a nationalist organisation defined on 
ethnicity, in significant contrast with Simko's socioeconomic nation(alism) of the 1920s. 
For various reasons the Komala was unable to extend its appeal into other parts 
of Kurdistan in Iran. Perhaps most importantly the Komala failed in this objective 
because of its internal dynamics, whereby the desire for collective decision making ruled 
out a hierarchical structure. A leaderless organisation was a completely foreign concept 
to most Kurds, familiar with the dominance of their tribal amirs, shaykhs, and aghas . 
. Severely hamstring by this omission, the Komala eventually appointed, in October 1944, 
Mahabad's leading citizen, Qazi Mohammed, as its spiritual leader. 
3 The role of the Soviet Union in the rise and fall of the Kurdish Republic ofMahabad will be 
analysed in detail in Chapter Five. 
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There was a growing recognition, however, that for. the Kamala to be able to 
assert its autonomy demands it required an effective military arm, not of Kurdish 
peshmergas standing alone but with external backing. The Soviet Union was the obvious 
choice given its occupation of northern Iran. Moscow was happy, indeed enthusiastic, to 
lend support, but demanded that the Komala would have to reform itself The Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was consequently formed in September 1945. The 
KDPI' s manifesto included the following key points: 
(1) The Kurdish people in Iran must manage their own local affairs 
and be granted autonomy within Iran's borders; 
(2) The Kurdish people must be allowed to study in their mother 
tongue. The official administrative language in the Kurdish 
territories must be Kurdish; 
(3) Iran's constitution should guarantee that district councillors for 
Kurdistan be elected to. take charge of all social and administrative 
matters; 
( 4) State officials must be chosen from the local Kurdish population; 
(5) The KDPI is committed to progress in agriculture and trade; to 
developing education and sanitation; to furthering the spiritual and 
material well-being of the Kurdish people; and to the best use of 
the natural resources of Kurdistan; and 
(6) The KDPI demands freedom of political action for all the people 
of Iran so that the whole country may rejoice in progress. 
(Quoted in Ghassemlou 1993: 106) 
After seizing control ofMahabad and the surrounding towns and countryside, the 
KDPI declared an autonomous Kurdish Republic on 22 January 1946 (Map 4:2). Qazi 
Mohammed was elected President. The expanse of the Republic largely coincided with 
the territory controlled by Isma'il Simko on two occasions during the late 1910s and 
early 1920s. Within this area the KDPI immediately set about demonstrating that · 
Mahabad was indeed an autonomous Republic. The KDPI government assigned 
portfolios to a new cabinet, including Qazi Mohammed's cousin, Saif Qazi, as Minister 
of War. Other indications of the KDPI's sovereignty included the Kurdish language 
/ •, 
becoming the exclusive tongue in schools and in the now flourishitl:g Kurdish 
newspapers, journals, and books. Kurds took over all government administration 
positions. Qazi Mohammed entered negotiations with Tehran, and demanded that "the 
Kurds need their own state now" (Entessar 1992: 19). 
Map 4:2 The.Kurdish Republic ofMahabad, 
Iran, Janua -December 1946 
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The KDPI also had what it thought was a strong military arm. Aside from its own 
forces drawn from the tribes surrounding Mahabad, the KDPI was boosted by the arrival 
of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his peshmergas from Iraq. The KDPI was thus able to 
replace the Iranian police force previously responsible for law and order. Moreover, 
although Moscow had been careful not to officially commit to the actual military defence 
of the Republic, the presence of the Soviet Army to the north was enough of a deterrent 
to prevent Mohammed Reza Shah from moving against the rebellious Kurds. 
But in May 1946 the Soviets withdrew from Iranian territory, a move which 
signalled the beginning of the end for Mahabad. Like his father before him in the early 
1920s, Mohammed Reza Shah was able to reorganise and re-equip the Iranian Anny. At 
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the end of 1946 Tehran moved against the Republic, its forces proving too strong for the 
KDPI peshmergas. After only a brief scuffle Iranian troops entered the city itself on 17 
December, by which time they were unopposed. Within twelve months of its formation 
the Kurdish Republic ofMahabad had collapsed. 
The establishment of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran was, ironically, both 
the reason for the Mahabad Republic's success and its failure. In the first instance, 
because many of its leaders were foreign educated the KDPI elevated Kurdish 
nation(alism) to a new intellectual plane. This new basis of identity cut across tribal 
divisions in a more secular, political manner than, for example, Shaykh Said's religious 
nation(alism) of the mid 1920s. Such modern political organisation attracted the 
attention of other Kurds, hence the arrival of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, as well as the 
interest and support of the Soviet Union. For all these reasons the KDPI's Kurdish 
Republic of Mahabad enjoyed, albeit for only a short time, the highest level of political 
autonomy that any Kurdish rebellion had (and has) ever established. And as such the 
Republic provides and persists as a crucial reference point in contemporary Kurdish 
nation(alism). 
But these were also the reasons for the KDPI's failure. For example, while the 
emerging Leftist and Marxist political doctrines represented the spirit of the times for the 
growing number of politically active, urban Kurdish intellectuals, they were nothing short 
of alien concepts to the still important aghas and tribes people, far beyond their 
intellectual capabilities. Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his peshmergas arrived from Iraq not 
I 
fresh and ready to take on the Persians but weakened and demoralised after a failed 
rebellion against Baghdad. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from 
northern Iran, for its own much wider geopolitical interests\ provided Tehran with the 
'political and geographic freedom to attack and defeat the separatist movement. 
Qazi Mohammed did not attempt to flee the advancing Iranian Army. He and 
other KDPI leaders, found guilty of treason, were hanged in Mahabad's main square on 
31 March 1947. The President's death was later acclaimed by KDPI Secretary General 
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, who "praised Qazi Mohammed for his exemplary conduct 
4 These are also explained in Chapter Five. 
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and indefatigable endeavour to further the Kurdish cause at the expense of his own life" 
(Entessar 1992:19). 
Kurdish national politics after Mahabad 
The Mahabad experience had both positive and negative impacts for the Kurds, 
not just in Iran but also in Iraq and Turkey. On the credit side of the ledger, the 
achievements of the KDPI at Mahabad demonstrated the potential of broad based 
political parties to achieve Kurdish autonomy. This example led to the formation of a 
plethora of such organisations, of various sizes, persuasions, and modi operandi, in Iraq 
and Turkey. But all these parties had one common trait: The dissemination of the 
nationalist message to the Kurdish masses with the objective of transcending tribal 
politics in pursuit of some level of national self-determination. Opposing this surging 
ethnic nation(alism), however, were the considerable forces of the three official 
nation( alism)s of the Persians, Arabs, and Turks. The enormous power disparity between 
the Kurds and Tehran, Baghdad, and Ankara meant that mass Kurdish nation(alism) 
would be a prolonged and extremely bloody experience. Seeking territorial and political 
unity the governments of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have employed varying degrees of 
political suppression by banning Kurdish parties, of cultural repression by o1:1tlawing the 
Kurdish language, religion, and customs, and military oppression through martial law, 
implemented by the wholesale destruction of villages, kidnappings, torture, and murder, 
mass deportations of the general population to other parts of state territory, etc. 
In the aftermath of the KDPI's brief flirt with independence it and other Kurdish 
political organisations, including the remnants of the Komala, were forced into secret 
operation. Support for the KDPI nosedived, especially amongst the tribes who 
participated at Mahabad. Following the deathly purge of Qazi Mohammed and his 
colleagues, the new leadership were identified, arrested, and imprisoned. Kurdish schools 
and 'government' offices were destroyed, Kurdish printing presses were dismantled, and 
speaking, writing, and teaching in the Kurdish language were banned. 
While Mulla Mustafa Barzani was encamped at Mahabad a group of Kurdish 
intellectuals in Iraq had established, in August 1946, the Kurdish Democratic Party 
(KDP). This organisation, which evolved from the shortlived communist Kurdish 
Liberation Party, was led by its Secretary - General, a lawyer named Hamzah Abdullah. 
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The urban, middle class KDP hierarchy recognised the crucial importance ofBarzani as a 
charismatic, energetic, and appealing religious and secular leader capable of overcoming 
tribal divisions by acquiring the allegiance of the vital aghas and shaykhs and their loyal 
peshmerga, so he was consequently appointed as President. Barzani, however, was 
unable to assume this position in Iraq, as conditions there had not settled after his 
rebellion against Baghdad in 1944 - 45. Rather, after the demise of the Republic of 
Mahabad Barzani escaped to the Soviet Union, where he was to spend the next twelve 
years in exile. With Barzani absent the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq floundered 
through most of the 1950s. 
For the Kurds in Turkey the immediate post-war period was one of silent 
recovery after the brutal repression under the Kemalists during the 1920s and '30s. 
Circumstances began to change for the better, however, after Turkey's first general 
election in 1950, in which the Kurds demonstrated ''their deep antipathy to Kemalism by 
voting heavily for the (opposition) Democratic Party" (McDowall 1991:23). Aghas and 
shaykhs took on a new importance in the liberalisation that followed, because as still 
respected leaders of the Kurds they controlled substantial voting blocs. Turkish political 
parties in general and the new Ankara government in particular recognised this rather 
ironic Kurdish power source, and the Kurds' voting loyalty was bought, just as the 
Ottomans had done, by the proffering of gifts. For example, aghas, shaykhs, and a new 
landlord class were reinstated with lands and property confiscated in the interwar 
crackdown, Kurds were elected to the Turkish parliament, some of whom even made it 
to the cabinet, and for the first time government funded schools, roads, hospitals, and 
other infrastructure were built in Kurdistan in Turkey. 
Despite these reforms the Kurds were still severely restricted by various Turkish 
laws.· Most importantly, specifically Kurdish political parties were (and still are) illegal, 
so politically minded Kurds had to belong to overtly Turkish organisations and not voice 
any Kurdish nationalist sentiment. The Kurdish language, dress, and customs also 
remained illegal, and the Turkish government persisted with the rather optimistic 
euphemism that the Kurds were not really Kurds at all, but merely 'Mountain Turks who 
have forgotten their language' (Atarodi 1991:283; Bulloch and Morris 1992:168). Thus 
behind the facade of liberal democratic reforms the legal repression of Kurds remained 
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untouched, and as a consequence Kurdish nation(alism) in Turkey in the 1950s was 
extremely stifled. 
Back in Iran a mid 1950s lull in the Kurdish - Persian confrontation which 
followed the fall of Mahabad enabled the KDPI to begin to reorganis~ itself and its 
activities, although still in the utmost secrecy, for it too was an illegal organisation. But 
over the ensuing years the KDPI was able to expand its urban, middle class following in 
cities other than Mahabad, which it had been unable to do in the 1940s. The KDPI was 
also able to recruit en masse the tribal aghas and shaykhs and their peshmergas, the 
constituency so vitally lacking at the Republic. Emerging out of the political shadows, 
however, was a dangerous strategy for KDPI organisers, who once again were 
"increasingly harassed by the authorities. Two leading members of the 
KDPI Central Committee were arrested and remained in jail until the 
revolution of 1979. In 1959 at least 250 activists were arrested, whilst 
others escaped to Baghdad" (McDowall1991:23). 
To escape this new repression the top leadership of the KDPI withdrew across 
the border into Iraq. This move, however, created teilsions with Barzani's KDP, which 
by the early 1960s was receiving arms and money from Tehran for its own struggle 
against Baghdad, as Iraq and Iran were mutual archenemies themselves. Continued 
Persian support became contingent on Barzani ceasing all cooperation with the KDPI 
and preventing their recrossin:g back into Iran, isolating the KDPI leadership from the 
Kurdish popUlation inside and thus undermining Kurdish nation(alism) iritheir own state. 
Barzani's self centred interest in the fate of the Kurds in Iraq, his consequent disregard 
for the Kurds of Iran, and his personal need to retain Tehran's military and financial aid 
led the KDP to do exactly as the Persians demanded. Tensions between the KDP and 
KDPI came to a head in 1968, when Barzani executed Sulaiman Muini, a prominent 
KDPI leader, and more than 40 other members of the KDPI hierarchy living iri Iraq. 
Muini's corpse was subsequently handed over to the Persian authorities who promptly 
displayed it in a number of Kurdish towns, forcing large number-s ofKDPI -loyal aghas, 
shaykhs, and peshmergas back underground. The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran 
simply collapsed. 
The KDPI was, however, able to continue the fight, ironically but entirely 
practically, from Baghdad. For just as the KDP and Tehran had forged an alliance of 
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convenience against their mutual Arab enemy, the KDPI had denounced Mohammed 
Reza Shah's regime, immediately attracting the support of the Ba'ath government of 
Iraq. The enemy of my enemy is indeed my friend. Just as the Persians and Ottomans had 
played on Kurdish tribal divisions and rivalries, the Persians and Arabs exploited the 
KDP ~ KDPI tension and were able to employ each other's Kurds as local proxies to 
their own antagonism. 
This discussion of the first stage of modern Kurdish politics has demonstrated a 
number of crucial points. First, it has traced the early evolution of the :first and most 
important Kurdish political parties during World War Two and throughout the following 
two decades or so. This process saw the basis of Kurdish political organisation transform 
from the individual tribe to pan-tribal (but certainly not universal) modern political 
. parties. Second, and in relation to this same point, the tension between the KDP and the 
KDPI illustrated that the inter-tribal rivalries of the pre-modern period had gone through 
a similar transition, and had by no means been eliminated by the rise of Kurdish political 
parties. 
Finally, this section has alluded to the fact that, by the 1960s, the modern state 
system had become entrenched in the Middle East, unlike the interwar years. This 
development had the important consequence of fragmenting the Kurds politically and 
they would now have to negotiate independently with Tehran, Baghdad, and Ankara. In 
turn, this separation meant that Kurdish nation(alism) in each state would evolve along 
different trajectories at different rates. It is on this last point that this section is 
concluded, for the emergence of a truly popular Kurdish nation(alism) in Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey occurred at distinct stages from the 1960s on. 
Popular nation(alism) 
The KDP rebellion, Iraq 1961- 75 
Popular Kurdish nation(alism) first emerged in Iraq in the early 1960s. This 
assertion is made on the evidence provided by the Kurdish Democratic Party's fourteen 
year rebellion against a number of successive governments in Baghdad. 
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As absentee President of the KDP, Mulla Mustafa Barzani returned from exile in 
the Soviet Union after the Free Officers Revolution of July 1958, which overthrew the 
Hashemite monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq. Barzani and the new .Iraqi 
President, General Abdul Karim Qasim, entered an alliance of convenience in 1959. For 
Barzani this collusion had two interrelated purposes, the affirmation of his pre-eminence 
amongst Kurdish nationalists, and the quashing of other Kurdish political parties, as well 
as some remaining tribes, opposed to the KDP. These other Kurdish organisations were 
labelled as pro-monarchist by the new Republic's regime, thus providing the motivation 
for Qasim to arm and finance the KDP in its struggle against Kurdish rival groups. 
The partnership was, however, to be shortlived. After obtaining government 
recognition Barzani was, by 1960, demanding Kurdish autonomy. in Kurdistan in Iraq. 
Qasim, realising that Barzani had become too dominant within the KDP and vis - a - vis 
other Kurdish groups, began to distance his government from Barzani and to· support 
rival factions. By the summer of 1961 the KDP was in open conflict with their Kurdish 
opponents. This skirmishing produced cracks within the KDP. The urbanised, 
democratically minded members of the party's hieni.rchy regarded the intra-Kurdish 
fighting as a tribal affair which served nobody's interests but Baghdad's and who 
resented Barzani' s authoritarian, tribal leadership style. 
Barzani, however, still commanded the largest following, and especially a 
substantial peshmerga force. By December 1961 Barzani's troops, estimated at more 
than 6 000 and far outnumbering any other Kurdish force (McDowall 1991:27), 
occupied a 480 by 112 kilometre crescent ofKurdistan in Iraq, nearly 54 000 km2, from 
the Syrian border to the city of Khanaqin. KDP control of this substantial slice of Iraqi 
territory, and Barzani's continued demands for autonomy, was too much for Qasim to 
remain a bystander, so Iraq's military was mobilised and entered the conflict against 
Barzani towards the end of 1961. 
Baghdad's entry into the war on the side of the anti-KDP Kurds seemed to signal 
the end for Barzani's rebellion. But the experienced campaigner was able to find a new 
patron, the government in Tehran, who assumed Baghdad's role of providing arms and 
money. This partnership was. a major escalation in the conflict. Although Baghdad was 
able to seize major cities and towns, Barzani' s peshmergas changed to guerilla tactics 
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rather than large scale engagements and maintained control of the countryside. This 
anarchic state of affairs persisted throughout the 1960s, the KDP continuing to receive 
support from Tehran, and Barzani continuing to build up his forces. On the other hand, 
Baghdad was beginning to realise that it was fighting a war it could not win on the 
battlefield. 
The new Ba'ath Socialist government, which seized power in a two-step military 
coup in July 1968, was acutely aware of the improbability of a military victory over the 
Kurds. A truce was sought at the negotiating table, and on 11 March 1970 a peace 
agreement was signed between the KDP and Baghdad, laying the foundations for the 
establishment of a Kurdish Autonomy Region (KAR; Map 4:3). In the following months 
"a number of clauses of the·. agreement were implemented, 
including the amendment to the constitution (recognising the 
existence of two nationalities in Iraq), the appointment of senior 
Kurdish officials including some members of the KDP as 
governors of Dohuk and Arbil .... Kurdish police chiefs for the 
three provinces of Dohuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniya. Factories 
were established, and agrarian reform quickened" (McDowall 
1991:29). 
But by 1972 the agreement, known as the 'March Manifesto' and supposed to be 
fully implemented by 11 March 1974, was beginning to fall apart. Encouraged by Iran 
Barzani increased his demands of political and military authority within the KAR .. Clearly 
concerned with Barzani's ongoing and ever closer relationship with Tehran, Baghdad 
began to delay the implementation of the March Manifesto's remaining provisions. Most 
important among these was a new census, which was to be used to delineate the KAR's . 
geographic area using the 50 percent population threshold. 
As 11 March 1974 approached the March Manifesto was quickly becoming a 
dead letter. Baghdad, "faced with a protracted war it could not win, (Entessar 1992:75), 
realised that an alternative proposal had to be formulated. Their new plan, unveiled on 12 
December 1973, was immediately rejected by the KDP, for two reasons. First, the new 
census was to be cancelled and the boundaries of the KAR were to be determined by the 
195 7 census. Second, the document included no provision for a proportion of Iraq's oil 
revenues to be spent exclusively in Iraq, a consistent KDP demand. A third plan 
announced on 11 March 1974, the very day that the March Manifesto was to be fully 
implemented, was similarly rejected by the KDP. 
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The collapse of the March Manifesto precipitated an instant renewal of fighting 
between Kurds and Arabs. The KDP, heavily supported by Iranian weaponry and money, 
now had a peshmerga force estimated to be a staggering 50 000 strong (McDowall 
1989:9). But the KDP, and Barzani in particular, still had Kurdish opponents, and many 
thousand Kurds fought alongside Arab goverrurient forces. Despite this Kurdish division, 
by 1975 Baghdad had realised that it was now fighting a war that it could not win -
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unless it was able to break the ties between Tehran and the KDP. As a means of 
achieving this objective, the Ba'ath government conceded on its hitherto steadfast refusal 
to resolve its own dispute with Tehran by redrawing, in Iran's favour, the international 
boundary along the strategic Shatt al-Arab waterway5• In return Tehran agreed to cease 
its military and financial support of the KDP. 
The Barzani rebellion instantly collapsed, as did the whole KDP. A pro-Barzani 
faction remained loyal to Mulla Mustafa's sons, Massoud and Idris, who assumed the 
KDP leadership after their father was once again exiled from Iraq. An anti-Barzani 
faction, however, accused Barzani of betraying the Kurdish cause and under the 
leadership of Jalal Talabani formed the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK) in June 1976. 
But there is no doubt that Mulla Mustafa Barzani was a great Kurdish nationalist who 
inspired the emergence of a truly popular Kurdish nation(alism) in Iraq. As McDowall 
(1991:26) writes, "no other Kurd could so rally rank and file Kurds as could he", to 
which Entessar (1992:55) adds, ''Mulla Mustafa's success was .... a result of his ability to 
combine secular (as an agha)and religious (as a shaykh) power into a highly charismatic 
leadership". Mulla Mustafa Barzani died in the United States in 1979 after an incredible, 
but ultimately fruitless, half a century of rebellion against central government. 
The Kurds in Turkey, 1961-1978 
The KDP rebellion in Iraq was a source of great inspiration to the Kurds in 
Turkey, and in 1965 the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (KDPT) was formed with 
the specific objective of achieving complete independence through the creation of a . 
separate Kurdish state. This organisation was established and operated in the utmost 
secrecy, for it was (and is) illegal to form overtly Kurdish political parties and to express 
Kurdish nationalist sentiments. Thus although the Kurds were enfranchised and could 
hold political office, they had project a Turkish identity and be members in a Turkish 
party. For these reasons the KDPT maintained clandestine operations, mobilising and 
organising the Kurdish populace until, . on 3 August 1967, the KDPY came out of the . 
political woodwork. On this day the KDPT staged mass public demonstrations which 
attracted 10 000 Kurds in Silvan and 25 000 Kurds in Diyarbakir onto the streets. 
5 This agreement was signed in Algiers on 6 March 1975 between Mohammed Reza Shah and 
Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein. 
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McDowall (1996:18) writes that these rallies were "the first expression of Kurdish anger 
(in Turkey) for 30 years". 
The KDPT and the Kurds in general, however, were to pay a heavy price for this 
outburst, with the government in Ankara establishing special army units to survey and 
subdue the Kurdish population. Many Kurds were employed by the army to report any 
Kurdish political activity, and suspects were arrested en masse, detained, tortured, and 
even murdered in prison, their homes searched and often torched. Under this onslaught 
the KDPT, a solely political party with no military defence, disappeared by the late 
1960s. 
Despite its short life the KDPT had succeeded in pushing the hitherto denied 
'Kurdish problem' into the public eye. Turkish opposition parties of the left, also banned 
from referring to the Kurds by name and certainly to any kind of Kurdish nationalism, 
defied government strictures and increasingly expressed an interest in the Kurdish cause. 
In the late 1960s ties between a plethora of new explicitly Kurdish (and thereby illegal) 
political parties and a similarly vast array of Turkish organisations of the left became ever 
closer. These new relationships were exemplified by the association between the 
Organisation of Revolutionary Kurdish Youth (DDKO) and the Turkish Workers Party 
(TWP). The DDKO was established in 1969 by Kurds who were also members of the 
latter. By October 1970 the TWP had decided to recognise the Kurds as a distinct ethnic 
group and the legitimacy of their struggle, and were immediately outlawed by the regime 
in Ankara. 
Six months later, in March 1971, the Turkish army staged a successful coup and 
formed a military government. On the premise of pre-empting an imminent Kurdish 
uprising the new regime moved quickly and decisively against the numerous Kurdish 
groups and dissident Turkish parties. The DDKO and the -TWP were, of course, 
especially targeted, "their leaders and activists were imprisoned, and the military initiated 
a new round of sustained attacks on Kurdish villages, resulting in their destruction and 
the deportation of their residents" (Entessar 1992:90 - 91). This wave of suppression 
ushered in a period of "relative tranquillity" (McDowall 1996:410), but by 1974 a 
"rejuvenated Kurdish movement had a broader social base and was more radical in its 
demands than in the 1960s" (Entessar 1992:91). 
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The repression of the early 1970s was indeed a powerful force in the mobilisation 
of a great number of Kurds into multifarious groups. This Kurdish political 
reorganisation centred on and was dominated by the revival of the old DDKO, which 
became the new Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association (DDKD), which by 
1978 had a total membership of 50 000 (McDowall1991:20). The emergence of a mass 
Kurdish nation(alism) in Turkey, inspired by Barzani's KDP in Iraq and given 
considerable impetus by a stubborn and brutal Turkish government, was complete by the 
late 1970s. 
The KDPI and the Islamic Revolution, Iran 1978·- 80 
By the time the KDP's fourteen year rebellion against Baghdad had imploded in 
1975, the Kurds in Iran were on the fast track to achieving a popular Kurdish 
· nation(alism) after the Mahabad defeat, the reprisals that followed in the 1950s, and the 
period of inactivity during the 1960s. And once again the KDPI was the main focus of 
the Kurds' mobilisation. The KDPI of the mid 1970s, however, was a fundamentally 
different political party than the KDPI of the Mahabad Republic. After Mohammed Reza 
Shah's brutal suppression the KDPI was able to begin the process of overcoming its 
previous burden; the lack of popular support. Koohi"Kamali (1992:181) neatly describes 
this crucial change, claiming that during the 1970s the KDPI 
· ''was rapidly being transformed from a relatively small underground 
organisation into a mass party with .. a sizeable membership and a 
reasonably clear programme for Kurdish autonomy .... The KDPI received 
its main support from urban middle class intellectuals .... merchants and 
· government employees, and from the tribal elites". 
The loyalty of the tribal elites enabled the KDPI, for the first time, to gather 
together a "credible military force" (Koohi"Kamali 1992:182). In combination with an 
astute urban intellectual leadership, headed by Secretary General Abdul Rahman 
Ghassemlou, the KDPI represented a modem political party which had subsumed tribal 
loyalties to a popular Kurdish nation(alism). 
The political and military strength of the KDPI was demonstrated in the lead up 
to the Islamic Revolution of January 1979, which overthrew the Shah's regime and 
installed the Shi'a fundamentalist government of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ghassemlou, 
recognising the imminent downfall of Mohammed Reza Shah's government, aligned the 
KDPI with the Shi'a opposition. When Khomeini's forces moved against Tehran, so too 
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did the KDPrs peshmergas, who seized control of local police stations and army 
barracks. The more organised, popular, and focussed KDPI, with its larger, better 
equipped, and more disciplined military arm, were intent on establishing a Kurdish 
autonomy region within the new Iran. 
And the KDPI believed its chances of obtaining that status were extremely good, 
for two important reasons. First, because "Ghassemlou had consistently advocated 
cooperation with other revolutionary groups" (McDowall 1989:17), and secondly 
because the KDPI had moderated its previous demands of secession from Iran to 
autonomy within Iran. Moreover, the draft Islamic constitution was a further source of 
hope for the Kurds, for it guaranteed equal rights for ethnic minorities, of the Islamic 
Republic, allowed all Muslims to maintain their own school of religious thought, and 
permitted the use oflocallanguages in local schools and press. 
But it soon became clear that the Shi'a fundamentalist governm~nt would renege 
on such promises. As Khomeini himself put it, 
"Sometimes the word (minority) is. used to refer to people such 
as the Kurds .... These people should not be called (a minority), 
because this term implies that there is a difference between these 
brothers. In Islam (that is Shi 'a Islam) such a difference has no 
place at all. There is no difference between Muslims who speak 
different languages" (Quoted in Entessar 1992:29). 
The majority of Kurds and certainly the KDPI, however, are Sunni Muslims, and 
as such are more moderate than their Shi'a counterparts. Khomeini's claims were thereby 
rejected, the KDPI recognising that there was a difference between "Muslim brothers" 
and between "Muslims who speak different languages". These. divergent positions 
precipitated armed clashes between KDPI peshmergas and Khomeini's Revolutionary 
Guards, or pasdaran, which increased in intensity and frequency throughout the summer 
of 1979. Events on the battlefield reached a climax in August, when Khomeini deployed 
the Iranian army, with helicopter gunships, jet aircraft, tanks, and.heavy artillery, against 
KDPI forces. 
The military conflict eliminated nearly all possibility that the new Islamic 
Constitution would provide for Kurdish cultural and political recognition. This fear was 
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confinned in November 1979, when the final draft of the constitution was passed by the 
Iranian majlis (parliament) in which 
"All mention of the equality of the ethnic peoples was dropped; 
there was no guarantee of the religious rights of the Sunni and as 
for the use of local languages, the constitution stated that local 
languages could be used in the press, the mass media, and 
schools, but only alongside Persian, and that school textbooks 
had to be in Persian. The constitution clearly had no intention of 
accommodating the ethnic aspirations of the minority peoples" 
(Koohi-Kamali 1992: 185-86). 
Tehran's repudiation of Kurdish ethnicity, religion, and language meant that the 
fighting persisted well into 1980. Although thePersians were able to regain control of 
major cities and towns, the KDPI continued to dominate the countryside, from where 
they mounted a guerilla war against Tehran. Secretary General Ghassemlou and Iranian 
President Bani-Sadr entered negotiations over a ceasefire and some level of 'self-
administration', but offers and counter-offers·were consistently rejected by both parties. 
The undoubtedly limited chances of reaching a negotiated settlement, however, were 
completely overridden, on 22 September 1980, by a more pressing crisis: Iraq's invasion 
oflran. In the consequent eight year Persian Gulf war, the KDPI was to play a significant 
political and military role, further evidence of the emergence of popular Kurdish 
nation(alism) in Iran. 
The KDP, PUK, and KDPiin tile Iran -Iraq war, 1980- 88 · 
.It is useful to review the situation of the three major Kurdish parties, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq and the · 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPn, at the moment of Baghdad's invasion. The 
KDP, although it had recommenced minor military operations, had not recovered from 
its devastating defeat in 1975, from the severance of its military and financial lifelines 
fro~ Tehran, nor from the exile and death of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1979. The 
decline of the KDP was compensated by the rise of Jalal Talabani's PUK, which had 
gained Syrian endorsement, established its headquarters in the capital Damascus and its 
branch office in Sulaymaniya. The KDPI, alienated by Khomeini's new Shi'a Islamic 
regime, were pushed further into the arms of Baghdad, who willingly opened the military 
warehouse and the treasury purse-strings. 
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Iraq's belligerence-prompted the new govemn:1ent in Tehran to declare the 1975 
Algiers agreement null and void, and immediately resumed supplying the KDP with arms 
and cash. Given Baghdad's support of the KDPI, this renewed Tehran- KDP link meant 
that the two state governments were both using their opponent's Kurds to destabilise 
each other. So once again the KDP and the KDPI became local proxies to a wider 
conflict: Tehran used the KDP to fight Baghdad and Baghdad used the KDPI to fight 
Tehran in the Kurdistan regions, while Arabs and Persians fought each other along the 
central and southern fronts. Both Tehran's and Baghdad's strategy, of course, was to 
force the other to commit troops to fighting the Kurds along a northern front, weakening 
their opponent's presence on the more critical central and southern fronts; thus 
increasing their chances of victory. This rather simple scenario was complicated by the 
Syrian backed PUK who, having split from the KDP in 1975, often found themselves in 
open disagreement, even violence, with the Barzani brothers. 
This situation reveals a substantial contradiction: While the Arab and Persian 
governments both vehemently denied the rights of Kurds and open:ly fought the Kurdish 
nationalist movement at home, both recognised and exploited the very same struggle 
within their opponent's boundaries. Similarly, Kurds .on both sides of the border 
temporarily forgot the previous atrocities committed by their new sponsor on fellow 
Kurds in each state. Given these contradictory client - patron relationships it is little 
wonder that Kurd fought Kurd during the eight year Iran - Iraq war. 
And that war very quickly fought itself to a standstill on the central and southern 
fronts. After the initial success of Iraq's invasion, Iranian forces mobilised en masse and, 
with the same Islamic fervour that had carried the Shi'a regime to power, repelled the 
Sunni Arab enemy. Within a few short months Iraqi forces were entrenched along a 1 
000 kilometre long defensive line barely inside Iranian territory. "The scene", writes 
O'Ballance (1996:123) quickly became "reminiscent of the First-World War, with Iraqi 
_ troops holding ever stronger entrenchments and Iranian 'human waves' battering 
themselves against them, mostly unsuccessfully". This "bloody stalemate between the 
two giants" (McDowalll991:34), which was to ultimately cost more than a million lives, 
continued in this theatre almost unchanged for the entire duration. The military 
confrontation in Kurdistan, however, was to be much more fluid, but certainly no less 
bloody. 
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In the summer of 1982 Tehran launched a concerted assault on KDPI held 
territory in Kurdistan in Iran. By November it had captured the road between Piranshahr 
and Sardasht, a serious blow to the KDPI because this was a vital supply line in its 
guerilla war. But such tactics of warfare avoided direct engagement with Persian forces, 
and it was not until early 1984 that the KDPI was evicted altogether from Iran and into 
Kurdistan in Iraq. The Kurdish civilian population was, of course, caught up in the 
conflict; indeed McDowall (1989:24) claims that 27 500 Kurds had been killed by this 
stage of the war, of whom only 2 500 were peshmergas, a civilian- military ratio of 10 
to one. The arrival of the KDPI remnants in Iraq, however, merely exacerbated its 
conflict with the KDP who, being dependent on Tehran's supply of arms and money, had 
assisted in the operations (Koohi-Kamali 1992:188). 
But the KDP's main priority in the first years of the war was, as usual, to fight 
the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad, which from July 1979 had been headed by President 
Saddam Hussein. The PUK was also active militarily against the Arabs, and between 
them their estimated peshmerga force of 15 000 tied down nearly I 00 000 Arab troops. 
The KDP and PUK, it must be remembered, shared a mutual animosity towards each 
other, and on occasion this erupted into violence. ill-feeling between the KDP and PUK 
ran particularly high in 1984, after the PUK agreed to a ceasefire with Baghdad. When 
the KDPI arrived at this time, it was no surprise that they and the PUK stood together 
against the KDP. 
Beginning in 1985, however, the KDP, PUK, and other Kurdish parties in Iraq 
began a rapprochement that resulted, in July 1987, in the formation of an Iraqi Kurdistan 
Front (IKF). By emphasising the member parties' common goal of national self-
determination, thus down-playing their political differences, the IKF adopted a strategy 
which 
"called for the formation of an Iraqi National Front of all (that is,· 
including Sunni and Shi'a Arab) opposition parties, the 
·· overthrow of Saddam Hussein, an end to the Iran - Iraq conflict 
on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty both sides of the 
international border, and full Kurdish national rights and 
democratic choice". 
All these demands indicated that the IKF had moderated the previous objective of 
Kurdish self-determination through full independence to autonomy within Iraq. This 
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important change in the Kurdish nationalist strategy reflected a sophisticated political 
realisation that the prospects for a sovereign Kurdish state, especially one that also 
included parts or all of Kurdistan in Iran, let alone Turkey, were extremely remote. 
The IKF's agenda attracted the support of Tehran, and during 1987 KDP, PUK, 
and Persian forces cooperated in military operations in Kurdistan in Iraq. The Kurds 
dominated the countryside, rural villages, and small towns, and hindering Arab troop 
movements by cutting road links. 
The establishment of the IKF was perceived in Baghdad as a great threat to 
Iraq's survival. After decades of exploiting animosities between Kurdish tribes and more 
recently political parties as a means of keeping the Kurds divided and thus of minimal 
danger, the sudden appearance of a united Kurdish nationalist organisation was an 
unprecedented moment of: for the l<.urds, national glory and, for the Arabs, of great 
menace. Saddam Hussein· responded to this growing peril, even before the formal 
announcement of the IKF' s existence, with what became over the next two years perhaps 
the most brutal repression of any Kurdish nationalist movement ever, in either Iran, Iraq, 
or Turkey. For beginning on 15 April 1987 the Arab government resorted to the use of 
chemical weapons against the Kurds. By the middle of the year, when the IKF entered 
the public arena, "chemical weapons were in daily use" (Karadaghi 1993:225). Countless 
thousands died in this most vicious of retributions. 
While the deployment of chemical weapons was a grisly new twist in the violent 
history of the Kurds, these latest reprisals also included a return to some old strategies of 
suppression. Foremost amongst these were the wholesale destruction of villages, up to 3 
000 claims McDowall (1991:38), the mass deportation of half a million Kurds 
(McDowall1991:38) to detention camps in the deserts of southern and western Iraq, and 
large scale arbitrary arrest and execution. In strategic areas Baghdad also enforced 'free 
fire zones', "in which any living creatures - human or otherwise.- were to be shot on 
sight'' (McDowall1989:27). As a result of all these tactics many Kurds began to flee to 
"',· -· ~- - --
Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Despite this intense and brutal oppression the IKF continued to 
operate a military campaign into 1988, with Tehran's support, and optimism persisted 
that Saddam Hussein's downfall was imminent. Continued military successes, for 
example, the capture of the town ofHalabja on 15 March, however, were not steps to 
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ultimate victory but, on the contrary, merely provocation for even more horrendous 
reprisals than those exacted during the previous year. 
And it was the IKF ':' Persian occupied town of Halabja that was the first to be 
struck, the day after Arab forces were evicted. Saddam Hussein again used chemical 
weapons, the mustard and nerve gas artillery shells raining down for several hours. The 
Middle East Watch reported that: 
''Dead bodies - human and animal - littered the streets, huddled in 
doorways, slumped over the steering wheels of their cars. 
Survivors stumbled around, laughing hysterically, before 
collapsing .... Those who 'had been directly exposed to the gas 
found that their symptoms worsened as the night wore on. Many 
children died along the way and were abandoned where the fell" 
(Quoted in McDowall 1996:358). 
The horror at Halabja has come to symbolise the 'tragic history of the Kurds' (Bulloch 
and Morris 1992). 
The incident at Halabja also signalled the beginning of yet another round of 
ferocious attacks on the Kurds between March and September 1988. Known collectively 
as the Anfal operations6, these were to surpass in barbarity even the offensives of the 
previous year. The Kurdish situation was rendered even more dire by Iran's exhaustion 
from the war with Iraq, and Tehran's subsequent acceptance, on 20 August 1988, of 
Security Council Resolution 598, a year old UN ceasefire resolution. 
Within a week Baghdad initiated an all out attack on the remaining IKF positions, · 
with ground and air forces operating in unison. Chemical weapons were o~ce again 
deployed on Kurdish villages and towns, and even on those Kurds, some 120 000, 
attempting to reach safety in Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Mass deportations, internments, 
i 
·and executions continued with "a brutality reminiscent of Nazi death camps". (McDowall 
1996:359). 'Activists' claim that the Anfal operations claimed an astonishing 186 000 
Kurdish lives and destroyed no less than 4 000 villages (Buckley 1994: 11). McDowall 
(1996:360) asserts that by the end of the war a staggering 1.5 million Kurds, one third of 
the Kurdish population of Iraq, had been "forcibly resettled", and that an incredulous 45 
000 km2 ofKurdistan in Iraq, some sixty percent, had been simply "cleared of Kurds". 
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Given these statistics it is little wonder that Buckley ( 1994: 11) describes · Anfal as "a 
carefully planned programme of extermination", while Karadaghi (1993:225) claims that 
Anfal "undeniably reached the level of genocide". 
At the start of the Iran- Iraq war the KDP, PUK, and KDPI saw the conflict as 
an opportunity to press their claims for Kurdish self-determination. By the cessation of 
hostilities all three parties were as far away from achieving that objective as they had 
ever been. For neither party held any significant amounts of territory, their peshmerga 
forces had taken a battering, and their political leadership entered "a period of self-doubt 
and self-criticism" (McDowall1991:42). On this last point there was general recognition 
that the Kurds' lack of unity, not only between parties in . different states but also 
between parties of the same state, had cost them dearly. The IKF, however, had shown 
·:;:;:~-'--<~ 
that a united political front was both possible and criticaL But its dependence on Tehran 
had also illustrated, once again, the Kurds' vulnerability to such alliances of convenience. 
The KDP, PUK, and KDPI faced many individual and collective dilemmas indeed in the 
aftermath of the Persian GulfWar. 
The PKK in Turkey, 1978- 96 
Although the Kurdish renaissance in Turkey during the mid 1970s was led by the 
Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association (DDKD), it was another group, the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), that from ~ts inception in 1978 spearheaded Kurdish 
nation( alism), and has done so ever since. The origins of the PKK can be traced to the 
early 1970s when one Abdullah Ocalan, then a student in Ankara, formed a small group 
amongst the rapidly growing Kurdish proletariat in Turkey's main industrial centres. This 
organisation was known as Apocular, the followers of AjJo, Apo being Ocalan's 
nickname. The Apocular was a strongly Marxist - Leninist party that deplored the 
exploitation of both rural and urban Kurds by Turkish overlords, thus framing the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in terms of class struggle and popular revolution. Despite 
its Marxist - Leninist dogma the Apocular decided against linking forces with the 
Turkish left, and in 197 5 Ocalan and his small band of lieutenants withdrew from Ankara 
and returned to Kurdistan in Turkey in order to establish popular support. 
6 Anfal is an Arab word meaning 'the spoils of victory', and is also the name of a chapter in the 
Koran. 
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The Apocular 's call for working class rebellion instantly struck a chord with the 
Kurds of economically underdeveloped eastern Turkey. By 1978 the Apocular's 
following was such that it had to reform itself, and subsequently became the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK). Again led by Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK openly demanded 
Kurdish national self-determination through nothing less than complete independence in 
a Kurdish state. Ironically; Ocalan and many of the PKK leadership spoke only Turkish, 
not Kurdish. But this peculiarity did not detract from the PKK's legitimacy; quite the 
reverse, in fact. As McDowall ( 1996: 419) notes: 
'1:he PKK's nationalism was all the more virulent because the 
founders sought to recreate an identity they felt they had 
lost .... For the PKK the intensity of Kurdish national feeling was 
accentuated by the loss of spoken Kurdish among its founding 
members". 
In September 1980 the Turkish military staged its third successful coup in twenty 
years, seizing power and immediately "made it clear that they intended to brook no 
expression of the Kurdish movement or identity whatsoever" (McDowall 1991: 19). 
Given the PKK's by now overt activities a new crackdown was thus inevitable, and 
nearly 2 000 PKK members, including some of the central committee, were arrested. The 
remaining PKK leaders, including Ocalan, managed evade the Turkish army and escape 
over the border into Syria. With backing from Damascus the PKK quietly prepared itself 
for a return to Kurdistan in Turkey, training a sizeable peshmerga force for a planned 
armed struggle against the Turkish government. Northern Syria and northern Iraq thus 
became the focus ofPKK activity throughout 1981 - 83, with Turkey still under military 
rule, and many PKK basecamps were·established in these regions. 
With the restoration of civilian rule in Turkey in late 1983 the PKK began to test 
the water by staging cross border attacks on government installations. Ankara 
imrilediately responded by stepping up security measures "against those ethnic 
nationalism in an effort to destroy Kurdish ethnic identity'' (Entessar 1992:98). The 
mutual aninlosity between the PKK and the Turkish government reached a new 
animosity on 15 August 1984 when PKK peshmerga killed 24 Turkish soldiers in attacks 
on the towns of Eruh and Shemdinli. Approximately 1 000 Kurds were arrested and 
imprisoned in Diyarbakir. Initially the prosecution demanded 30 of these captives receive 
the death sentence; by early 1985 this figure had reached a rather incredulous 600 
(McDowall1991:79). 
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The P~' s resort to what is essentially a terrorist strategy of engagement is 
representative of its overtly separatist posture. This military and political extremism has, 
not surprisingly, alienated the PKK from other more moderate but less powerful 
autonomy seeking Kurdish voices. Even some elements of the general Kurdish 
population is disgruntled with the PKK, for often it is them that get caught in the cross-
fire and bear the brunt of government reprisals. Indeed, a virtually continuous 'state of 
emergency' has been brutally enforced by the Turkish army since 1984. In the decade 
following the first PKK attacks in 1984 McDowall (1996:418) estimates that this 
conflict, on both sides, has cost 12 000 lives. By this year the death toll may well have 
reached as many as 20 000 (The Christchurch Press 2 September 1996:8). Despite these 
losses, the destruction of villages, the forced removal of people from their homes and 
land, the continued economic underdevelopment, thousands of Kurds continue the fight 
for full Kurdish independence. 
A key factor in the persistence of the PKK' s campaign is the use of the mountain 
basecamps established during the early 1980s in northern Syria and northern Iraq. These 
hideaways continue to be used for training peshmergas and launching their attacks. The 
mountainous terrain and their location over the border supposedly gives these 
strongholds double protection from Ankara's reach. But on QCcasion, and with tacit 
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permission from Baghdad, Turkey has employed the tactic of 'hot pursuit' to chase PKK 
peshmerga over the border on their return home from operations and to attack the camps 
·themselves. Such cross-border incursions were common throughout 1986 and '87, while 
Baghdad was preoccupied with its war with Iran and perceived Ankara's raids not as 
violations of its sovereignty but as beneficial to its own war against the Kurds of Iraq. 
Indeed, the PKK's presence in northern Iraq, especially when the Turkish army visited, 
was the source of considerable consternation to the KDP who began to feel pressured 
from both sides. But after the Persian Gulf War ceasefire in August 1988 Baghdad 
reversed its acquiescence to such obvious breaches of Iraq's territorial sovereignty, and 
Ankara's hot pursuits across the border ceased. 
The Kurd- Turk conflict in Turkey, however, has continued essentially unabated 
since 1988. A number of ceasefire agreements throughout the past eight years have failed 
to develop into any type of lasting .peace. That goal, so long as the PKK is able to 
continue its terrorist campaign and maintains its separatist position, and the Turkish 
108 
government persists with its military suppression and denies Kurdish cultural and 
political rights, will remain a distant mirage. Moreover, although the PKK's political 
stance and guerilla operations do not rest well with many Kurds, Abdullah Ocalan and 
his organisation will continue to dominate mass Kurdish nation(alism) in Turkey. 
The KDPI since1988 
After the Iran- Iraq war both the Tehran government and the KDPI were in 
weak financial and military situations. With both sides exhausted Secretary General 
Ghassemlou believed that the KDPI's post-war reconstruction would be best served by 
negotiating a limited autonomy agreement with the Persian government. This 
immediately caused a split in the KDPI, with the more virulent Kurdish nationalists still 
demanding the pursuit of complete independence. Ghassemlou was adamant, however, 
that negotiated autonomy was the most cotlrse most likely to bring success, ·and met 
secretly with government officials on a number of occasions throughout 1988 and into 
1989. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989 and the more moderate incoming 
head of state, President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, gave Ghassemlou increased cause 
for optimism. 
But only a month later Ghassemlou's and the KDPI's hopes lay in tatters: The 
Secretary General was assassinated on 13 July 1989, in a Vienna hotel room where he 
was to meet representatives of Rafsanjani's new government (Buckley 1994: 13). 
McDowall (1991:41) analyses the effect ofGhassemlou's demise: 
"For many years (Ghassemlou) had been recognised as the most able 
politician of the whole Kurdish people. Since there was little doubt his 
assassins were the very Iranian delegates with whom he was negotiating, 
it put the feasibility of negotiation in doubt". 
Unfortunately, Ghassemlou's successor, Sadegh Sarafkandi, suffered the same fate on 18 
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September 1992, this time in a Berlin restaurant. Three other senior KDPI officials were 
also killed in this attack. O'Ballance (1996: 178) solemnly notes that "it appeared as 
though the Iranian government was running a secret assassination squad to help it 
control Kurdish insurrection activities". 
The June 1988 split in the KDPI and murder of Ghassemlou in July 1989 and of 
Saratkandi in September 1992have been serious setbacks to the KDPI and the Kurdish 
109 
nationalist movement in Iran as a whole. But Kurdish nation(alism) in Iran is 
undoubtedly now a mass phenomenon, thanks largely to the work of the KDPI, which is 
now a truly popular political party with an optimistic future. Indeed, as Koohi-Kamali 
(1992: 192) explains: 
"The KDPI of 1989 is a very different organisation from that of 
1947, when the Kurdish republic collapsed .... Militarily and 
politically it is better organised. It has thousands of members and 
supporters who have been involved in the national identity 
'Struggle for some time. Surviving the years of the (Islamic) 
revolution and its aftermath has transformed the KDPI from an 
inexperienced underground party, highly dependent on the Kurds 
in Iraq, into a relatively independent political force which could 
not only determine the destiny of Iranian Kurdistan; but may also 
have a significant influence on the future of the country as a 
whole". 
For the KDP and PUK in Iraq, and the government in Baghdad, the Persian Gulf 
War had also cost them dearly, and a period of relative calm followed the end of the war. 
This 'peace' was broken by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, precipitating a 
series of events that are best evaluated at the global scale. As these events involved the 
KDP and PUK to a considerable degree, the analysis of these two organisations since the 
end of the Iran - Iraq war are also best evaluated at the global scale, and is therefore left 
until the third section of Chapter Five. 
Conclusion 
This discussion has emphatically demonstrated the international conflict in 
Kurdistan from the late nineteenth century to the present. In doing so it has also traced 
the development ofKurdish nation(alism), which demands the recognition of the separate 
and distinct concepts of nation and state and the rejection of the assumption that all 
states are nation-states. Moreover, this chapter has illustrated a s~rong, longstanding, and 
bloody example of a conflict that is far more than a 'civil war', but something less than a 
conventional 'international' conflict. The international conflict n Kurdistan, therefore, 
represents a case the rests uneasily between conflict research's two categories, and 
therefore is evidence of the need to reconceptualise this important phenomenon. 

Chapter Five 
Global geopolitics and the Kurdish 
international conflict 
"The Kurds are the orphans of the international community" 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani1 
Quoted in Atarodi 1991:282. 
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Introduction 
This third and final case study chapter increases the geopolitical scale of analysis 
from the Middle East to the global, and examines the international conflict in Kurdistan 
in global geopolitics. This discussion, therefore, confronts international relations' division 
between 'international' and domestic politics, and hence also of conflict research's 
separation of 'international' conflict from civil war, in simple accordance with state 
boundaries. I will demonstrate that this is not an allegation based on a one off special 
circumstance but an enormous contradiction resulting from eighty years of Kurdish 
geopolitical history at the global scale. I shall also argue that the exploitation of the 
Kurds by foreign governments for their own much broader geopolitical purposes, a 
constant aspect of the Kurds' role in international relations, is an implicit recognition of 
the Kurds as a distinct political community capable of waging sustained 'civil wars' to 
weaken respective ,state governments. This argument, again, illustrates that the nation 
and state concepts are not equitable and their conflation into nation~state is 
inappropriate. 
The Kurds' involvement at the global scale is divided into three time periods, 
coinciding with three global geopolitical discourses that have permeated the Middle East 
during the twentieth century. The first of these was European colonialism, which in the 
aftermath of World War One and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire brought the. 
state system to the Middle East: But not, as we know, to the Kurds. The Kurds and 
Colonialism in the interwar years are analysed in this first section. 
The great upheaval of the Second World War displaced European colonialism, 
which in turn was replaced by the all - pervasive geopolitical world order that became 
known as the Cold War. The Kurds and the Cold War, which lasted until the collapse of 
communism across Eastern Europe and, in particular, the implosion of the Soviet Union, 
between November 1989 and December 1991, are analysed in the second section. 
The third and final section examines the Kurds in the much heralded but highly 
ambiguous 'new world order'. Indeed, a number of contradictory doctrines appear to be 
competing for the mantle of the new world order's geopolitical discourse; hence the 
concept, not of one dominant order but of many rival disorders, for example, 
Fukuyama's (1989) "triumph of liberalism". One contender, the "rogue state doctrine" 
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(Klare 1995a; 1995b), has characterised Western and especially US policy towards Iraq 
since the latter's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and has been all important as far 
as the Kurds are concerned. For this reason the rogue state doctrine is employed as an· 
analytical tool to examine the Kurds in the global geopolitics of the post-Cold War 
world. 
The Kurds and colonialism, 1914 - 39 
While this section concentrates on the Kurds' colonial relationship with Britain, it 
is important to note that Britain was by no means the only colonial power in the Middle 
East. Two other major colonial powers with extensive interests in the area warrant 
special mention: France held the League of Nations mandate for the territories that 
became the independent states of Lebanon (1943) and Syria (1946); and Russia, or the 
Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, was able to annex the 
Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (1920), 
but who was unable to achieve the same result in eastern Anatolia, where it had been 
deeply involved prior to the latter's incorporation into the new Republic of Turkey 
(1923). Other foreign states, such as Greece, Italy, and the United States, were also 
present, but their involvement was relatively minor and essentially superfluous to the 
Kurdish centric story to be told here. This discussion therefore focuses on Britain, the 
· mandate power for the territory that evolved into fully independent Iraq (1932), but also 
includes reference, where necessary, to the participation of France and Russia/Soviet 
Union. 
The colonial carve-up hegins: The Sykes-Picot Treaty, 1916 
The Ottoman Empire, in decline throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
completely disintegrated in the wake of its defeat in World War One. Its collapse opened 
the way for the victorious European states to partition its former territories amongst 
themselves. Indeed, preparation for this colonial carve-up began .before the end of the 
war; early evidence of Allied confidence in the Ottoman defeat. The beginning was 
marked by the Sykes-Picot Treat)?, negotiated and signed in secret by the Entente 
powers of Britain, France, and Russia in September 1916. The confidential agreement 
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planned to divide the former Ottoman territories into separate spheres of direct British, 
French, and Russian control, with adjoining territories over which these three Allies were 
to have lesser, but still substantial, political influence (Map 5: 1). Ahmad (1994: 186) 
comments that Sykes-Picot was "one of the most important imperialist· treaties in the 
history of secret diplomacy". 
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Map 5:1 demonstrates that the Sykes-Picot Treaty would divide the Kurds and 
Kurdistan into the 'control' and 'spheres of influence' of France and Russia and the state 
of Persia. The pre-existing boundary between the Ottoman Empire and Persia was 
maintained,- thus assigning eastern Kurdistan to Tehran's sovereignty. Although an 
historic opponent of Constantinople, Persia had remained neutral during the war and for 
this reason the Allied powers embedded the inviolability of Persia's western border 
(McDowall 1996:117). This respect is highlighted in Map 5:1, with the Sykes-Picot 
2 The Sykes-Picot Treaty takes its name from the two architects of the document, British 
diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and French diplomat Georges Picot. 
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Treaty not applying to any territory east of the Persian boundary. Meanwhile, France was 
to preside over western, central, and southern Kurdistan, while Russia gained suzerainty 
over northern and central Kurdistan. Given Britain's influence over Kurdistan after the 
war, it is ironic that the Sykes-Picot Treaty did not allow for any British influence, direct 
or indirect, in this region. 
Before the secret agreement could be implemented, however, it was 
circumvented in November 1917 by the new Bolshevik regime in Moscow. Lenin's 
October Revolutionaries unilaterally unveiled the Treaty and claimed that they were not 
bound to an agreement signed by Czarist Russia. McDowall (1996: 115) explains that the 
Bolsheviks ''wanted nothing of such imperialist schemes, except to expose them to the . 
light of day". With Moscow's withdrawal and its cover blown, the Sykes-Picot Treaty 
was under serious threat as the. basis for post-war cooperation between the two 
remaining Entente powers, Britain and France. 
Not that the Kurds, who became aware of the Treaty's existence only after its 
exposure, would have lamented its passing. Although Sykes-Picot was intended as a 
basis for determining which colonial powers would assist what indigenous peoples in 
their transition to statehood, the fact that the Kurds were to be partitioned ·three ways 
did not augur well for Kurdish unity and independence. 
Britain and France made an immediate attempt to rework the Sykes-Picot Treaty, 
by transferring the territory destined for Russian hands to Britain. No improvement here 
for the Kurds, as they would still be under the three-way influence ofBritain,.France, and 
Persia. This modified Sykes-Picot Treaty would not, however, last long either. Its final 
demise resulted from Britain's determination to seize full control of the Mosul vilayet 
(province), a region in southern central Kurdistan (see Map 5:1). Under Sykes-Picot the 
Mosul vilayet was to be divided in two, the western half to be controlled by France and 
the eastern half by Britain. For Britain to acquire the whole vilayet, therefore, London 
would have to persuade, cajole, or otherwise coerce Paris into relinquishing its half of 
the Mosul vilayet. 
Britain's interest in the Mosul vilayet was a strong geopolitical one, indeed a 
theme that has come to characterise modern Middle East politics: Oil. At the time the 
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largest known oil deposits were located in the Mosul vilayei, and with a Royal Navy 
recently converted from steam to diesel power Britain was determined to secure control 
of this valuable prize. Britain's individual geopolitical considerations consequently 
overrode diplomatic niceties, London renounced the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which was 
"pushed aside and Britain got its way" (O'Ballance 1996: 19). 
The ultimate downfall of the Sykes-Picot Treaty meant that, when Ottoman 
forces surrendered to Britain on 30 October 1918, at Mudros on the island ofLemnos in 
the Aegean Sea, there was no agreement guiding the post-war colonial carve-up of the 
former Ottoman Empire. It was in this power vacuum, when the political map of the 
Middle East was yet to be drawn, that the possibility of an independent Kurdish state 
was greatest. 
An independent Kurdistan? 
Although the United States was only a small player in the Middle East, President 
Woodrow Wilson was a source of great hope for the Kurds. In January 1919 Wilson 
announced his Fourteen Points for World Peace, the man and his plans becoming 
instrumental in the establishment of the League of· Nations, the first 'international' 
organisation of its kind. For the Kurds, Wilson's Twelfth Point (Quoted in McDowall 
1996: 115; emphasis added) provided an unprecedented opportunity to secure collective 
sovereignty, because it asset:te.d that 
"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
·secure sovereignty, but other nationalities (primarily the Kurds and 
Armenians) which are now ·under Turkish rule should be assured an 
undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of 
. autonomous development'. 
Moreover, and in particular, the actions of Britain, the major colonial presence in 
the Middle East, provided much encouragement to the Kurds. Although Britain's 
primary concern was Mesopotamia (now central and southern Iraq), its acquisition of the 
whole Mosul vilayet (now part of northern Iraq) meant that "it was drawn Inexorably 
into consideration of (neighbouring) Kurdistan's fate .... (Britain) immediately recognised 
that the peace and prosperity of northern Mesopotamia (including the Mosul vilayet) 
would depend directly on what happened north of the border (in Kurdistan)" (McDowall 
1996:117- 18). 
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In fact, London had realised Kurdistan's new importance before the end of the 
war. On 22 October 1918, for example, Arnold Toynbee of the Foreign Office had 
suggested (Quoted in McDowall 1996:118; emphasis added) to Sir Mark Sykes, the 
British architect of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, that 
"If there is to be an individual Mesopotamia under Arab government with 
British administrative assistance, the natural corollary would be an 
autonomous Kurdistan, likewise assisted by His Majesty's 
Government. ... Such a Kurdistan would include not merely the country 
south of the Lesser Zab, but Rowanduz, Hakkari, and Bohtan districts up 
to the line .... of the Armenian frontier''. 
Sykes, however, was unconvinced and preferred instead. a Kurdish-Armenian 
state from the Black Sea down to Siirt (fifty kilometres south of Lake Van) and Urfa 
(just north of the Turkish - Syria border and eighty kilometres east of the Euphrates 
River), and an autonomous Southern Kurdistan running from Siirt to Urmia (ten 
kilometres west of Lake Urmia) and down to Mahabad3, but excluding Mosul vilayet, 
Arbil, and Kirk:uk (McDowall1996: 118). Whatever the precise boundaries were to be, it 
was already clear, even at this early stage, that the Kurds were unlikely to be united in a 
true nation-state of Kurdistan; one way or another they would be divided. The positive 
aspect, however, was that in 1919 the British seemed set on establishing at least some 
type of Kurdish autonomous region, with the possibility of statehood to follow. 
So it was that the British sought an agreement with the Kurds, whereby London 
would bestow political autonomy, perhaps even independence, upon the Kurds, in return 
for the Kurds securing the frontier regions around Mosul vilayet. With this ·motivation 
British political officers began a search for a single dominant Kurdish leader with whom 
they could negotiate and conclude a formal partnership. That man was Shaykh Mahmoud 
Barzinji, incumbent governor of Sulaymaniya vilayet and both an agha and shaykh, a 
man of "considerable spiritual and temporal standing" (O'Ballance 1996:19). An 
. arrangement between Britain and Barzinji was duly worked out, ~n which Barzanji was 
given an increased area to govern. But, as mentioned in Chapter Four, this expansion 
brought Barzinji into conflict with other Kurdish leaders, and when he questioned British 
authority later in 1919 he was removed into exile in India. 
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Despite Barzinji's insolence, the Kurds did not forfeit British support for their 
autonomy or independence. In fact, in August the following year Britain made its 
strongest commitment yet to establishing a de jure Kurdish homeland. This assurance 
provides substantial evidence that London recognised the Kurds as a political community 
and, as such, as an important player in the geopolitics of colonialism. 
Making promises: The Treaty of Sevres, 1920 
The Paris Peace Conference, which lasted over a year from January 1919 to 
January 1920~ concluded (eventually) the post-war settlements not only for Europe but 
also for the Middle East. The Kurds were represented at the meeting by one Sharif 
Pasha .. Given the deep tribal divisions then characteristic of Kurdish nation(alism), 
however, it is impossible to conceive of this one man representing a single, unified 
Kurdish position. Indeed, there were already some serious political divisions emerging 
between the Kurdish tribes, especially with regard to which colonial power, Britain or 
France, would best serve their interests. Nevertheless, Sharif Pasha conveyed just such a 
message of Kurdish unity to the Peace Conference, claiming that Kurdistan was an 
"indivisible whole" and invoked the Kurds' right to self-determination in an ''independent 
Kurdistan" (McDowall 1996: 13 3, 131 ). 
Although the British were .certainly aware of the Kurds' internal disagreements, 
there was much optimism that the Kurds would soon be able to overcome their 
differences, establish an autonomous region with foreign assistance, and eventually 
emerge as an independent state. This positive thinking was codified in the Treaty of 
Sevres, one of the many products of the Paris Peace Conference. This document was 
signed on 10 August 1920 in the city near Paris of the same name, between the main 
Allied partners and the Ottoman government, now presiding over the remnants of the 
former Empire known as Turkey. For the Kurds, the most important of the Treaty's 433 
articles was, and still is, the often quoted (eg, Entessar 1992:51; Ahmad 1994:203; 
McDowall 1996:450 - 51; O'Ballance 1996:13; emphasis added) Article 64, which 
promised that 
3 It is interesting to note that after the demise of the Sykes-Picot Treaty Persia's western 
bonndaty was no longer regarded by Britain as inviolate, with the cities ofUrmia and Mahabad 
both located across the border. 
"If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the 
Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 624 shall address 
themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as 
to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires 
independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these 
peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should 
be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a 
recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. 
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a 
separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by 
the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an 
independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan 
which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayef'. 
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Back in the Middle East a new drama was unfolding. The lead actor was the 
incredible, phoenix-like figure of Mustafa Kemal, who arose out of the ashes of the 
Ottoman Empire. This Turkish Genera~ who had led Ottoman forces against the 
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs) at Gallipoli, was to almost single-
handedly change the course of events in the Middle East, and especially for the Kurds. 
Mustafa Kemal, whose achievements earned him the additional name 'Ataturk', literally 
meaning 'the Great Turk', vehemently rejected continued Ottoman governance of 
Turkey and its acceptance of what Kemal perceived as unjust peace settlements. 
Appealing for Muslim unity in the face of Christian onslaught, Kemal rallied Turkish 
forces and was able to assert his authority throughout much of Turkey outside the 
Ottoman capital of Istanbul. In particular, Kemal's forces were able to reclaim the 
predominantly Kurdish vilayets of eastern Anatolia. The Kurds, as Muslims themselves, 
were initially supportive of Kemal, but as illustrated in Chapter Four this working 
relationship was shattered when Kemallater abolished the religious posts of Sultan and 
Caliph and pursued secular policies. 
Because the Ottoman government had 'represented' Turkey at the Paris Peace 
Conference, Mustafa Kemal regarded the Treaty of Sevres as "a dead letter from the 
moment it was signed" (Ahmad 1994:204). For the Treaty was not only signed by an 
illegitimate government, but greatly reduced Turkey in size (see, for illustration, the 
4 Article 62 defined 'Kurd.istan' as "the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, 
south of the southern boundary of Armenia .... and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and 
Mesopotamia" (Ahmad 1994:203; McDowalll996:450). 
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Turkey envisioned by the Sykes-Picot Treaty in Map 5: 1) and therefore seriously 
undermined its territorial viability. Both factors were equally abhorrent to Kemal, hence 
his dual mission to overthrow the Ottoman government and expand Turkey's territory. 
Mustafa Kemal's rapid progress towards achieving these twin objectives meant that 
'"holes were blown in the Treaty of Sevres" (O'Ballance 1996: 14). 
Even without the powerful force that was Mustafa Kemal, it is unlikely that the 
Treaty of Sevres would have survived unscathed from wider geopolitical events. For 
example, only one of the fourteen states party to the Treaty5 ever ratified it, and when 
Italy did so "it quickly disowned it and declared itself unready to send 'one soldier' to 
the former Ottoman regions in order to implement its articles" (Ahmad 1994:205). 
Moreover, on 10 August 1920, ironically the very day that the Treaty of Sevres was 
signed, Britain, France, and Italy finalised a tripartite agreement whereby northern 
Kurdistan was to be divided into respective areas of influence. 
All these factors led the Allies to renegotiate the Treaty of Sevres; not with the 
Ottoman 'government' ·in Istanbul but with Mustafa Kemal, whose de facto government 
had established itself in Ankara. The Kurds, previously an important part of the post-war 
geopolitical landscape, were slowly but surely being pushed aside in the growing power 
contest between London and Mustafa Kemal. 
Breaking promises: The Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 
The renegotiation process began in London in February 1921, with a meeting . 
between all those party to the now effectively defunct Treaty ofSevres. For the delegates 
realised that to enforce the Treaty, particularly the clauses allowing for Kurdish 
autonomy with the option of independence, the Allies would have to deploy a substantial 
military force to remove Kemal from Kurdish Anatolia and parts of Kurdi~tan. Such a 
prospect was unpalatable to Western governments; especially France, Greece, and Italy 
who, when attempting to unilaterally enforce territorial awards made by the Sykes-Picot 
Treaty, had all suffered defeats at the hands ofKemal since the 1918 Armistice. Britain, 
who perhaps had the capacity to control Kemal, was similarly reluctant to become 
involved militarily; the cost of reversing the post-World War One demobilisation being 
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particularly prohibitive. Moreover; 0 'Ballance ( 1996: 14) intriguingly6 notes that Britain, 
France, and a new player in the Middle East, the United States 7, were cautious of 
"a new, major, and dangerous enemy rising in the east from the ashes of 
Czarist Russia - the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the threat of 
world communism. The Western Allies had a change of heart and began 
to see Kemal as a possible south-eastern bastion against this new 
communist threat". 
For the Kurds of Turkey occupied Anatolia and Kurdistan, Allied refusal to 
respond militarily to Kemal meant that it was increasingly likely that they would be 
subject to Ankara's suzerainty. Given Kemal's relentless drive for Muslim unity, 
therefore, it was unlikely, indeed improbable, that the Kurds would be able to fulfil the 
requirements set out in the Treaty of Sevres. 
This pessimistic outlook for the Kurds was blackened further by Britain, who for 
its own reasons wanted out of the Sevres commitment. Foremost amongst these was, 
once again, the status of the Mosul vilayet and the enormous geopolitical value of its oil 
deposits. Under the existing arrangements . the Mosul vilayet could be added to an 
independent state in greater Kurdistan. Entessar (1992:52) neatly describes Britain's 
consequent reasoning on this critical issue: 
"The British were aware of the existence of oil in Kirkuk and other cities 
in the Mosul vilayet. .. . By incorporating the area into their client state of 
Iraq, as opposed to allowing the establishment of an independent and 
unpredictable Kurdish state, they WOl.Jld have a more secure grip on the 
area's oil reserves". 
With the Kurds unable to force their own claims on the ground, with no 
representation in London, and with no other delegate prepared to negotiate on their 
behalf, the Sevres Treaty partners were able to eliminate Articles 62 - 64, the very 
5 
6 
7 
The fourteen states that signed the Treaty of Sevres were Armenia, Belgium, Britain, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Hijaz, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
and, of course, the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad 1994:202) .. 
I say 'intriguingly' because this quote so closely resembles the geopolitics of the Cold War and 
the Western policy of containment of the Soviet Union, discussed later in this chapter. Yet this 
was a global geopolitical discourse that, in conventional understanding, did not begin until after 
the Second World War. This quote, therefore, is provocatively suggestive of an extended 
writing on the geopolitics of containment. But it must also be noted that O'Ballance (1996), in 
making this claim, presents no evidence in support of this assertion. 
The United States entered the politics of the Middle East soon after the Armistice through its 
interest in protecting and guiding to statehood the Christian Armenians. This American interest 
did not last long, however, and it turned down a League of Nations offer to be the mandate 
power for Armenia. Ironically, soon after, in 1920, Armenia joined the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 
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clauses that referred to the Kurds and Kurdistan. Ahmad (1994:205) succinctly 
summarises the dire consequence of the Articles' omission: "With the need to mention 
these articles gone, the Kurds were dismissed altogether from the game". 
Britain's volte-face from supporting Kurdish independence in the Treaty of 
Sevres to the complete removal of the Kurds from the political agenda is exemplified in a 
1930 memorandum to the League of Nations, which claimed that 
"On political grounds the conception (of Kurdish independence) 
is almost fantastic. Although they possess many sterling qualities, 
the Kurds of Iraq are entirely lacking in those characteristics of 
political cohesion which are essential to self-government. Their 
organisation and outlook are essentially tribal. They are without 
traditions of self-government of self-governing institutions. Their 
mode of life is primitive, and for ·the most part they are illiterate 
and untutored, resentful of authority and lacking in discipline or 
responsibility". 
The promises made to the Kurds at Sevres were emphatically broken by the 
signing of a replacement agreement on 24 July 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne was an 
unmitigated disaster for the Kurds: Not one of the new Treaty's 143 articles made any 
reference to the Kurds or Kurdistan; northern Kurdistan was incorporated into Mustafa 
Kemal's new Republic of Turkey8; and, as a consequence, the Kurds were now well and 
truly divided between Persia, 'British' Iraq, 'French' Syria, and Turkey: The Kurds were 
written out of the political map of the Middle East (Map 5:2). For a ?ombination of 
reasons, therefore, the Kurds missed out on what was undoubtedly their best opportunity 
achieve outright statehood. 
O'Ballance laments the Allies' collective dropping of the Kurdish issue, claiming 
''the cause of the Kurds was abandoned and they were sold down the river''. Likewise 
,.Bulloch and Morris (1992:73 - 97), who refer to the entire episode as nothing less than 
"The Great Betrayal". 
While from a moral standpoint Britain's actions are perhaps unpalatable, they can 
be explained by emphasising that at the time of the colonial carve-up Kurdish 
nation(alism) was not sufficiently strong for the Kurds to force, politically or militarily, 
their claims to independence (see Chapter Four). Viewed in this light it is little wonder 
8 In its present geographical form. 
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that Britain chose, when its own hand was forced by Mustafa Kemal, to draw the Kurds 
out of the political map of the Middle East. Nevertheless, this section has demonstrated 
that the Kurds were a vital consideration in the geopolitics of colonialism: An implicit 
recognittion of the Kurds as a political community; but one that was ultimately 
expendable in Britain's wider view of the world . 
. ,• 
.. 
Source: BYU 1991. 
As the Kurds were eventually written out of the colonial cartograph, therefore, 
· they should have been dismissed once and for all from the 'international' relations 
agenda, particularly at the global scale, and assigned merely to the domestic politics of 
Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Rather ironically, however, the Kurds were to remain a factor 
until, and indeed during, World War Two: The denial of Kurdish aspirations merely 
proved to be a major catalyst for a growing nationalist sentiment. This feeling was 
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expressed, as we saw in Chapter Four, in the many rebellions of the 1930s which 
precipitated foreign (British) involvement. The Kurds were determined to achieve self-
determination, and as such they would undoubtedly remain an item on the global 
geopolitical agenda and not, therefore, be pushed outside 'international' relations. 
The Kurds in the Cold War, 1945-91 
) I mentioned above that as early as the 1920s the United States, Britain, and 
France perceived the Soviet Union as a ''new, major, and dangerous threat" (O'Ballance 
I . 
1996:14). Mostly latent throughout the 1920's and '30s and notwithstanding the four 
po~ers' victorious alliance during World War Two, this antagonism rapidly became 
overt in the immediate post-war aftermath. The new political hostility between the 
'West' -headed by the US and with its West European allies as loyal lieutenants- and 
the 'East' - led by the Soviet Union and supported by its East European satellites -
established and indeed came to define the world order that became known as the Cold 
W a? which persisted for the next four and a half decades. It is an exercise in futility to 
attempt to 'define' the Cold War in a few introductory sentences to a section within a 
single chapter. But in order to fully appreciate the following discussion it is necessary to 
offer a conceptualisation of the Cold War world order as it affected the Kurds and 
Kurdistan. This framework is best constructed by outlining the Cold War geopolitical 
discourses of the US/Western Alliance and the Soviet Union/Eastern Bloc, respectively 
known_as 'containmenf and 'Sovietology'. 
The strategy of containment drew heavily on Mackinder's (1904) 'Heartland' 
thesis, which argued that control of the Eurasian 'heartland' would enable control of the · 
'world island' - Europe, Asia, the Indo sub-continent, the Middle East, and Africa - · 
which would lead to global dominance. As the heartland power the Soviet Union was 
thus perceived by the US and its allies to be in a strong position to assert itself as 
geopolitical.hegemon, hence the threat of 'world communism'. The Heartland thesis was 
further developed, even before the end of World War Two, by Spykman's (1944) 
argument that the only way to prevent Soviet hegemony was to 'contain' communism to 
9 The term 'cold war' was first coined by Walter Lippmann in 1947, and was used to contrast the 
developing US - Soviet political antagonism with the recent militazy 'hot war' with Germany 
(Taylor 1993;79). 
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the heartland and circumvent the expansion of Moscow's Socialist Empire. This 
'containment' would only be achieved by surrounding and isolating the Soviet fortress; 
thus Spykman's concept of a 'Rimland' immediately adjacent to the Eastern Bloc and 
stretching from Central and Southern Europe, eastward into the Middle East and Central 
Asia, and still further east to Southeast and Far East Asia, and finally to Japan and 
Alaska. 
By its own argument the Heartland - Rimland thesis also defined how the West 
would perceive, rightly or wrongly, Soviet actions in Rimland and/or world island states. 
That is, the containment strategy constructed its 'threatening other' as an inherently 
expansionist Empire whose moves into and beyond the Rimland needed to be countered 
by strong political and, if necessary, military responses. Soviet desire to penetrate the 
Rimland and achieve world hegemony was labelled 'Sovietology', and it was the West's 
containment of Sovietology that served to define the Cold War world order. 
In this geopolitical doctrine the Kurds and Kurdistan occupied a highly strategic 
location along the very interface of the Soviet Union and the Rimland, and were thus 
prime targets for superpower intrigue. , While considerable Soviet and American 
involvement in Kurdish politics throughout the Cold War was mediated by Moscow's 
and Washington's overriding interest in the states of the Middle East, especially (in the 
Kurdish context) Iran and Iraq. For this rea~on the fo~owing discussion examines the 
' ' 
Kurds in the geopolitics of the Cold War via Soviet and/or American relations with Iran 
and Iraq. In this section I will again demonstrate that the Kurds and their cause were 
exploited by both superpowers for their own much broader geopolitical purposes. 
The Soviet Union and the rise and fall of the Mahabad Republic, 1946 
The Kurds' first contact with global geopolitics in the Cold War era came with 
the highly successful but shortlived Kurdish Republic of Mahabiid, which rose and fell 
· largely at the political whim of the Soviet Union. In order to fully understand this 
relationship, it is necessary to briefly examine the preceding events of World War Two 
which gave rise to the Republic. 
Although Iran was officially neutral at the outbreak of the Second World War, 
the Allied powers began to suspect that Reza Shah Pahlavi had pro-German sympathies. 
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This prospect, for two reasons, was of particular concern to Britain and the Soviet 
Union. First, after Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on 6 June 1941 Iran 
became a strategic supply route to the isolated and desperate USSR. If Iran came into 
the Nazi orbit this vital lifeline would be severed. Second, Hitler's drive towards the 
oilfields of the Caucasus in 1941/42 opened Allied eyes to the prospect that Iran's 
substantial oil reserves would be an enormous, indeed immeasurable, boost for the 
German advance. For these two reasons the Allies 'invaded' Iran in August 1942, with 
the Soviet Red Army occupying northern Iran and Britain installed in southern Iran. Reza 
Shah Pahtavi was forced to abdicate, and his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, was installed 
in power. This new government, however, was little more than a puppet and 
administered only over a small central zone between the Soviets and the British. In this 
zone lay most ofKurdistan in Iran, over which Tehran's control was less than negligible. 
Ironically, yet entirely understandably, Moscow had its own designs on the 
Iranian oilfields. So during its occupation the Soviets actively encouraged Azeris living in 
the northern. Iranian province of Azerbaijan to seek secession from Tehran and then, of 
course, to unify with the Soviet Republic of the same name lying immediately to the 
north. Given that Iranian Azerbaijan was adjacent to, even partially overlapping with, 
Kurdistan in Iran, Soviet intrigue in Azeri affairs could hardly go unnoticed by the Kurds. 
And it will be recalled from Chapter Four that it was at this time that the Kurds in Iran 
established their first modem political parties. Foremost amongst these was the 
Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan, or Komala, which not surprisingly 
"decided to rely on the Soviet Union in a marriage of convenience to further its cause of 
Kurdish autonomy" (Entessar 1992: 17). That cause reached a pinnacle in January 1946 
when, following the Azeri example of a month earlier, Komakt and the newly fonned 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran established an autonomous Republic ofMahabad. 
While the Soviets were supportive of the Republic, they had been careful not to 
formally commit to its actual military defence. On the other hand, however, '~he 
Mahabad Government expected the USSR to stand by them, (but) this was wishful 
thinking" (McDowall 1991:22). Moscow's reasoning for avoiding such an obligation 
flowed from its desire to secure a post-war oil concession from the Tehran government. 
By April1946, as Entessar (1992:22) explains, negotiations over such a deal had reached 
a critical stage:. 
"In discussions with Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, the Soviets 
promised to remove their troops from Iran in return for an oil concession 
in the northern oilfields. Prime Minister Qavam reminded the Soviets that 
the Iranian Parliament (majlis) had to approve an oil concession and that 
since . the term of the Parliament had expired elections were needed to 
convene a new Parliament. However, parliamentary elections were not 
permissible under Iranian law so long as foreign troops were occupying 
part of the country. In an April 1946 agreement, the Soviet Union 
promised to remove its troops from Iranian territory .... By 9 May 1946 
the Soviets had withdrawn from Iran". 
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It was only after the Soviet deterrent was removed that Tehran was free to move 
against the autonomous zone which, as we also saw in Chapter Four, disintegrated on 17 
December 1946. Thus the rise and fall of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was 
attributable as much to the Soviet Union's changing geopolitical considerations as it was 
to the Kurds' own strengths and weaknesses discussed previously. 
As explained in Chapter Four Kurdish political organisation was forced 
underground in the wake of Mahabad by brutal government suppressio~ not only in Iran 
but also in Iraq and Turkey. The remainder of the 1940s and the folloyving decade, aptly 
described by Kendal (1993:62- 8) as "the quiet years", was indeed a period of covert. 
nation(alism) in silent preparation for a better organised resistance to central authority. 
Thus the Kurds collectively faded not only from the Middle Eastern but ~lso global 
geopolitical scene. The Kurds' return did not begin until the early 1960s. 
Creating alliances: Superpowers, client states, and the Kurds, 1960- 75 
It is useful, indeed necessary, to survey the general geopolitical landscape as of 
the Kurds' re-entry into global geopolitics, circa 1960. To begin with, the United States 
was heavily allied to Mohammed Reza Shah's regime in Tehr~ who feared its 
expansionist, superpower northern neighbour. Washington was also a major backer of 
IsraeL as it had and has always been. Iran and Israel were both fearful of Iraq: Iran 
because Baghdad was its major rival in dominating the Persian Gulf; Israel because 
. ' 
Baghdad was strongly pan-Arab and anti-Israeli. For these reasons Tel Aviv10 and 
Tehran, beginning in 1963, cooperated in providing substantial military and financial 
10 The capital of Israel is a contestable decision. The Israeli government and people contend that 
Israel's 'true' and 'eternal' eapital is the holy city of Jerusalem. The overwhelming majority of 
the international community, however, do not recognise this claim, and as most of Israel's 
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support to the two year old Kurdish Democratic Party's rebellion against the Arab 
government in Baghdad, so as to weaken their mutual archenemy from within. Although 
there existed some ties between Moscow and Baghdad at this time these were weak and 
certainly countered by the Soviet Union's longstanding relationship with Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani 11. The absence of an overt Soviet involvement in Iraq and the links between 
Barzani and Moscow- which meant that Barzani's consistent appeals for American help 
fell on deaf ears in Washington - had the important effect of preventing, until the very 
end of the decade, US involvement in Kurdistan. 
This situation, however, changed dramatically in July 1968 with the military coup 
in Iraq that installed the Ba'ath Socialist Party as government. Given the new 
government's party title it is not hard to guess its political persuasion, and alnlost 
· immediately the Moscow - Baghdad. relationship began to flourish. With the spectre of 
Iraq falling into the communist orbit, Washington became interested in the KDP's 
rebellion. The first US initiated discussions with Barzani occurred in August 1969, at the 
very time the KDP was struggling to contain a strong Iraqi army offensive. These 
negotiations led to a secret agreement whereby the US would donate $14 million to the 
Kurdish cause in Iraq. Twelve years after the event Ghareeb (1981:138- 39) published 
the agreement's main points, which included: 
11 
12 
13 
(1) The subject of United States aid to the KDP must be kept secret 
from all, including high ranking members within the Kurdish 
movement12• 
' (2) The objective of the KDP insurgency was to overthrow the Ba'ath 
Socialist regime; 
(3) The KDP must not cause any harm to Iran, particularly by 
supporting the KDPI. In return, the Iranian government would not 
take any actions hostile to the Kurdish movement13; 
( 4) The KDP would be closed to prospective communist members, . 
and the KDP must not protect them; 
(5) All Soviet offers of aid to the KDP must.be rejected and the 
United States immediately notified of such offers; and 
diplomatic and government infrastructure is located in Tel Aviv, I regard this city as the capital 
of Israel. 
Remembering that Barzani had spent eleven years in exile in the Soviet Union following the 
demise of the Republic of Mahabad, during which time he made extensive contacts with the 
Soviet government and had adopted socialist political views (O'Ballance 1996). 
One can only wonder as to how the Americans expected Barzani to 'keep quiet' a cash injection 
ofUS$14 million, with all the armS that this could buy, from even his own leadership! 
It is unclear whether this means the 'Kurdish movement' in Iran, in Iraq, or in general. It 
seems improbable that the Shah would have agreed to the cessation of activities against the 
Kurds in Iran, so I can only suspect that this 'guarantee' refers to the Kurds of Iraq. 
(6) The United States government considers Barzani the man 
responsible for the KDP and would accept only his opinion. 
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The secrecy surrounding this agreement did not, however, last long and by the 
early 1970s it had become clear that the US, through its Central Intelligence Agency, 
was "heavily involved" (Entessar 1992: 120) in supporting the KDP's rebellion. During 
the first half of 1972 the veil was further removed. In April the growing Baghdad -
Moscow relationship was codified with the signing of an Iraqi - Soviet Treaty of 
Cooperation and Friendship. The following month US President Richard Nixon and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with the Shah, who evidently persuaded them to 
join Iran and Israel in further assisting the KDP. Nixon consequently ordered the CIA to 
covertly channel another $16 million to Barzani (Vanly 1993:169), 
From this increased support and the 1969 agreement Barzani believed the US 
was genuinely committed to a KDP victory and the dismemberment of the state of Iraq. 
Barzani even promised Washington exclusive access for US companies to Kurdistan' s 
oilfields after a Kurdish secession (Entessar 1992: 122). Not surprisingly Baghdad was 
becoming increasingly paranoid of a US-Iran-Israel conspiracy to destroy Iraq, which 
merely drove Baghdad further into the Soviet sphere, Moscow supplying large amounts . 
of military hardware. But Barzani' s faithful interpretation of US support was misplaced: 
Washington had no desire to facilitate a Kurdish ~ctory, much less the break-up of the 
Iraqi state. Rather, the United States was .hoping "to benefit from an unresolvable 
situation in which Iraq is intrinsically weakened by the Kurds' refusal to .give up their 
semi-autonomy .... The US would not like to see the situation resolved either way", but 
this "was not imparted to our clients (the Kurds), who were encouraged to continue 
fighting" (The Pike Commission Report to the House of Representativ~s 1976; Quoted 
in McDowall1996:331 and Entessar 1992:122). That struggle continued, as we saw in 
Chapter Four, until Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement in March 1975, the Shah 
instantly ceasing all support for Barzani and the KDP's 14 year rebellion crashed to its 
· disastrous end. 
Thus once again the Kurds had been exploited by Middle Eastern and foreign 
governments for the latter's own geopolitical purposes. And with the collapse of their 
uprising in Iraq the Kurds' hopes of achieving national self-determination once again fell 
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foul of the changing global geopolitical vagaries of the Cold War. Once more the Kurds 
withdrew from the world stage, only to return again just four years later. 
Changing alliances: 
The Islamic Revolution and the Iran- Iraq war, 1979-88 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran in January 1979 swept aside the hated regime of 
Mohammed Reza Shah, ended ·the 68-year Pahlavi dynasty, installed the Shi'a 
fundamentalist government of Ayatollah Khomeini, and established Iran as an Islamic 
Republic. These dramatic changes also had a profound effect outside the state, 
precipitating a major shift in Middle East, and indeed global, geopolitics. Through the 
United States' close association with the Shah's regime Khomeini and his cohorts incited 
intense anti-American ill-feeling in revolutionary Iran. This animosity culminated in the_ 
seizure of the American embassy and its staff in Tehran on 4 November 1979, which 
eyolved into a 444-day hostage crisis that very nearly triggered a military confrontation 
between the US and Iran (Slim 1992:206). Almost overnight the Islamic Revolution had 
transformed Iran from a close US ally to an archenemy, an antipathy that continues to 
the present day. 
Ten months into the hostage crisis Iraq, a Soviet client state whose Ba'ath 
Socialist regime had been destabilised by an American backed Kurdish Democratic Party 
during the 1970s~ invaded Iran, starting the eight year. Persian Gulf War. Baghdad's 
offensive gave the US an ideal counter to containing the new threat in the Middle East. 
The problem, however, was that Iraq, while not entrenched in the Soviet camp, was by 
no means a secure US ally. Indeed, formal diplomatic relations between Washington and 
Baghdad, severed after Iraq's role in the Arab - Israeli war of June 1967, had not been 
restored by 1980. But "the United States, still indignant at the 'loss' of Iran and hounded 
by the memory of the hostage crisis of 1979 - 80, was eager to help Iraq" (Entessar 
1992:142). 
Washington's first step in assisting Baghdad came in March 1982 with the 
decision to remove Iraq from its list of states suspected of sponsoring Arab terrorist 
organisations. It is perhaps no coincidence that at about the same time, as Iraq's position 
on the battlefield began to weaken, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein began to 'test the 
water' concerning possible US support for his war with Iran. That possibility was, of 
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course, extremely good, and from 1983 the US and other Western governments began to 
supply Baghdad with arms, cash, and export credits. Full US - Iraqi diplomatic relations 
were restored on 26 November 1984. But again, just as the US had done with the KDP 
in the early 1970s, Washington's policy was not to aid Iraq to victory over Iran, but for 
the war to reach an inconclusive end. In the words of Geoffrey Kemp, President 
Reagan's Middle East expert in his National Security Council: "It wasn't that we wanted 
Iraq to win the war, we did not want Iraq to lose"14 (Miller and Mylroie 1990: 143). 
For the KDP and the PUK, Washington's decision to back Iraq in the war was a 
double and ironic blow: It not only meant that US and Israeli support· previously 
channelled through the Shah's Iran came to a halt, but also that they were now fighting 
against an Iraqi army armed and financed by the same two sponsors. On the other hand, 
US support for Baghdad clearly helped the KDPI, who received substantial assistance 
from the Ba'athist regime throughout the war. These contradictory changes in patron-
client alliances were one cause of the open hostility between the KDP and the KDPI in 
the latter half of the war. 
The role of the Soviet Union, or rather the lack of it, during this episode deserves 
special mention. In the first instance it is ironic, given the friendship between Moscow 
and Baghdad in the early 1970s, that the Soviets evidently allowed Saddam Hussein to 
switch allegiance to Washington. Without an extensive but 1..'!-nnecessary (in this context) 
discussion one can only speculate as to the reasons why Moscow acquiesced to this 
development. Soviet involvement in the Afghanistan war against the Muslim mujaheddin 
was probably one crucial factor in the cooling of relations between Moscow and 
Baghdad. But the new US - Iraq alliance did not, as perhaps would be expected, force 
the Soviet Union into a counter-balance with Iran, despite their mutual anti-American 
position. Again, one can only theorise as to why this did not happen, but certainly one 
stand-out, plausible explanation is the vital differences between Moscow and Tehran: 
Soviet atheism, or at least agnosticism, was anathema to fervent Iranian Islam. 
14 It seems probable that Washiligton did not want Iraq to win the war because the disintegration 
of Iran would undoubtedly have arisen Soviet interest in filling the vacuutn., and a Soviet 
invasion could very easily have escalated into a direct US - Soviet confrontation. On the other 
hand, the US was detennined that Iran's fundamentalist Shi'a Islam would not be 'exported' 
around the Gulf, and spread to threaten its important ally, Ismel. 
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The apparent absence of overt Soviet involvement in the Iran - Iraq war meant 
that it was, perhaps, removed a step from the direct superpower confrontation of the 
Cold War. Nevertheless, the KDPI at least continued to play a vital role for the United 
States and Israel in the 'containment' of Shi'a fundamentalist Iran. Washington and Tel 
Aviv had, therefore, effectively swapped Barzani's KDP for Ghassemlou's KDPI as their 
Kurdish client. The Kurds, once more, were being exploited for the geopolitical purposes 
of foreign powers, and were not supported for the Kurds' own cause. Clear empirical 
evidence, I suggest, of state-centric 'international' relations with a contradictory 
recognition of the differences between nation and state. That even those involved in 
practical 'international' relations recognise, although perhaps unwittingly, the mismatch 
between nation and state is highly ironic: One would imagine that it would be formal 
international relations people would be in a position to emphasise this crucial point. 
This situation, of course, rendered the Kurds extremely vulnerable to the political 
whims of Middle Eastern and foreign governments. ''Nothing mo~e clearly illustrates this 
vulnerability", writes McDowall (1996:361), ''than the international failure to take any 
substantive measure to restrain Iraq from its chemical weapons attacks (against the 
Kurds)". As we saw in Chapter Four this horrific new development began in April1987, 
continued until late 1988, and killed countless thousands. Although these attacks were in 
clear violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons and 
other instruments of international law, Western governments, especially the US and 
Britain, responded belatedly and even then with only weak diplomatic statements. 
Washington and London avoided the outright condemnation of Baghdad by 
claiming that there was no "conclusive evidence" (Entessar 1992: 144) that the Ba'athists 
had committed the alleged atrocities. This attempted exoneration, however, was a 
·scarcely plausible facade that attempted to cover Western governments' real reasons for 
not responding to Iraq's brutal treatment of its Kurdish population. For the evidence of 
chemica! attacks, including eyewitness accounts, the treatment of survivors in Europe, 
analysis of soil samples, appeals by the PUK to the United Nations, and even the reports 
of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a private Massachusetts based 
organisation, Physicians for Human Rights, was "overwhelming" and "incontestable" 
(McDowall1991:45; 1996:361). 
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The real motives behind Western governments' "deafening silence" over the 
chemical attacks were strategic and economic. The West's massive support of Baghdad 
in the Persian Gulf War, through technology transfers, export credits, arms sales, and 
construction projects, meant that they had actively contributed to Iraq's chemical 
weapons programme (Burrows and Windrem 1995). The eventual deployment of those 
weapons was seen as a 'tolerable consequence', an acceptable price to pay for Baghdad's 
invaluable contribution in containing the Iranian threat. Moreover, by the time 5 000 
Kurds were gassed to death at Halabja, Western governments were well aware that Iran 
was exhausted and the end of the war was nigh. With their collective eye on lucrative 
post-war reconstruction contracts that Baghdad was bound to offer, estimated at an 
astonishing $50 000 million (McDowall 1996:362), Western governments were against 
any action that would jeopardise such valuable commercial interests. The only action of 
any substance was the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 620, which 
condemned Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The resolution, however, did not mention 
the Kurds as the victims and, as McDowall (1996:363) concludes, "it was clear that 
many states of the industrialised world .... had little intention of curtailing their arms sales 
(and other strategic and economic interests) on account of either the UNSCR 620 or the 
1925 Protocol". 
So once again the Kurds suffered at the hands of Western geopolitical interests. 
Even in these most horrendous of circumstances the Kurds were seen as expendable, as 
sacrificial to the objectives of the 'international' community. On these grounds one must 
give considerable thought to the opinion expressed on 7 September 1988 in The 
Guardian (Quoted in McDowall1996:362): 
"You don't often find it, even in extremis, but morality still has a 
place in international relations. And sometimes the failure to 
speak out against the indefensible, drenched in shuftling 
hypocrisy, betrays a supine immorality all of its own".· 
Whatever the extent of the Kurds' presence in the world's conscience, they were 
soon displaced by the dramatic collapse of communist states across Eastern Europe, 
beginning in 1989, the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end. of the Cold 
War itself by the end of 1991. What would the corning of a new world order mean for 
the Kurds? 
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Perhaps~ hopefully, the post-Cold War world would bring an end to the Kurds' 
exploitation by foreign powers for their own geopolitical purposes and a genuine interest 
in resolving the Kurds' plight. For this section has demonstrated that throughout the 
Cold War this scenario was their lot: Use by foreign governments to weaken whichever 
regime was currently perceived as a threat. Again, this demonstrates an implicit 
recognition of the Kurds as a nation that could act as an internal power sink to 
destabilise opposition states. Once more this belies the conventional conflation of nation 
and state and the division between 'international' relations and domestic politics. 
The Kurds and the rogue state of Iraq, 1990 -
This section employs the new 'rogue state' doctrine to examine the Kurds in 
post-Cold War global scale geopolitics. The thesis is best represented in the writings of 
Michael Klare (1995a; 1995b), and essentially asserts that, with the demise of the Soviet 
Union and Washington's need to find another 'threatening other' to replace it, the United 
States identified a number of 'rogue states' as the new threat to global (read American)· 
security. Foremost among such ·states are those accused of sponsoring 'international' 
terrorism, for example Iran and Libya, and those suspected of actively but covertly 
pursuing nuclear weapons status, such as Iraq and North Korea. The 'rogue state' 
doctrine, while certainly not beyond contention because it is (as yet) impossible to regard 
it as 'defining' the new world order, does provide a useful geopolitical framework with 
which to examine the Kurds at the global scale in the post-Cold War era. 
The 'rogue state' doctrine is here applied to Iraq, for since the end of the Cold 
War it is Iraq that has achieved the dubious honour of being the quintessential 'rogue 
state'. Clearly, Iraq-as-rogue-state propels the Kurds of Iraq to the forefront of the 
Kurds role in 'international' politics from 1990. While the Kurds of Iraq have dominated 
at the global scale during this time, it is important to note - as I will where.necessary 
during this. section - that the Kurds of Iran and Turkey have also been affected. This 
interaction will demonstrate the interrelationships between global, Middle Eastern, and 
local politics. 
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The Gulf Crisis and War, August 1990- February 1991 
Iraq's first 'roguish' act came towards the very end of the Cold War, with its 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Baghdad 'legitimated' its attack on the grounds 
that Kuwait was Iraq's historical 'nineteenth province', and in retaliation to Kuwait 
City's refusal to slow oil production which would force oil prices up. Iraq desperately 
needed increased oil revenues to finance the reconstruction of its devastated 
infrastructure and economy in the wake of the eight year war with Iran. This essentially 
regional conflict assumed global crisis proportions through the 'rogue state' doctrine. 
For in March 1990, five months before the invasion, 
"a team of five hundred (United States) military specialists began 
working ... .to develop a detailed blueprint for a US- Iraq war in 
the Kuwait - Saudi Arabia area. Known as Operations Plan 1002-
90, the resulting document .... covered every aspect of a future 
conflict. The plan 'spelled out which (US) divisions would go to 
Saudi Arabia, what frequencies they would use, where they 
would get their water, how they would treat their casualties, and 
how they would handle the news media" (Klare 1995a:36). 
Thus Klare (1995b:625 - 26) claims, as the Pentagon itself admitted in 1992, that ''before 
a single soldier entered Kuwait, the basic concepts of Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm were established". 
Throughout the escalating diplomatic crisis which preceded the Gulf War, the 
Kurds attempted to present a united political face through the Independent Kurdistan 
Front (IKF). The policy was one of evenhandedness, the Kurds opting "for a position of 
neutrality in the dispute, condemning the (Iraqi) invasion though not actively supporting 
the allied response to it" (Bulloch and Morris 1992:8). This balanced stance resulted 
from two juxtaposed alternatives. On the one hand, this was perhaps an opportune time 
to negotiate a northern peace with Saddam, to leave Baghdad free to prepare for the 
increasingly likely conflict in the south. Moreover, given its rel~tive military weakness 
and the dire warning of Saddam's deputy, Izzat Ibrahim, who told the Kurds "If you 
have forgotten Halabja, I would like to remind you that we are ready to repeat the 
operation" (Quoted in McDowall1996:370), the IKF "did not want to give Saddam any 
excuse to launch a new wave of repression in the north on the grounds that the Kurds 
were siding with the enemy" (Bulloch and Morris 1992:8). But to deal with Saddam 
now, of course, would align the Kurds with Baghdad at the very moment Iraq was being 
cast as an international pariah, and would consequently endanger any coalition support 
I~! !i 
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that may be forthcoming. On the other hand, however, the IKF knew that "nothing could 
be more dangerous than for the Kurds openly to side with the US led coalition .... they 
longed for Saddam's discomfiture but feared open association with the West'~ 
(McDowall 1996:369). The Kurds, it seems, had learnt from their previous experiences 
ofWestern betrayaL 
With the outbreak of war on 17 January 1991 and the growing realisation of 
Iraq's imminent defeat, the coalition and especially the US began to consider what a 
post-war Iraq might look like. It was clear that the coalition was committed to the state's 
territorial integrity. For the disintegration of Iraq would undoubtedly involve a lengthy 
commitment of coalition forces, certainly far longer than the Gulf War deployment. 
Moreover, a power vacuum in Iraq would merely encourage Iran to seize the southern 
·· Shi'a Arab regions and the highly contested Shatt al-Arab waterway~ a possibility of 
special concern to Washington, the US particularly fearful of increased Iranian influence 
in the Gulf. Similarly, Turkey would undoubtedly be tempted to repossess the oil rich 
Mosul vilayet which it had begrudgingly conceded to Britain in 1925. The Kurds would 
be but another complicating factor in any remapping of state boundaries. But while the 
coalition was committed to Iraq's continued existence, it was also obvious that the US, 
in particular, desired the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
Hence on 15 February, still a fo~ght before the Gulf War ceasefire on 28 
February, President Bush (Quoted in Mayall1991:428) asserted that 
''There's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for 
the Iraqi military and the fraqi people to take matters into their 
own hands to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, 
and to comply with the United Nations and then rejoin the family 
of peace loving nations". 
Tills message and others like it were repeatedly broadcast into Iraq, in both Arabic and 
Kurdish, by the Voice of America and the Voice of Free Iraq, an Iraqi-opposition-in-
exile radio pperating out of Jedda, Saudi Arabia, and sponsored (at least at this time) by 
the US CIA (Entessar 1992:146; McDowalll996:373). 
Moreover, an IKF delegation had met with representatives of the British Foreign 
Office in London, and PUK leader Jalal Talabani was in Washington when the ceasefire 
came, attempting to met State Department officials. The Americans, however, were not 
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as receptive as the British, and Talabani was refused permission to visit the State 
Department itself Despite this diplomatic snub the IKF was optimistic of Western 
support for an uprising, and thus the political leadership "began to drop the cautious 
guard they had adopted throughout the crisis and started to plan for the final showdown 
with Saddam" (Bulloch and Morris 1992: 12). 
The Kurdish. rebellion and refugee crisis, March- Apri/1991 
Events within Kurdistan in Iraq, however, were moving much faster than the 
IKF. Inspired by the apparent propitiousness of the moment, with a defeated and 
vulnerable government in Baghdad and perceived coalition support, the Kurds began 
their latest nationalist rebellion. But this uprising was unlike their countless others of the 
past one hundred and more years; for it was initiated not by tribal aghas or shaykhs, nor 
by leaders of modem political parties, but by the general population itself As KDP leader 
Massoud Barzani himself admitted, "The uprising came from the people themselves, we 
did not expect it". Another spokesman similarly conceded that the IKF "merely followed 
the people onto the streets" (McDowall 1996:371). Indeed, O'Ballance (1996:185) 
summarises the rebellion as a "spontaneous outbreak of insurgency, which took Kurdish 
political leaders by surprise. As they were unable to stem it, ·they made capital, joined in, 
and swam with the insurgent tide". Undoubtedly this rebellion was clear evidence of a 
truly popular Kurdish nation(alism). 
The uprising began in the small town of Raniya on 4 March, when the civilian 
population, led by only a small number of peshmerga, attacked the Ba'ath Party's 
headquarters and seized control. From here the rebellion spread like wildfire. Within a 
fortnight the Kurds commanded more than 75 percent of Kurdistan in Iraq (Karadaghi 
1993:230), including major cities such as Arbil, Dohuk, Sulaymaniya, and Zakho. 
On 21 March peshmerga forces captured the oil rich City of Kirkuk, a highly 
symbolic event for two reasons. First, this was the first time in seventy years of almost 
continuous rebellion against Baghdad that the Kurds had gained full control of this vital 
city. Second, the fall of Kirkuk coincided with the New Ruz festival that welcomes the 
Kurdish new year; an entirely appropriate timing, for the successes of the rebellion itself 
seemed to be ushering in a new dawn of Kurdish nationalism. That image became even 
more real when the Kurds of the pro-government Kurdish Popular Army.- previously 
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ridiculed by the anti-Saddam Kurds, who called themjash, or 'little donkeys'- "defected 
almost to a man" ( 0 'Ballance 1996: 185), contributed greatly to the continuation of the 
revolt's momentum, and "were thus transformed from embarrassed ·collaborators with 
Baghdad into champions of the uprising" (McDowall 1996:371). Bulloch and Morris 
(1992:2) capture the poignancy of the moment: "(The Kurds) forgot the mournful adage 
which has so accurately reflected their plight: 'The Kurds have no friends but the 
mountains"'. 
Kurdish euphoria, however, was to be shortlived. Baghdad's elite Republican 
Guard had escaped the rout in Kuwait, and on 28 March began a vicious counterattack 
using assault helicopters, tanks, and heavy artillery. The lightly armed, predominantly 
civilian (and therefore with minimal training and experience), and poorly organised 
peshmerga stood little chance against the Arab onslaught. The brutality of the offensive 
was extreme, but certainly not unprecedented: Once again the Kurds were subject to 
massive bombardment, wholesale destruction of villages and towns, large scale and 
arbitrary arrest, detention, deportation, torture, and murder. Estimates of the number of 
Kurds, civilian and peshmerga alike, killed in Saddam' s retribution range from 20 000 
(McDowall 1996:373) to 30 000 (0 Tuathai11993:28). 
In the face of such severe tactics many peshmerga chose not to fight but to flee 
with their families ahead of the Republican Guard's advance. Even the citY ofKirkuk, the 
Kurds' "biggest prize", was given up without much of a fight: In fact, Kirkuk fell to 
government forces at the end of the third day of Baghdad's counterattack, "after little 
more than a week in rebel hands" (Bulloch and Morris 1992: 1). Other major cities and 
towns throughout Kurdistan in Iraq were also quickly recaptured, and the Kurdish 
rebellion collapsed, almost without resistance (O'Ballance 1996: 187). 
Realising they were now defenceless ag8inst a merciless Iraqi war machine, with 
the memory of Halabja still fresh in their minds, and Izzat Ibrahim's warning ringing in 
their ears, panic stricken Kurds fled their homes in a "mad stampede" (McDowall 
1996:373) towards the relative safety of Iran and Turkey. Although the Kurds' intense 
fear of renewed chemical weapons warfare was not realised, two million Kurds (Entessar 
1992:146; Karadaghl 1993:230; Van Hear 1993:69; see Map 5:3); nearly half the 
Kurdish population of Iraq, undertook the exceedingly dangerous journey through the 
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snow ·covered mountains of Kurdistan. For even though peshmerga forces were routed 
and the population was on the run, Baghdad relentlessly pursued the Kurds: 
"On the road to Turkey one journalist said he had seen nearly 
500 fugitives killed by phosphorous bombs dropped from 
helicopters: 'People are burned to death inside cars. Iraqi 
helicopters are bombing civilians without let up'. Similar scenes 
occurred on the roads to Iran" (McDowall1996:373). 
Ma 5:3 The Kurdish exodus from Ira 
KEY 
Republican Guard advance 
March 1991 Ill. Direction of Kurdish exodus 
Outgunned peshmerga units 
1500 000 
( 
e Baghdad 
·1 N Scale (Km) I A oE=' ====:=IC~..o·o~---~2oo 
Source: The Economist April- May 1991 and Buckley 1-994:9. 
For those Kurds that managed to avoid Iraqi air strikes there was a second deadly 
danger. With mountain roads and tracks congested with refugees, progress all but ground 
to a halt. The desolate Kurds, completely unprepared for the freezing cold, bitter winds, 
and the rain, sleet, and snow, were forced to camp along roadsides and on bare mountain 
slopes. The exposed Kurds suffered terribly, especially the young and the old among them. 
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Estimates on the number of deaths per day varied from a seemingly conservative 1 000 
(Buckley 1994:11) to an horrific 3 000 (Van Hear 1993:69). Whatever the exact figure, 
there was no doubt that the Kurdish refugee problem was becoming an unmitigated 
humanitarian disaster: A crisis superlatively described as "a refugee problem unlike 
-;--~-- -~----. /----. ,.-...:c:----·------ -- "' 
anything we've seen yet" (Coser 1991:322) and "a wretched plight" (The Economist 20 
April1991:12). 
Operation Provide Comfort 
The coalition's complicity in inspiring the rebellion meant that they were at best 
partially and at worst wholly responsible for the Kurds' desperate situation as of late 
March 1991. Coalition governments, however, were steadfast in their refusal to intervene 
militarily on behalf of the Kurds. (Howe 1991:325; Entessar 1992: 152). Washington and 
· London, reaffirming their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, claimed that the 
confrontation between the Kurds and Baghdad was a 'civil war'; as such it was an event 
completely ·under Iraq's domestic jurisdiction and not within the purview of 
'international' law (Shaw 1991:719 - 20). British Prime Minister John Major, for 
example, declared that ''What is going on in Iraq is disturbing and malignant. But it is 
also within the borders of Iraq and we have no international authority to interfere". 
Similarly, on 5 April President Bush asserted that "American lives are too precious for us 
to be sucked into a civil war" (Bulloch and Morris 1992:30). Three days later Secretary 
·of State James Baker reiterated the words of his President, insisting that that the US was 
"not prepared to go down the slippery slope of being sucked into a civil war" (The 
Economist 13 April 1991:43). Thus in early April 1991, as the Republican Guard 
inflicted a terrible punishment on the Kurds, precipitating "one of the biggest and fastest 
human migrations that has ever taken place" (Buckley 1994:11), the coalition was 
prepared to leave them to fend for themselves. 
But these governments faced a rising tide of public concern from·· their own 
domestic constituencies, which thought otherwise. Live on-the-spot television coverage 
of the unfolding Kurdish crisis portrayed the full horror of Baghdad's revenge: 
Harrowing images of harassed, homeless, and hungry Kurds camping on freezing, 
windswept, and wet mountainsides (Gowing 1991:111). Sympathetic Western audiences 
were outraged at their governments' attempts to wash their hands of the growing 
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tragedy and abandon the Kurds to their fate. In Britain The Independent newspaper 
epitomised public condemnation of the coalition's betrayal of the Kurds: 
"Mr Major, to his shame, says he cannot recall asking (the 
Kurds) 'to mount this particular insurrection', as though the 
revolt were a freakish event which had nothing to do with 
us .... The man (President Bush) who reportedly told the Central 
Intelligence Agency in January to provoke the Kurds into 
insurrection and preached rebellion during the Gulf War now acts 
like someone with a nasty bout of amnesia" (Quoted in 
McDowall1996:373). 
With the crisis deepening as a result of hundreds of thousands of Kurds pouring 
across the borders into Iran and Turkey, the Western public became the urllikely 
champions of the Kurdish cause (at least temporarily) and demanded their governments 
provide military protection and humanitarian relief to the Kurds. (The Economist 13 and 
20 Aprill991). This internal pressure was matched by pleas from Tehran and Ankara for 
international assistance in providing for, respectively, 1.5 million and 500 000 Kurdish 
refugees in western Iran and southeastern Turkey (Map 5:3). 
On 5 April the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, which condemned 
Iraqi repression of the Kurds, demanded the cessation of such actions, and called for 
Baghdad ·to allow humanitarian relief agencies into northern Iraq. The Resolution was 
important for a number of reason~. First, "it was the first to mention the Kurds by name, 
:_,,, •'--:-''< 
thus lifting their status 'internationally,. Second, "it was also the first time the United 
Nations had insisted on the right of interference in the internal affairs of a member state" 
(McDowall 1996:375). Third, and in terms of this thesis, Resolution 688 includes clear 
evidence of a . somewhat-more-than-implicit but not-quite-explicit recognition of the 
divergence between nationand state, and also of the interrelationship between local and 
global scale politics. That the conflict between the Kurds and Baghdad, through its 
resulting refugee crisis, resulted in a UN Security Council Resolution emphatically 
demonstrates that this was more than just a 'civil war'. 
In practical terms Resolution 688' s real importance came in its provision of the 
legal basis for humanitarian intervention to assist the Kurds. With the principle of non-
intervention thus circumvented (at least temporarily and on a small scale), the US 
Britain, France, and Holland responded to public criticism and launched Operation 
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Provide Comfort15• This exercise used coalition ground forces to establish a 'safe haven' 
in northern Iraq, where non-permanent refugee camps would be built and urgently 
needed shelter, food, and medicine would be provided to the Kurds. The location of the 
Kurdish safe haven (Map 5:4) reflected the coalition's desire to entice the refugees in 
Turkey back into Iraq, which Ankara had demanded so as·to reduce the likelihood of the 
" new immigrants inciting rebellion amongst Turkey's own restless Kurds. Successful US 
demands that all Iraqi forces b~ withdrawn south of the 36th Parallel and the imposition 
of a 'no-fly-zone' north of that line ensured the protection of not only the enclave but a 
substantial proportion of Kurdistan in Iraq (Map 5:4). International non-governmental 
humanitarian organisations, coordinated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), operated underneath and behind the coalition's cover. 
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'Operation Provide Comfort' was the British name for the mission, while the United States 
insisted on calling it 'Operation Poised Hammer'. 
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Operation Provide Comfort, belying the coalition's reluctance to become 
involved, proved a major success. After the 1KF and Baghdad announced a ceasefire on 
11 April, and the Iraqi government acquiesced to all UN and coalition demands a week 
later, Kurdish refugees in Iran and Turkey returned in droves to Iraq and the security of 
the safe haven and no-fly-zone. During short stays in coalition-run refugee camps within 
the safe haven, the refugees received food and medicine. Confident in the coalition 
ground and air presence, many Kurds then returned to whatever remained of their 
homes. As the civilians returned so too did the political leadership and the peshmerga 
who, with the Iraq army confined below the 36th Parallel, were able to reassert their 
control over the northern part of Kurdistan in Iraq (Map 5:4). But the rebellio~ the 
retributio~ and the refugee crisis had cost the Kurds dearly, and once again they could 
point to the geopolitical vagaries of global powers as at least partly responsible for their 
plight. 
Forward to peace or back to war? 
With Iraq's army effectively neutralised by coalition troops protecting the safe 
haven and Allied aircraft enforcing the no-fly-zone, the IKF was confident that a 
substantial and lasting autonomy agreement could be formulated with Baghdad. Thus 
within weeks of the Republican Guard chasing two million Kurds out of Kurdistan in 
Iraq, the Kurdish leadership was back at the negotiating table with Saddam Hussein, 
attempting to agree upon a new Kurdish Autonomy Region. 
By June 1991, however, "it was clear that the negotiations were grinding to a 
halt". The deterioration of the talks had as much to do with Kurdish infighting as 
"Saddam's foot-dragging style of negotiation, (McDowall 1996:377). The KDP - PUK 
rivalry once again surfaced, causing a serious split in the IKF. The major reason for the 
renewed tensions was that Jalal Talabani had indicated that if these negotiations failed 
the PUK was ready to resume their guerilla war. On the other 'hand Massoud Barzani 
·was against a return to war given the KDP's, and the Kurds' in general, losses of more 
than a decade of almost continuous war. Without a common negotiating position the 
IKF, and the talks with Baghdad, were in serious jeopardy. 
As negotiations began to stall Saddam Hussein contributed further to their 
eventual cancellation in August, by gradually imposing an economic blockade on the 
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Kurds through the establishment of a "fortified containing line across northern Iraq along 
the 36th Parallel" (O'Ballance 1996: 195). Vital food and fuel supplies were cut off, and 
again the Kurds began to suffer miserably, as they were effectively subjected to a double 
embargo with international economic sanctions still in force against Iraq. The blockade 
was only penetrated by small amounts of humanitarian relief brought in from Iran and 
Turkey. These supplies, however, were woefully inadequate and became extortionately 
expensive commodities on the black market. The KDP, in particular and much to the 
chagrin of the PUK, gained considerable income through its control of the only practical 
road border crossing from Turkey into Kurdistan in Iraq, where it was able to charge 
'import duties' and acquire significant quantities of the goods. 
Despite the crippling econonnc sanctions, the breakdown of autonomy 
negotiations, the growing KDP - PUK tension, and the withdrawal of the last coalition 
ground troops from the 'safe haven', control of which was handed over to the UNHCR 
and. other international non-governmental humanitarian organisations, the Kurds 
remained optimistic about the creation of a Kurdish Autonomous Region .. The greatest 
single source of this positive outlook was the holding of a Kurdish 'general election' on 
19 May 1992, which established in Arbil an unprecedented Kurdish National Assembly of 
105 seats. The KDP and PUK had 50 seats each, while the remaining five were shared 
between two minority parties16• The election of a Kurdish President was similarly 
declared a dead heat, and Barzani (48%) and T~~abani (45%) were appointed as joint 
heads of the IKF. Although the election was undoubtedly an "historic moment" 
(McDowall 1996:381), both of these results reflected the Kurds' division between the 
KDP and PUK camps. To some extent this rivalry was diluted by the non-involvement of 
Barzani and Talabani in the Kurdish parliament, but their personal competition continued 
nonetheless. 
In October 1992 fighting between PUK peshmerga and Iraqi forces broke out 
around Sulaymaniya just south of the 36th Parallel. By November this confrontation had 
spread to Arbil, and up to 200 000 Kurds were once more in flight towards the Iranian 
border (McDowalll996:378). These battles proved costly to Baghdad, who also feared 
that a continued ground operation north of the 36th Parallel, as Arbil is, would soon bring 
Hi The Assyrian Democratic Movement gained four seats, while a KDP surrogate, the Kurdistan 
Christian Unity Party, gained one seat. 
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a coalition response, and decided to withdraw from the fighting. Saddam Hussein, 
however, maintained the economic pressure, which achieved its objective of undermining 
the popularity of the Kurds' new government. Barzani himself was forced to admit that 
the IKF's "governing process is paralysed .... There is a crisis in the Kurdistan Front" 
(Quoted in McDowall1996:'379). 
As the harsh economic and difficult political conditions continued throughout 
1993 tensions between the KDP and the PUK began to increase. The tightrope snapped 
in May 1994, and the two parties descended into open conflict around the city of 
Rowanduz. McDowall (1996:386) estimates that over 1 000 peshmerga were killed, 70 
000 civilians fled their homes, and both the KDP and the PUK were guilty of executing 
prisoners. Although fighting between these two groups was not a new phenomenon, the 
entry into the conflict of a new Kurdish organisation, the Islamic Movement ofKurdistan 
(IMK), certainly was. The IMK was led by one Mulla Uthman Abdul Aziz, previously a 
pro-Government }ash commander but who had stood in the 1992 Presidential elections 
and gained a credible (given his background) four percent of the vote. The IMK was 
based around Mull Uthman's home city of Halabja, which was hitherto PUK territory, 
thus bringing these two groups into opposition. Indeed, the KDP and IMK cooperated in 
the fight against their mutual foe. This battle had died down by August, but flared again 
in December, "leaving 500 dead, thousands of civilians displaced from many towns, Arbil 
in the hands of the PUK, and the administration paralysed" (McDowal11996:387). 
This situation persisted throughout 1995 and well into this year. The cover 
provided by the coalition patrolled no-fly-zone has afforded the Kurds, despite 
occasional clashes, their greatest protection form the Iraqi army. This security, however, 
has been undermined by the Kurds' own internal animosities, especially between the 
Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Moreover, the 'double 
embargo' enforced on Kurdistan in Iraq has exacerbated these tensions and caused great 
suffering to the general population. But as the previous and the present chapter has 
shown, the Kurds are an optimistic and resilient people, and if they can overcome. their 
political differences- a big ask, I concede - and the coalition maintains the no-fly-zone, 
their dream of a Kurdish Autonomy Region in Kurdistan in Iraq may, finally, become a 
reality. The immediate future of the Kurds in Iraq, therefore, is not only in their own 
hands but also in those of the coalition governments and, perhaps, even the United 
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Nations, for so long as Iraq is treated as a 'rogue state' the Kurds will play a vital role in 
the g~opolitics of the Middle East in the post-Cold War world. Given the long history of 
foreign powers using the Kurds for their own geopolitical purposes, the safe haven and 
no-fly-zone should in no way be regarded, especially by the Kurds, as permanent - even 
in the short term - features of the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape. 
What has, unfortunately, remained constant in the post-Cold War world, 
however, is the exploitation of the Kurds by foreign governments for their own much 
broader geopolitical purposes. And again this in itself is an implicit, although now more 
explicit, recognition of the Kurds as a nation capable of acting as an internal counter 
against disliked and unwanted regimes .. Once again this demands the separation of nation 
from state and an expansion of the state centric approach of 'international' relations. 
· Moreover, the use of the Kurds as a local proxy to the global conflict equally 
emphatically illustrates the need for a relaxation of conflict research's division between 
'international' conflict and 'civil war'. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has seriously undermined 'intern~tional' relations' separation of its 
field of study from the 'domestic politics' of states. For the Kurds, despite their 
statelessness, have played a consistent and prominent role in the geopolitics of 
colonialism, Cold War, and esp~cially in the 'rogue state' doctrine as it has been applied 
to Iraq since the end of the Cold War. In turn, the presence of the Kurds, maybe not as a 
dominant actor but an actor nevertheless, on the world stage clearly illustrates that 
nations, even when they are not states, can be involved in 'international' relations. Both 
of these points reinforce the need to reconceptualise 'international' relations, and 
'international' conflict in particular, in a non-state centric manner that allows better, 
more fluid consideration of local and regional scale geopolitics. That the Kurdish conflict 
can be analysed at the global scale, and over the great majority of the twentieth century, 
is a substantial contradiction of state centric 'international' relations: A critical 
geopolitics indeed. 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
Nation(alism) and international conflict 
"(When the United Nations Charter was fonnulated) 
threats to peace were expected to sweep across state 
borders, not erupt within them .... The nation-state was 
supposed to be the basic .unit of international politics .. 
Yet since the end of the Cold War, the pent-up hatred 
and frustration of nationalist hatreds. have exploded, 
splitting the nation-state atom and sending shock waves 
across the international system". 
Peter Fromuth in The making of a security community: The 
United Nations after the Cold War (1993:344) 
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The Kurdish case study could conveniently end here, with a ·synthesis of the 
'current situation' of the main Kurdish parties in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. That is, Chapter 
Four illustrated that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continues, as it has done since 
1984, its terrorist-style campaign against the Turkish government. In response Allkara 
persists with its military suppression of the Kurdish guerillas and population. This Middle 
Eastern scale chapter also pointed to the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran's (KDPI) 
weakness after its costly involvement in the Persian Gulf War and the assassination of its 
strong and charismatic Secretary-General, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, in 1989. The 
global scale framework of Chapter Five enabled a better understanding of the 
contemporary status of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq than had this scenario been evaluated at the Middle Eastern 
scale. For the present state of affairs in Iraq is a direct result of global geopolitical 
. events, namely the Gulf War, the Kurdish rebellion, Baghdad's counterattack, and the 
refugee crisis. The creation of the safe haven and no-fly-zone has established a fragile, 
coalition monitored separation of Kurdish and Arab forces, but it has also seen a double 
economic embargo placed on Kurdistan in Iraq and inter - Kurdish fighting, especially 
between the KDP and PUK. 
But one must always be extremely wary when· dealing with case studies of 
political. instability, for events tend to unfold quickly, dramatically, and often 
unpredictably. Such caution is even more essential when dealing with the Middle East: A 
part of the world which is more volatile, spontaneous, sensational, and erratic than most. 
. ' 
And this has proved to be the case here, with major developments in the Kurdish 
situation in Iraq over the past two months1. These recent events are of the utmost · 
importance, no.t only for the Kurds and their future but also for this thesis, and are 
described and analysed here. These eventualities are also of extraordinary value because 
they./ simultaneously provide a more than useful temporal, empirical, and theoretical 
! 
means of concluding this thesis. 
The time ofwritingis late October 1996. 
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Another Kurdish crisis in Iraq, August- October 1996 
The latest developments in the Kurdish situation in Iraq were triggered in May of 
this year when the KDP and the PUK once again confronted each other militarily. The 
major issue of contention appears to have been which of the two parties controlled the de 
facto Kurdish enclave, remembering that the Kurdish National Assembly (KNA) was 
ineffective in asserting joint KDP- PUK authority. A second important sticking point, at 
least for the PUK, is the KDP's control of the vital supply routes into Kurdistan in Iraq 
from Turkey, which provides the KDP not only with income but also the power of 
distributing scarce resources. Given that the PUK's territorial stronghold is southern 
Kurdistan, and thus well removed from these entry points, few resources were reaching 
that far into Iraq. Initially the fighting was spasmodic and small scale, but gradually 
increased in intensity throughout the summer. 
This renewed KDP - PUK fighting is not in itself a 'new' development, merely a 
recurrence of a longstanding animosity between the two parties. This antagonism dates 
back to the PUK's split from the KDP in 1975, was evident during the Persian Gulf War, 
and was given new expression, as we saw in Chapter Five, following the 1991 Gulf War 
and its aftermath. By August, however, the open conflict was quickly becoming much 
more than just inter - party fighting, and was transforming into another Kurdish crisis in 
Iraq. 
KDP leader Massoud Barzani played a key role in the evolution, and escalation, 
of this conflict. In mid-August he accused the PUK of operating with Iranian military 
support, which both Jalal Talabani and Tehran denied. It does appear, however, that 
Iranian forces entered northern Iraq on the at least plausible argument of 'hot pursuit' of 
KDPI guerillas returning from cross-border attacks in Iran. It is a fine line between such 
chases and 'inadvertently' attacking KDP forces. Whatever the legitimacy of Barzani's 
accusation it was, in fact, quite ironic that he should lambast Talabani for accepting such 
support, for it will be remembered that the KDP enjoyed substantial financial and military 
support from Tehran, both during the Shah's reign (1961 - 75) and under Ayatollah 
Khomeini throughout the Persian GulfWar (1980- 88). 
Even more ironic than this criticism, however, was Barzani's appeal, in late 
August, to Saddam Hussein himself for military assistance in defeating the perceived 
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PUK - Iran coalition. Within days Iraqi ground forces crossed the 36th Parallel and 
gathered to the south of the de facto Kurdish capital of Arbil, then held by the PUK and 
home to the essentially defunct KNA. Despite warnings from Washington, London, and 
Paris, who had been alerted to Iraqi troop movements by satellite photographs, Saddam 
Hussein employed his forces in a joint operation with the KDP against the PUK in Arbil. 
After only a brief fight the city was captured on 31 August. This KDP - Baghdad 
cooperation was most certainly a new development in the recent history of Kurdish 
politics, although by no means is it unprecedented, recalling for example the KDP -
Baghdad alliance after the 195~ Revolution against nominally pro-monarchy Kurdish 
groups. 
Even though the attack lasted only a few hours and ceased as soon as Arbil was 
taken, the operation was a major boost for Saddam Hussein. For example, the Iraqi 
President announced his return to Kurdistan in Iraq and that Baghdad still possessed, or 
rather had rebuilt, the military capabilities to influence, if not determine, the medium to 
long term future of the Kurds in Iraq. In doing so Saddam also signalled to Tehran and 
Ankara that northern Iraq was still within his reach, so to deter continued raids into 
Kurdistan in Iraq by both Iranian and Turkish forces. Despite the no-fly-zone Saddam 
Hussein was back. 
The United States, however, was not amused. Iraq was once again portrayed by 
Washington as a 'rogue state', even though it was acting entirely within its borders. 
President Clinton claimed that Saddam Hussein's aggression was "not an action he could 
take without paying a price" (Quoted in McGeary 1996a:27). In the first week of 
September Washington exacted that price by launching 44 cruise missiles in two air 
strikes against military installations in southern Iraq. The no-fly-zone over southern Iraq 
was extended northward from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel. After some dithering Baghdad 
eventually withdrew its troops from north of the 36th Parallel, obviously fearing 
Washington's threats of"disproportionate retaliation" (Krauthamn1er 1996:40). 
Despite the US air strikes, which rather confusingly struck targets in southern 
Iraq, Saddam Hussein's venture beyond the 36th Parallel was "an impressive success" 
(Krauthammer 1996:40) in the ongoing contest with Washington. For the northward 
advance not only saw the c9llapse of the .safe haven (CNN News 11 September 1996), 
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but also wiped out a clandestine CIA operation in Kurdistan in Iraq. Fedarko (1996:19) 
explains that 
"For five years, the CIA has been running a modest mission to 
bind diverse factions of Kurdish and Iraqi (Arab) dissidents into 
an opposition against Saddam Hussein. With Baghdad's re-entry 
into northern Iraq, that mission was obliterated". 
Even the CIA director, John Deutch, was forced to concede that Saddam Hussein "had 
emerged from the latest confrontation 'politically stronger"' (The Guardian 29 
September 1996:10). Another US official asserted that "Our entire covert action 
programme has gone to hell" (Quoted inFedarko 1996:20). 
The withdrawal of both the US presence, which had helped to keep the Kurdish 
factions apart, and the Iraqi incursion meant that by October the KDP and PUK were 
once again able to engage in open fighting. In the eyes of the general population the KDP 
had lost considerable credibility in inviting Saddam Hussein back in. The PUK was able 
to recapture towns and territory lost through Baghdad's intervention. By mid- October 
the PUK had returned to the outskirts of Arbil. Barzani has once again threatened to call 
upon Saddam Hussein for assistance, while the PUK has once again operated with 
Iranian support (The Christchurch Press 26 October 1996: 14). The US, fearful of 
renewed Baghdad intervention and, even worse, a possible escalation involving large 
scale Iranian action, has launched a peace mission, headed by Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau, to resolve the KDP- PUK conflict. At 
the time of writing Pelletreau has successfully negotiated a ceasefire, which came into 
force on 24 October. This cessation of hostilities has enabled Pelletreau to set up a 
meeting between Barzani and Talabani, with the US envoy as mediator, to be held in 
Turkey in the first week in November (The Christchurch Press 26 October 1996: 14). 
So what do these latest events mean for the immediate future of the Kurds? I 
would make two points in answer to this highly important question. First, I believe that 
. while the KDP and PUK should welcome and enthusiastically support US mediation 
efforts- for these are undoubtedly in both parties' interests- this should be tempered by 
caution with regard to Washington's motives outside this role. Chapter Five 
demonstrated that throughout the periods of colonialism, Cold War, and the present 
'rogue state' doctrine the Kurds have been consistently exploited by foreign and 
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particularly Western governments for their own much broader geopolitical purposes. The 
covert CIA mission in Kurdistan in Iraq, although now disbanded (though probably only 
temporarily), serves to illustrate the likely continuance of such policies towards the 
Kurds. For that operation was clearly aimed not at establishing an organised, effective, 
autonomous Kurdish enclave but at destabilising the· Ba'ath regime and deposing 
Saddam Hussein (Fedarko 1996:18 - 20). On this count the Kurds should be doubly 
wary, for the US knows that "the splintering of a Saddam-less Iraq would leave Iran as 
the dominant Gulf power, an unpalatable solution (to Washington)" (Ogden 1996:21). 
For this reason Saddam Hussein still, ironically, fulfils a useful geopolitical role for the 
US by acting, as during the Persian Gulf War, as a bulwark against Iran. This double 
edged policy of limiting Baghdad's external military capab~ties but leaving Saddam 
strong enough to counter Tehran has become known as "dual containment" (The 
Guardian 29 September 1996: 10; McGeary 1996a:27). 
Moreover, the Kurds should be extra cautious re Washington's real motives for 
its air strikes: The magnitude of the US retaliation appeared to be a consequence of the 
new .crisis' timing, coinciding as it did with the height of the US Presidential election 
campaign. Firing a few missiles at Washington's favourite easy-target rogue state was a 
convenient and ideal means of for President Clinton to boost his re-election campaign, as 
his fitst-term Administration has often been criticised as lacking leadership, initiative, and 
strength on foreign policy issues. For the Kurds to perceive US military action as a 
safeguard against Baghdad aggression beyond election day, therefore, may prove to be a 
serious mistake. 
But the Kurds are caught between a rock and a hard place, for they correctly 
recognise that any kind of autonomy agreement with Baghdad - if and when they can 
overcome their own disagreements - will depend greatly on us guarantees. Given that it 
is likely that the US are using the Kurds as an internal counter against Saddam, 
Washington may, despite its current efforts, be reluctant to see a negotiated peace 
between the KDP/PUK and Baghdad come to fruition. That may sound overly cynical, 
but again history is instructive: Although supportive of the KDP against the Ba'athists in 
the 1970s and, as well as the PUK, against Saddam in 1991, it was ultimately proved in 
·both instances that Washington did not want the Kurds to prevail. Barzani has indicated 
that at least he is aware of these dangers, suggesting that the KDP is "still willing to 
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cooperate with America if it is really serious" (Quoted in Wilde 1996:27). I personally 
doubt that Washington is "really serious", at least not in the way Barzani is probably 
thinking. 
The possibility of an autonomy agreement for the Kurds in It:aq leads to my 
second point regarding the recent events and the Kurds' immediate future. And this is to 
suggest that the prospects for a Kurdish Autonomous Region in It:aq do, in fact, appear 
favourable. These are likely to increase the longer coalition governments continue 
patrolling the no-fly-zone and keep Saddam at arms length, even if the elbow bends 
occasionally, for this will allow more time for the KDP and PUK to reconcile· their 
differences and, hopefully, come to some kind of modus vivendi. One must concede, 
however, that there are a number of obstacles along the autonomy road, apart from the 
KDP - PUK rivalry and Saddam Hussein. For example, the Kurds are still suffering 
miserably from the effects of more than five years of double economic embargo. As long 
as these dual sanctions continue, so too will the PUK remain embittered at the KDP's 
control of the meagre resources that do make it into Kurdistan in Iraq. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of a KAR being established in Kurdistan in Iraq is 
good, certainly much better than the chances in Iran or Turkey. But this, in turn, presents 
its own problems for the Kurds. For if those in Iraq achieve some type of autonomy 
agreement, then this will undoubtedly inspire Kurds in Iran and Turkey into even more 
vociferous calls for their self-determination, for their own autonomous regions. The 
prospect of three contiguous KAR's would, of course, inevitably lead to Kurdish calls 
for each to secede and join in a unified, independent state of Kurdistan. As the first step 
in this direction the spectre of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is strongly resisted by both 
Tehran and Ankara, who in all probability would begin a new crackdown on their own 
dissident Kurdish groups, especially the PKK and KDPI. 
There is much at stake, therefore, in the November negotiations between the 
KDP and the PUK. The Kurds and their sympathisers must hope that Barzani and 
Talabani can put their own differences aside in the interest of the far greater cause of the 
Kurds in all three states, and not sacrifice another opportunity for some form of self-
determination at the alter of political egos. As Barzani himself has recently declared: 
''Hopelessness is a kind of death. We must always have hope, to the very last minute of 
154 
our lives, that things will work out for the Kurds" (QUoted in Wilde 1996:27). That 
working out begins next week. 
A second important question needs to be asked and answered in relation to these 
recent events: What do they mean in the context of this thesis? Several pertinent 
comments are insightful in this regard. During the course of this research it has been 
suggested, by a number of colleagues on more than one occasion, that Kurdish rivalries 
and infighting do not merely detract from the idea of a single, unified Kurdish nation but 
actually necessitates the rejection of the Kurds as such an individual political community. 
I have thought long and hard about this problem, and have come up with the following 
response. I accept that Kurdish factionalism does indeed make the concept of Kurdish · 
nation(alism) problematic, but I do not believe that it demands the outright dismissal of 
i 
the proposition. On the contrary, I think their divisiveness and antagonisms actually 
contributes to making Kurdish nation(alism) distinctive and unique. I make this assertion 
for three reasons. First, the current inter-party rivalries can be seen as a throwback to the 
tribal area, for as illustrated in Chapter Four internal divisions and conflict have 
characterised Kurdish political history for centuries. Second, it must be emphasised that 
Kurdish divisions are not entirely of their own making: They are just as much a result of 
the Kurds' partition into so many states and the decades, even centuries, old divide and 
rule policies of Tehran, Baghdad, and Ankara. Given the highly militarised situation in 
and around Kurdistan, it is hardly surprising that inter-Kurdish hostilities often and easily 
descend into armed warfare. Third, and perhaps most simply yet powerfully, it is crucial 
to remember that Kurdish inter-party conflict is not about their existence or otherwise as 
a nation. Rather, the conflict is over what that nation(alism) means and how to best fulfil 
it. in terms of national self-determination. The KDP, for example, argues for autonomy 
within a federal Iraq, while the PUK maintains a policy of outright secession and 
independent statehood. On these grounds, therefore, I do not perceive the recent (and 
current) intra-Kurdish fighting as in any way de-legitimising their claim to nationhood; it 
may complicate Kurdish nation(alism) and hinder progress to self-determinatipn, but in 
no way does it undermine their nation status. 
But in terms of this thesis undoubtedly the most telling facet of the recent drama 
was the consistent referral in the media to the fighting between the KDP and the PtJK as 
a 'civil war'. Even former US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger referred to 
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Baghdad's intervention as "supporting one side in a civil war between two Kurdish 
factions" (CNN News 5 September 1996). This description is a crucial point of 
immeasurable importance, for if Kurd against Kurd constitutes a 'civil war' then what, 
pray. tell, is Kurd against Arab? Or, for that matter, Kurd against Persian and Kurd 
against Turk? Under conflict research's state-centric categorisation, both situations 
would be classed as 'civil war'. But to suggest that these two fundamentally different 
conflicts are of the same genre stretches credulity beyond breaking point. On the other 
hand, under conflict research's interpretation Kurd against Persian/Arab/Turk is not an 
'international' conflict because, as we know, the Kurds do not live in their own 'nation-
state' This dilemma simply yet effectively demonstrates the need, no, demand, for a 
reconceptualisation of what is 'civil war' and what is 'international' conflict. I believe 
that my argument for consideration of an inter-nation-al conflict both overcomes this 
categorisation problem and is indeed vindicated by the. reference to intra-Kurdish conflict 
as 'civil war'. 
A third vital point emerged from the recent events: The extraordinarily quick, 
almost instantaneous, escalation of events from the local (the KDP - PUK conflict), to 
the Middle Eastern (Baghdad's intervention), to the global (US air strikes) scale; and 
back to the Middle Eastern (Baghdad's withdrawal), and down again to the local 
(renewed KDP- PUK fighting) scale. This rapid transition once again demonstrates that 
local, Middle Eastern, and global geopolitics are highly dependent upon each other, and 
in both directions. To use the 'nation-state' as a "container" (Taylor 1994) as 
international relations and conflict research do, therefore, is to draw an arbitrary division 
along this local - Middle Eastern - global continuum. For how are we to understand 
Middle Eastern geopolitics, for example, if local geopolitics are excluded from analysis? 
Clearly, this categorisation is absurd and there is obviously a need, no, demand, to move 
"beyond containers" (Taylor 1995), to go past the 'nation-state' and reconceptualise and 
remap both international relations in general and international conflict in particular. 
Nation(alism) and international conflict 
This thesis has been an attempt to write just such a 'critical geopolitics' of, 
specifically, 'international' conflict. The need for making such a critique arose from 
conflict research's division .between 'civil war' and 'international' conflict in simple 
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accordance with nation-state boundaries, which reflected its state-centric geopolitical 
discourse. As demonstrated in Chapter One, however, the nation-state was shown, 
because of its empirical infrequency, to be an inappropriate unit of analysis. Rather, I 
proposed the concept of nation, regardless of whether they were states or not, as a more 
appropriate means of mapping global political space because it is the nation, as a distinct, 
separate, and unique political community, that is the ultimate focus of individual and 
collective loyalty. I then argued that such a cartography would enable a nation-centric, 
rather than the conventional state-centric, conceptualisation of conflict between nations, 
as inter-nation-al conflict, with the belief that such an approach would better take 
account of: and indeed explain, local political geographies. Thus general argument was 
fleshed out during the course of this thesis. 
Chapter Two began by undertaking an extensive literature revtew on the 
contemporary conceptualisation of nation and nationalism. Such an understanding was 
essential given that I was attempting to undo the traditional conflation of nation and state 
in international relations/conflict research. The nation was indeed shown to be a distinct, 
separate, and unique political community, formed around ties of territory and resources, 
ethnicity and culture, and historical geography, that js created by and perpetuates the 
political doctrine of nationalism which seeks fulfilment of the nation through the 
achievement of national self-determination. It is nationalism, therefore, that is both the 
impetus behind and the result of nation-formation, hency the idea of nation(alism). The 
political doctrine of nationalism is also what links the nation to the state. Two distinct 
types of nation( alism), those with states, or official nation( alism), and those without 
states, or ethnic nation(alism), were identified and explained. It was also outlined how 
conflict between nations, whether ethnic or official, is a likely occurrence in a world in 
which all territory comes under the jurisdiction of one or another state. This non-state 
centric approach enabled a reconceptualised, nation-centric inter.;nation-al conflict to be 
·proposed. Chapter Two concluded by linking this review of nation(alism) studies to the 
Kurdish cas.e study which followed. 
Chapter Three began the overtly empirical argument by providing a local scale 
regional geography of Kurdistan. This discussion introduced the place, which illustrated 
the territory and resources of the Kurdish nation, the people, which examined the 
ethnicity and culture of the Kurds, and the partition of the Kurds and . Kurdistan, the 
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single most important dimension of the Kurdish nation's historical geography. 
Collectively these three sections demonstrated the spatial divergence between nation and 
state and the sociocultural differences between the Kurdish ethnic nation and the Persian, 
Arab, and Turkish official nations. The chapter concluded by identifying three sources of 
conflict between the Kurds and Persians, Arabs, and Turks. 
Chapter Four increased the scale of analysis to the Middle East, and traced the 
evolution of Kurdish nation( alism) from its early beginnings in the nineteenth century to 
the mass phenomenon of the past two generations. This charting was achieved by 
examining the development of the actual conflict between Kurds · and 
Persians/ Arabs/Turks, from the small scale tribal rebellions of amirs, aghas, and shaykhs 
to the large scale multi-party rebellions ·of modem political leaders. This discussion 
emphatically demonstrated the diametrical opposition of nation and state, and therefore 
the validity of conceptualising conflict between nations, again regardless of whether they 
are ethnic or official nations, as inter-nation-al conflict, for this is significantly more than 
just a 'civil war'. 
Chapter Five analysed the role of Kurdish nation(alism) at the global scale. I 
argued that the Kurds have consistently been recognised by governments foreign to the 
Middle East as a distinct political community and as such have exploited them during the 
periods of colonialism, Cold War, and the present rogue state doctrine, for their own 
much broader geopolitical purposes. This recognition and exploitation is an implicit 
acknowledgment of the critical difference between nation and state. Chapter Five also 
illustrated the links between global, Middle Eastern, and local geopolitics. 
In conclusion, then, this thesis has argued conflict research's state-centric 
approach to examining 'international' conflict is too rigid and restrictive an epistemology 
because nations, even when they are not states, can be involved in conflicts that are 
much more than mere 'civil wars', in character and in importance. This thesis has 
demonstrated one such example of an international conflict. The question now, perhaps, 
is to identify just how many other Kurdistan's are there are, so as to force a much needed 
revision of conflict research's approach to this crucial aspect of international relations. 
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